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This thesis examines modernist short fiction in English from the 1 890s to the
1980s, with particular reference to works by James Joyce, Ernest Hemingway,
Samuel Beckett and Donald Barthelme. The term 'interrogative' is evolved in the
course of the study to describe the relationship of the reader and of interpretative
discourse to the form. It is argued that the modernist story is marked by
indeterminacy and a resistance to teleological structuration as a result of its
narrative strategies of ellipsis, reticence and interdiction. Unlike those existing
theories which emphasize 'unity' or 'ambiguity' in the short story, the
interrogative approach takes as its starting point a post-Saussurean definition of
language as differential and plunsignificant and uses this to demonstrate the
form's constitutional resistance to determinate critical exegesis.Contents
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Stopping Short
Robert Coover's 'Klee Dead' is a story with a disappointing ending. The
narrator admits as much. 'I'm sorry,' he says. 'What can I say? Even I had
expected more. You are right to be angry' (1971, 111). He can give us no
plausible explanation for the poor eponymous clerk's death by jumping from a
high place. Even the putative suicide note turns out to be of uncertain legibility
and authorship, and it is written in the third person to boot. In fact, uncertainty
surrounds the significance of all the main events of the story, yet the narrator is
unwilling (unable, he would say) to exercise authority and answer the questions
his narrative is prompting us to ask:
Your questions, friend, are foolish, disease of the western mind.
On the other hand, if you wish to assume a cause-and-effect
relationship—that he is dead because he jumped from a high
place—well, you are free to do so, I confess it has occurred to me
more than once and has colored my whole narration. (ihid, O6)
He knows what we are looking for as readers, what we expect, what laws govern
our logic and our percipience. But if we want to determine consequence and
motivation in Klee's story, we will have to do so unilaterally, speculatively,
without collusion or validation from the text.
Coover's 'narratorial interdictiveness is, of course, a familiar strategy
within postmodernist metafiction. However, we might also consider that this
resistance to sense-making form and interpretative certainty belongs equally to
the genre in which Coover is working—short fiction. Cutting across the text's
postmodernist identity is its attachment to the modernist short form. Read
against this, alternative glossary, 'KIee Dead"s explicit interdictions and
withholdings merely voice techniques and devices that have governed
experimental short fiction throughout this century. For the reader schooled in
that form, Coover' s narratoria[ recalcitrance is a familiar posture, particularly in
5the way in which it both elevates the reader's role—prompting his co-productive
speculations—and yet occludes that material which would allow him to make a
determinate reading.
In this thesis I will be concerned with the trajectory within short fiction to
which Coover's text can be shown to have some critical attachment. I have
already used the conveniently vague terms 'modernist' and 'experimental'
above, but I want to propose in the course of this introduction that 'interrogative'
not only better encapsulates the formal procedures of this variety of short fiction
but also entails a post-Saussurean acknowledgement of language as differential
and plurisignificant.
It may seem strange to insist on this latter point so late in the day.
However, within short fiction theory there has been scant willingness to engage
with the consequences of poststructuralist thought. The major textbooks on the
genre show either strong structuralist leanings (e.g. Lohafer 1983; Lohafer and
Clarey 1989; Gerlach 1985; May 1994) or deliberately confine their critical
approach to the consideration of 'unity' (Hanson 1985) or 'ambiguity' (Head
1992). It should not be thought, however, that the impetus for my study is
simply a desire to move on from structuralism to poststructuralism, as though
that were the inevitable 'next step'. Rather, it is that the existing approaches
strike me as inadequate when tested against the stories themselves. By dint of
their narrative strategies, interrogative short fictions generate plurality and
indeterminacy. In readings which strive after 'structure', 'unity', 'ambiguity',
there is a tendency to suppress such effects by eliding the disruption caused by
the form's interstices, reticences and interdictions. Many critics see it as their
task to supply by inference or speculation that which the texts themselves
withhold. Itis as though the short form requires always an explicatory gloss to
make meaning from its restricted articulations. The tendency is to treat the form,
in Beckett's suggestive formulation, as a 'partial object' requiring fulfilment by
6the reader, rather than as a '[t}otal object, complete with missing parts' (1965,
101). My theory of interrogative short fiction, as I will develop it below,
endeavours to expose the shortcomings of existing approaches largely by
revealing how the texts in question elude the determinations they would seek to
make. It is a theory which sets out to validate the plural constitution of the form,
to account for its silences, to treat its shortness as a positive quality rather than as
an interpretative hindrance.
To begin with, the easiest way to elucidate this term 'interrogative' is by
contrast with existing theories and terminologies. The species of short fiction I
am looking at has been variously labelled 'modern', 'modernist', 'impressionist',
'Chekhovian', 'plotless', 'lyric', 'elliptical', 'open', 'epiphanic', 'dialogic'.
Where these definitions agree is in relation to the status of plot and action, which
is generally markedly de-emphasised or displaced in such stories. Typically
these fictions will be elliptical, both in the sense that they may delete elements in
their diegeses, and that they will often occlude any omniscient or authoritative
narratorial perspective.
Eileen Baldeshwiler, in her definition of the form, contrasts its 'lyric'
nature, which 'concentrates on internal changes, moods, and feelings', with the
'epical' type of story which is 'marked by external action developed
"syllogistically" through characters fabricated mainly to forward plot' (1994,
231). Whereas the 'epical' form will 'culminat[e] in a decisive ending', 'lyric'
stories, by comparison, will tend to conclude evocatively or figuratively (ibid).
Baldeshwiler's trajectory of the 'lyric' story includes Turgenev, Chekhov,
Mansfield, Woolf and Eudora Welty, all of whose works convey complex shifts
in mood and meaning through highly inferential, unemphatic surface structures
of plot and action.
Of interest to me in Baldeshwiler' s taxonomy is that despite hinting that
'lyric' stories may possess a quality of indecisiveness, particularly because of
7their tendency to be open-ended, she is ultimately able to overcome these poetic
or figurative hindrances and locate with certainty each story's 'emerging
emotion'—that unifying condition to which 'all other narrative elements must be
subordinated' (ibid. 239). It is as though the uncertainties generated by the
elliptical or markedly figurative narrative strategies are temporary only and can
be normalized by the thoughtful reader. On that basis, the distinction between
the highly resolute plot-motivated form with its climactic act of (dis)closure and
the impressionistic 'lyric' form would appear to be a difference of manner rather
than of kind. Whereas the former leads towards a revelatory end-point in its
action—a 'reasoned resolution' (ibid. 234)—the latter contains an equivalent
teleological impulse at the level of character motivation or feeling—that
'emerging emotion' or 'closing cadence' (ibid) to which everything in the
narrative tends. Despite their differences, both forms, according to
Baldeshwiler, nevertheless resolve: one in soft-focus, the other in a harsh light.
Baldeshwiler's essay highlights two common and related strands in
criticism of modernist or 'lyric' short fiction: one is the elevation in importance
of the reader's co-productive role: he is called upon to discern and articulate the
deep-laid patterns of meaning that the text does not make explicit. The other is
the determination that the text be determinable, that whatever the interstices or
opacities in its language or structure an explicatory locus exists on some level
which we as readers can attain.
Suzanne Ferguson in a more recent essay also discusses the augmentation
of the reader's sphere of influence, and, like Baldeshwiler, is interested in how
the text's occiusiveness and reticence can be compensated for by the
perspicacious reader. Ferguson argues that when we read 'elliptical' stones—
that is, stories that omit material which we require to process them
satisfactorily—we nevertheless readily construct 'hypothetical plots' that allow
us to 'explain' the interstitial text:
8The sense of a double plot in all such stories is strong, we
recognize a story that has not been fully told lying behind the one
that is told. Reading the stories, we become detectives, piecing
together the main elements of the hypothetical plots in order to
rationalize the actual plots (1994, 223)
As an example of this process Ferguson offers an analysis of Joyce's 'Clay'. I
deal with this story at length in chapter 2, but for now I would simply point out
some shortcomings in Ferguson's 'hypothetical' approach to the text. She states
that 'the parts of the hypothetical plot that are omitted are represented
metonymically by the episodes Joyce has written' (bid, 222). In other words, if
we scrutinize what 'parts' Joyce gives us it will be possible to reconstruct the
remainder of the 'whole'. What this theory does not allow for is the possibility
that those parts which have been written will be so gap-ridden, complex and
indeterminate that the reconstruction of some putative 'complete' story will
simply not be possible.
Constructing the hypothetical plot of 'Clay' is, according to Ferguson,
the means by which we can answer a question like 'Who is Maria?' (lb/ar). The
narrative itself does not supply sufficient information to answer this question, so
we infer a hypothetical story beginning with the time when Maria 'had a
"home" in which she was 'relatively happy' and how this contrasts with her
'desolation' now the family has placed her at the laundry (ibid). But even this
seemingly innocuous construction proves very difficult to sustain against Joyce's
textual practice. The technique of free indirect discourse through which Maria is
presented precludes the possibility of making a determinate summary of her
character and the extent of her awareness of herself and her status in relation to
her workmates and the family. For instance, when we read in the story that
'Everyone was so fond of Maria', it is possible that this expresses a generally
held opinion, of Maria, expressed by her workmates perhaps, in which case we
must decide (and, of course, we can't) whether it conveys, say, tolerance,
sarcasm or sympathetic indulgence. It is equally possible, however, that this line
conveys, through indirect thought, Maria's appropriation of something that has
9been said to her (her discourse is riddled with things other people have said).
Again, we cannot know in what sense it may have originally been meant, and so
we cannot judge the validity of Maria's appropriation of it. The free indirect
discourse also allows for the possibility that Maria is projecting a sense of
herself here as charmingly inoffensive, an image she seems to cultivate
elsewhere in the stoly, for instance when she is looking at herself in the mirror.
If that is so, then a reading of Maria emerges in which she is entirely conscious
of her own status and the impressions she gives, and far from the pitiable
benighted figure Ferguson describes. Alternatively, we might read this line as a
narratonal judgement of Maria. If so, then we would again have to consider
whether it is meant ironically or pitifully or literally. Indeed, the statement
'Everyone was so fond of Maria' could be all of these things at once, and more.
In truth, we cannot be sure from whom it emanates or what the quality of its
sentiment is.
On the matter of omissions in the story, Ferguson's argument that these
can be filled in with reference to the 'hypothetical' explanatory plot is equally
suspect when applied to actual omissions or withholdings in the text. For
example, the story ends with the incomplete 'text' of Maria's song. The song
she sings comes from Balfe' s opera The Bohemian Girl and the verse that she
omits concerns the wooing of a suitor. This omission leads us back to the man
on the Drumcondra tram whose appearance she elaborated (he would seem to be
a corpulent drunk) and whose advances (if that is what they were) she favoured
with the demure nods and looks she gives to the family. Perhaps this is the
reason for her awkward blushing. Joe takes her omission of this verse as an
understandable error, but it might equally suggest a well-developed awareness
on Maria's part of the impression she conveys and the effect her manner can
have. Our uncertainties over the reason for the omission multiply when we
consider the verse she does sing, which in Balfe's opera is performed by an
10abducted princess who despite being brought up by gypsies is still haunted by
dreams of her former nobility. Throughout 'Clay' there is the suggestion that
Maria considers herself superior to the other women in the laundry, to
Protestants, and even to the cake shop girl. Once again, we have to consider
Maria's intense self-consciousness and protested delicacy as knowing,
manipulative gestures. Given the manner of presentation, however, there is no
way to negotiate securely between these readings.
Ferguson concludes her analysis by suggesting that Maria is finally
'consoled by the appreciation of her wishful song' (1994, 222), supposedly for
her humiliation in the blindfold game. For a start, however, the narrative makes
no mention of how Maria reacts to the children's trick or how she feels about the
reception of the song; and this is crucial, because were consolation signalled then
this would privilege the reading of Maria's character that Ferguson is putting
forward. As it is, Joyce's narrator remains scrupulously impercipient of Maria's
reaction, as he does, indeed, of the family's response. Joe, we are told, is moved,
but by what? By pity for Maria? By the sentiment of the song? By the melody
or the singing? The narrative puts on its own blindfold at the end, suppressing
analysis of Joe's reaction so that we cannot look to his experience of Maria to
confirm any one reading of her.
Ferguson's desire to raise an explicatory hypothetical reading of 'Clay'
represents a failure, I would suggest, to validate the text's cultivated
indeterminacy. However, her approach is in many ways typical of the criticism
of the short form. The 'hypothetical plots' theory formulates the tendency to
seek out cohesive and determinate readings of texts in spite of their occlusions,
reticences or interdictions. It is as though the text represents a puzzle missing a
piece and it is the reader's job to supply that piece. The role of the reader is
indeed elevated in such criticism, but in such a way as to suggest that his role
can only be to fill gaps and provide explanations of all that the text has neglected
11to say. In other words, there seems to be a reluctance to credit indeterminacy, to
acknowledge the plural constitution of the form.
For many critics, 'unity' is the watchword, the job description, when
reading elliptical short fiction. Rohrberger and Bums, in their reading of 'Clay',
argue that at the end 'the elements of the story fall together in the reader's mind
to form a coherent whole.. .For full satisfaction the reader must make an effort to
see the story as a unified whole' (1982, 10). Clare Hanson, similarly, sees the
Joycean epiphany as 'a structural equivalent for conventional resolution of plot'
(1985, 7), which apparently means that the kind of unified closure achieved in
plot-motivated stories is also evident in modernist fictions with the readily
recuperable difference that whereas the former deals in resolutions of external
action, the latter is concerned with providing "objective correlatives" for
abstract states of mind or feeling' (ibid. Again, there is a reluctance to admit
that the narrative strategies employed in the form may preclude interpretative
norms such as 'unity' and 'resolution'.
All of these critics treat elliptical short fictions as though their interstices
and interdictions were there to be overcome rather than indulged. Beckett's
distinction between the 'partial object' and the '[t]otal object, complete with
missing parts' sums up the situation perfectly: our critics here, and the many like
them whose readings I will address in the course of subsequent chapters, would
appear to view the modernist short story as a 'partial object' requiring
explicatory fulfilment by the reader. This is not to say that they are unconscious
of the special effects of the form. Clare Hanson, in particular, is alert to the
techniques of 'deletion' and free indirect discourse. However, she does not
allow her acknowledgement of the disunifying effects of these devices to disrupt
the thematic Integrity she perceives in the stories. So, she claims that deletions
function in Joyce's texts 'to enhance our sense of the "unknowability" of human
character and experience' (1985, 59), while the eschewal of omniscient narration
12means that Joyce must direct matters 'in more covert ways. ..through
juxtapositions of characters, events, images and thought patterns' (ibid. 63). The
reader's elevated role in relation to these stories is a matter of perspicacity, of his
needing to look harder to perceive the texts' redoubtable coherence and unity.
It is curious that the greater demands elliptical texts unquestionably make
on their readers should not entail any corresponding anxiety among these critics
over the act of interpretation. Quite the reverse would seem to have been the
experience of Roland Barthes for whom any intensification of the plurality of a
text meant the retreat from what he termed (in 'The Death of the Author')
'theological' interpretation (1977, 147). For Barthes, those texts which were
'less parsimonious' with their plurality (1990, 6), which made the reader a
'producer' rather than a 'consumer' of meaning (ibid. 4), were by definition less
susceptible to determinate readings; what they demanded was not a increased
effort towards decipherment, but a lust to disentangle, endlessly, excitedly,
provisionally (1977, 147).
My theory of interrogative short fiction takes as its starting point
Barthes's injunction that 'To interpret a text is not to give it a (more or less
justified, more or less free) meaning, but on the contrary to appreciate what
plural constitutes it' (1990, 5). The value of Barthes's approach in relation to
the short from is first of all that it does not seek to explain away or recuperate
ellipses, interstices, withholdings, reticences, interdictions, but instead
recognizes how these phenomena affect the economy of meaning in a text. In
other words, the Barthesian reader's relation to the text is interrogative rather
than declarative. The kind of short fiction I will be concerned with throughout
this thesis is intensely plural as a result of its narrative strategies; what Barthes's
approach offers is a way of validating that plurality as the aesthetic—the
operative principle—of the form. This validation does not involve the reader in
any repressive imposition of meaning, but rather defines the form in terms of its
13active resistance to determinate discourses of all kinds—including the reader's.
The term 'interrogative' encapsulates both sides of the textual transaction: on the
one hand, the plurality that arises from certain narrative strategies, and on the
other, the reader's implication in that plurality. In existing theories of the
form—modernist, elliptical, lyric, impressionist—the emphasis has been very
much supply-side, concentrating on how writers achieve their complex effects
while allowing the interpretative discourse to remain relatively undisturbed. The
interrogative theory attempts to show how these short fictions undermine the
security of that discourse.
Efforts have been made in this direction before, most notably by Dominic
Head whose book The Modernist Short Story (1992) takes issue with the
dominant 'unity aesthetic' in short story criticism. Head argues that the form is
in fact marked by a 'cultivated disunity' (1992, 20) in its narrative techniques,
and in his chapter on Joyce especially he challenges the idea of the epiphany as a
point of structural resolution. The limitation of Head's study, for me, lies in his
resistance to any suggestion that the form might be productive of indeterminacy
or undecidability. Instead, he argues, 'specific kinds of ambiguity are examined
in specific ways' (ibid. 14), a claim which restricts his analysis to a kind of
supply-side hermeneutics. I shall deal in detail with the shortcomings of this
ambiguity theory in chapter 2, but for now I would simply take issue with
Head's opposition to a principle of indeterminacy. In his introduction he bases
his argument against indeterminacy readings on a somewhat unrepresentative
example, namely Frank Kermode's reading (in The Genesis of Secrecy) of
Kafka's 'Before the Law'. Kermode's point, according to Head, is that 'the man
in the parable, denied access to the Law, is comparable to the reader of any
parable' faced with the ultimate insufficiency of all interpretative glosses (lb Ed,
15). Head's counterpoint is that Kafka's parable is quite determinately and
decidably about something, namely the "uninterpretable" nature of 'Before the
14Law" (ibid). He suggests that the parable is 'in certain ways, a representative
modernist short fiction' (ibid) but does not specify in what 'ways' it is so. And
herein lies the problem: Kafka's text is, as Head states, a parable. It may be
'representative' of modernist short fiction but that is very different from saying
that it is a modernist short fiction. I would agree that Kafka's text can be read as
a parable about indeterminacy, but that is not the same as saying that it is
indeterminate. Head's justification for denying the principle of indeterminacy is
based, I would suggest, on a false analogy.
Nevertheless, Head's book is both innovative and important and has
prompted many of the theoretical questions I will seek to address in the course of
this thesis. As mentioned above, his work on the epiphany is particularly
significant as it offers a fundamental revision of what is for many the defining
characteristic of the twentieth-century short story. Head's dialogic approach
recasts the epiphany as a site of dissonance and ambiguity rather than of
impressionistic or figurative resolution. Although he disdains the 'idea of the
story as an end-oriented totality' (1992, 14), his emphasis on the epiphany
nevertheless responds to the widespread interest among short story critics in the
moment of closure. Indeed, for many it is the nature of the termination that
defines the form, as Susan Lohafer describes: 'Looking for a foothold, a vantage
point from which the short story might make a unique and serious claim on
theory, critics seized upon its one clear distinction from the novel: its shorter
span, its foregrounded "end" (Lohafer and Clarey 1989, 110).
In all the theories mentioned above—'lyric', 'impressionist', 'elliptical',
'modernist', 'open'—some complication at the moment of closure, some
diffusion of impact, is of defining importance; it is at this point that the form
most obviously differs from the plot-motivated variety with its conspicuous act
of disclosure and resolution. John Gerlach has used this interest in endings as a
theoretical basis for his extensive survey of the American short story. Gerlach
15comments on how, after Poe's essay 'The Philosophy of Composition' and his
reviews of Hawthorne's Twice-Told Tales, stories 'began to fall into patterns
based on how they were structured in relation to the ending' (1985, 3). Gerlach
sees the shift to more 'open' or irresolute endings as part of modernism's
recognition that 'causality and narrative restricted fiction by falsifying its view
of life' (ibid), clearly echoing Virginia Woolf's appeal in 'Modern Fiction' for a
more 'real' realism and an abandonment of the well-made novel's artificial and
meretricious structures.
The weakness in Gerlach's study, however, is that his readings fail to
recognize the extent of the modernist story's attack on the falsifications of
narrative and causality. He notes how at the point of closure writers 'strove to
give the impression of lack of resolution' (ibid; my emphasis). This is different
from saying that there is anything actually irresolute about their stories; like
Head and his theory of ambiguity, Gerlach seems to want to impose his own
quota on the extent of texts' indeterminacy. So, for example, in his reading of
Hemingway's 'Cat in the Rain', he notes the uncertainty created by the fact that
the cat delivered to the couple's room at the end of the story is not necessarily
the cat the young woman saw out in the rain. But he concludes that in the end
this does not matter very much as the real point of the story is the young
woman's restlessness in her relationships with the men in the story. 'The actual
cat is not going to be what she expected,' Gerlach writes, 'no cat would bring her
the satisfaction she wants' (ibid. 113). How does he know this? His reading is
necessarily speculative here. Rather than pursue the consequences for the text of
the interdictive refusal to clarify which cat she has been given or indeed where
the thematic centre of the story (if there is one) lies, Gerlach grants the story a
determinate meaning it simply does not warrant.
The restrictiveness of Gerlach' s approach arises from his conviction that
there is an 'underlying narrative grid that... each reader applies to any story and
16that every writer depends on the reader knowing' (ibid, 6). As with Ferguson's
theory of the 'hypothetical plot', the claim is that there exists always a cogent,
complete story which the reader can access and which will allow him to process
the elliptical text's artful diversions. Again, the interrogative short fiction is
being approached as though it were a partial object awaiting fulfilment by the
reader in possession of an explicatory 'narrative grid'.
Austin Wright is another critic who has explored the issue of closure. He
applies the term 'recalcitrance' to describe the short form's tendency to leave
things to inference, particularly in its ending. This recalcitrance is not unique to
the short story, however, but is an element in all texts which generate suspense in
order to delay or defer resolution. In a reworking of Barthes's hermeneutic code
Wright describes how if resolution is too easily reached then the text seems
'banal'; on the other hand, 'if the process is stalled and our quest for form is too
stubbornly frustrated, we find the work chaotic' (1989, 117). The choice of this
word 'chaotic' here is notable as it suggests an unwillingness to accept that a text
might perpetrate impedances against the transmission of meaning which the
reader cannot overcome. Sure enough, when Wright applies his notion of
recalcitrance to modernist short fiction he is keen to point out that it presents
only a temporary hindrance to the reader's interpretative activity. 'The open-
ended story,' he writes, '...is recalcitrant in its rejection of conventional
beginnings and ends, resolved by subtler notions of form' (ibid, 119).
Resolution may be less conspicuous, but it is still resolution. Enigmatic endings
present the reader with a challenge 'that can only be resolved by reflection after
the reading' (ibid. 121); they exhibit what Wright calls 'final recalcitrance—
meaning that it is instituted by the end of the story, not that it cannot be resolved'
(ibid').
In his reading of the Joycean epiphany, Wright contends that we must
look for 'a unifying principle subtle enough to bring the details into a single
17compass' (ibid). The principle he proposes is that of the 'discovery plot, in
which the protagonist's discovery is implicit, embodied in images with
emotional and moral significance' (ibid). But could we honestly say that
'Clay"s conclusion brings about this kind of discovery either for Maria or the
reader? She is literally blindfolded, and we are left lamely scrutinizing Joe's
obliquity, the narrating perspective having assumed an impercipience of its own
behind the free indirect discourse. I would be interested to know what has been
'discovered' at the end of 'Clay', and by whom.
Wright's theory of recalcitrance has much in common with Susan
Lohafer' s account of the process of reading short fiction. Lohafer argues that at
the level of the sentence we experience 'an impetus toward closure, blocked by
various kinds of interference which are in one way and another removed,
surmounted, absorbed' (1983, 42). Again, the assumption is that we will always
proceed towards a telos, a point of order and disclosure in the text. Underlying
both theories is an attitude to language that assumes that we as readers may pass
unimpeded from the signifier to the signified. Wright admits that language
presents the first level of recalcitrance in a text, but goes on to explain that it
exists in order 'to be understood, interpreted' (1989, 118). He entertains no
possibility that we may be irresolvably detained at the level of the signifier,
unable to pass through to the realm of determinate meaning.
When we read interrogative short fictions, however, we repeatedly
experience this kind of hermeneutic detention at the level of the signifier through
the occlusion of a guiding narratorial metalanguage. In Joyce's 'The Sisters', for
instance, the feral, unmediated trio of sigrnfiers, paralysis, gnomon, simony, are
not determined semantically by the text. They float free of any fixed referent
and leave us 'play-producing meaning' (MacCabe 1979, 35) with no way of
anchoring or securing their significance. Similarly, in Hemingway's 'Hills Like
White Elephants' strategic omissions in the narrative discourse undermine
18entirely our ability to impose a determinate meaning on even the most innocuous
pieces of dialogue. My theory of interrogative short fiction takes as its starting
point this reality of language, its differential and plunsignificant nature. What it
seeks to acknowledge is the way in which the narrative strategies of the form—
reticence, ellipsis, interdiction—indulge this plurality and instability by
removing or withholding the orientational material that would make determinate
reading possible.
Returning to the issue of closure, the interrogative theory makes it
possible to extend our understanding of the short story's resistance to resolute
endings. Rather than considering 'open-endedness' as simply a last-ditch
deviation from some putative conclusive norm, we can read it as another
manifestation of the form's climate of indeterminacy. Just as the strategies of
ellipsis and interdiction resist the teleological structure in the relationship of
signifier to signified, so at the narrative level there is a refusal to posit a  telos as
the text's controlling explicatory and unificatory force. In other words, we can
read the interrogative short story as anti-teleological in the widest sense.
The importance of teleological structuration in Western discourse has
been a persistent concern of J. Hillis Miller. In 'Ariadne's Thread', Miller
describes how the point of revelation in the linear narrative is one of the
fundamental principles of intelligibility:
The end of the story is the retrospective revelation of the law of
the whole. That law is an underlying "truth" which ties all
together in an inevitable sequence revealing a hitherto hidden
figure in the carpet. The image of the line tends always to imply
the norm of a single continuous unified structure determined by
one external organizing principle. This principle holds the whole
line together, gives it its law, controls its progressive extension,
curving or straight, with some arché, lelos, or ground. Origin,
goal, or base: all three come together in the gathering movement
of the logos (1976, 70).
The telos is the rationale of the text, the reason for its being written; in Barthes' s
words 'it is what is at the end of expectation' (1990, 76). Clearly, any disruption
or permanent deferral of the telos would involve a violation of the Aristotelian
19principle of unity. Throughout modernist and postmodernist literature, of
course, there has been a persistent effort to perform precisely this violation.
William Spanos has written of this 'impulse of the contemporary Western writer
to refuse to fulfil causal expectations' (1987, 19) in terms which can readily be
applied to the kind of short fiction I am concerned with. He describes this
impulse as a resistance to the model of the detective fiction in which clues lead
through a series of causal relations to a resolute and all-encompassing telos of
revelation. In this world, the 'eye' follows the 'leads' which 'lead' to the text's
solution. What the detective novel represents for Spanos is the idea of a
well-made positivistic universe., grounded in the equally
comforting certainty that the scientist/psychoanalyst/social
scientist (and reader) can solve the immediate problem of
deviation by the inductive method, a calculative interpretative
process involving the inference of relationships between
discontinuous "facts" that point or lead straight to an explanation
of the "mystery" (ibid. 18)
In the various readings of the short story I have been examining in the course of
this introduction a similar set of presumptions would appear to be in operation.
There is an assumption that the inductive or inferential method of reading will
uncover not a further perplexity of meaning—not a "mystery"—but a full
disclosure. I have been arguing that in fact the interrogative short story refutes
this readerly intuition and that we require a critical approach to it that is
equipped to recognize the value of this refutation.
When we stop short—in every sense—of the telos, when we refuse the
summons to intelligibility at the point of closure, we challenge what one critic
has called 'the traditional literature of knowledge' which conventionally depends
on the 'pivot of the teleological pnnciple...to say what it is about' (Watson 1991,
24). 1 would argue that interrogative short fiction challenges the teleological
principle through its techniques of 'shortness'—ellipsis, reticence, interdiction.
The resistance to closure in the form is not simply a formal innovation (or
deviation) at the end-point of the text; it occurs, rather, at every level as a
20resistance to teleological structure and determinate meaning. My interrogative
theory allows us to escape the narrow formalism of closural studies by
integrating the way in which short fictions end with the resistance to closure
evident in their discourse. Moreover, it affords the form a new prominence
within modernism and postmodernism by revealing its participation in the
radical innovations of narrative outlined by Hillis Miller and William Spanos.
The desire to place short fiction more precisely within these contexts has
to a great extent conditioned my choice of writers in the following chapters.
Obviously, any genre-based study will need to be selective if it is to undertake
sufficiently detailed analyses in a reasonable space. However, the writers I have
decided to focus on—Joyce, Hemingway, Beckett, Barthelme—are the four I
would have chosen whatever liberties I had been given in terms of wordage.
What connects these writers is, to put it simply, their willingness to  stop short
and to explore what happens when one removes or withholds fundamental
orientational material in narrative. They all, in various ways, answer to
Elizabeth Bowen's desire for a conception of 'shortness' as a 'positive' quality
(if positively disruptive), rather than as mere 'non-extension' (1950, 39).
Dubliners makes its own case for inclusion; no study of twentieth-
century short fiction can reckon without it. My emphasis falls first of all on the
ways in which Joyce's stories evade determinate readings, and how even as
sensitive an analytical tool as 'ambiguity' is insufficient in accounting for their
radical plurality. I go on to suggest, through a consideration of the use of
intertexts in the stories, that in fact all determinate or authoritative discourses are
undermined in Dubliners, including that of the reader.
This apparent hostility to particular modes of reading is even more
explicitly evident in Hemingway's short fiction. In my reading of In Our Time I
attempt to show how critical abductions from existing story forms act to resist
the reader approaching the text in pursuit of its supposed novelistic continuities.
21The much-rehearsed theory of 'omission' in Hemingway's stones is then
reconsidered in relation to Jonathan Culler's notion of literary presupposition in
an attempt to reveal how radical interrogativeness is generated by the occlusion
of unifying teleological structures in the text.
In many ways, Beckett's short fiction represents the theoretical centre of
my study. I suggest that the parodic and critical reading of modernist short
fiction which he undertakes in More Pricks Than Kicks offers an exemplification
of the formal definition I have established in my chapters on Joyce and
Hemingway. Thereafter, I examine the post-Trilogy short fictions, in particular
two of the 'residua'—'Imagination Dead Imagine' and 'Ping'—and discuss what
it was uniquely that the interrogative short form offered to Beckett in his
attempts to 'go on', to 'fail better', after the Trilogy.
My concluding chapter concerns American writers in the 1960s and
1 970s, especially Donald Barthelme, and their appropriation of the interrogative
story for the concerns of postmodernism. I suggest that examining the work of
these writers from a genre-based perspective allows for some significant revision
of the argument that postmodernist fiction represents a decisive breakthrough
against the aesthetics of high modernism.
My first duty, however, is to establish more clearly my definition of
interrogative short fiction. This I want to do in the form of a case study by
examining the story' emergence in England in the 1 890s. Not only does this
afford the opportunity to recover the work of some neglected writers of that
decade but it offers some explanation for why the interrogative form has been, in
English at least, a phenomenon of twentieth-century fiction.
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In Italo Calvino's short story, 'The adventure of a reader', the central character
enjoys a fnsson of narrative satisfaction familiar to any reader of fiction:
The novel Amedeo was reading had reached the point where the
darkest secrets of characters and plot are revealed, and you move
in a familiar world, and you achieve a kind of parity, an ease
between author and reader: you proceed together, and you would
like to go on forever. (Calvino 1985, 77)
Amedeo has arrived at the point  f full disclosure characteristic of the classic
realist novel. Revelation is his reward. The designs of intrigue and enigma will
soon be behind him. He has entered the end-game of the novel where the textual
world comes to rights, and his only remaining anxiety is to read to the very last
word.
For the reader of Calvino's story, however, no such climax of
consonance and identification is on offer. The last words of this text present
instead a tantalizing crux, a metafictional suspensiveness in which Amedeo must
decide whether to follow the woman sunbather into the sea or read those last
gratifying pages:
Dusk was falling. Below, the rocks opened out, sloping, into
a little harbour. Now she had gone down there and was halfway
into the water. "Come down; we'll have a last swim..."
Amedeo, biting his lip, was counting how many pages were left
till the end. (Calvino 1985, 81)
Amedeo wishes to read the final pages because he knows what they contain—a
promise realized, a desire fulfilled. To follow the woman would be to instate
another plot, to pursue another desideratum—sexual this time rather than textual.
In his hands he holds the perfection of the pattern of desire; to follow the woman
would be to defer, once again, that longed-for resolution.
24What interests me is that this structure of desire-consummation which
governs the story Amedeo is reading also governs the story we are reading, but
with the crucial difference that it is possible for Amedeo to read on to the end
and complete his satisfaction. We are offered no such possibility of fulfilment as
readers of his narrative. We may be intrigued by the ellipsis in that 'last
swim...', made expectant by the 'intermediary' properties of the scene ('dusk';
'halfway'), yet we cannot read on through any final pages to where the 'darkest
secrets of characters and plot are revealed', to where we might enjoy our sense of
'parity' with the author. The metafictional 'open' ending to the story interdicts
these desires; the text refuses to supply the information it has itself created the
appetite for. Where Amedeo's novel draws up conclus ens, our story
abbreviates; where his narrative gathers, ours seems to disperse. The ending to
'The adventure of a reader' does not permit the reader to attribute function and
significance retrospectively to all the details of the narrative; it does not realize
our expectations of closure. To adapt that most famous of fictive metaphors, the
scratches on the piergiass fail to arrange themselves around an ordering sun, and
remain scattered in many directions.
The structural parallel in Calvino' s story between sexual and readerly
desire is significant here. Denis de Rougement, in Love in the Western World
(published in French in 1940), uncovered the importance of the connection in
European literature through his study of the Tristan and Iseult myth, suggesting
that the Western novel's persistent fascination with transgressive, adulterous
sexual relations had its origin in the Tristan story where the vitality of passion
between the lovers is sustained by virtue of the impediments placed in the way of
its consummation.
Roland Barthes translates de Rougement's thesis into narratological
terms in his discussion of the hermeneutic code. For Barthes, the code, like
Tristan's sword, is necessary for the sustenance of readerly desire, and his
25description of it in his study of Baizac's 'Sarrasine' is fittingly sensuous:
[J] ust as rhyme (notably) structures the poem according to the
expectation and desire for recurrence, so the hermeneutic terms
structure the enigma according to the expectation and desire for
its solution. The dynamics of the text (since it implies a truth to
be deciphered) is thus paradoxical.. .[T]he problem is to maintain
the enigma in the initial void of its answer; whereas the sentences
quicken the story's "unfolding" and cannot help but move the
story along, the hermeneutic code performs an opposite action: it
must set up delays, (obstacles, stoppages, deviations) in the flow
of the discourse; its structure is essentially reactive, since it
opposes the ineluctable advance of language with an organized
set of stoppages: between question and answer there is a whole
dilatory area whose emblem might be named "reticence", the
rhetorical figure which interrupts the sentence, suspends it, turns
it aside (1990, 75)
This 'dilatory area' which acts to defer resolution, fulfilment, closure—and so
sustain desire, appetite, enigma—is manifest in a network of textual devices:
the snare (a kind of deliberate evasion of the truth), the
equivocation (a mixture of truth and snare which frequently,
while focusing on the enigma, helps to thicken it), the  partial
answer (which only exacerbates the expectation of the truth), the
suspended answer (an aphasic stoppage of the disclosure), and
jamming (acknowledgement of insolubility) (ibid. 75-6)
Such are the techniques of postponement and withholding by which the pleasure
of the text is cultivated. Crucially, however, there is in Baizac's world, and from
what we can gather in the world of Amedeo's novel too, an ultimately
satisfactory resolution of these enigmas, a point of (dis)closure where
equivocations are reconciled, parts made whole, and reticences 'voiced': 'truth,
these narratives tell us, is what is at the end of expectation' (ibid, 76).
In Calvino's story, by contrast, the hermeneutic indeterminacies are
sustained, prevarication and insolubility foregrounded, at the expected point of
closure. The snare, the equivocation, the suspended answer, all feature in
Calvino's text not as the means to an end but as the end itself The reticence that
characterizes the text's strategies of deferment is carried over into its conclusion;
what are usually techniques of interim suspensefulness become in this story
permanent interdictions of readerly desire.
My interest here is not only in the juxtaposition of plot structures in
26Calvino's story—one tending towards decisive closure, the other remaining
interrogative and open—but that these two types should be exemplified in
different genres: what cuts against the model of continuity and closure in
Amedeo's novel is the inlerrogativeness of the short story 'The adventure of a
reader'. The nature of this relationship between short fiction and the novel will
be returned to throughout this thesis, but for now it is sufficient to observe how
in Calvino's text the story form undermines by dint of its interstitial and
interdictive narrative strategies the continuities which govern the novelistic
model. When we come to consider the emergence of interrogative short fiction
in England at the end of the nineteenth century we find that the critical
interaction between the two forms is a vital element in the development of an
independent aesthetic of the short story. Indeed, it would seem that the key to
the form's identity rested on its ability to distance itself critically from the novel
and from novelistic practice.
I have chosen to focus this first chapter on a consideration of the
situation in England because there the interrogative story form develops later
than elsewhere in Europe and in America. This tardiness on the part of Victorian
writers makes for a study in resistance in which the constitution of the form and
its relationship with the dominant novel can be seen to be important critical
issues of the day. It also means that there is a large body of conventionally
structured (non-interrogative) short fiction against which to define our subject.
In addition, the development of the new story form is intimately connected with
the marked social and cultural changes affecting late-Victorian England, and this
allows us to place short fiction within the context of an emergent modernism.
Among critics of the short story there is wide agreement that the form
did not achieve recognition in England until long after its distinction in America
27and elsewhere in Europe.' Underlying this consensus is the belief that the
English imagination had a particular affinity with the novel which it could not
establish with the short form. V.S. Pritchett, for example, suggests that English
writers were 'slow starters in the art of the short story' because of the 'national
taste for the ruminative and disquisitional; we preferred to graze on the large
acreage of the novel and even tales by Dickens or Thackeray or Mrs Gaskell
strike us as being unused chapters of longer works' (1980, 164). Pritchett here
echoes Henry James who observed in 'Guy de Maupassant' that the English
preferred their fiction 'rather by the volume than by the page' (1905, 264). Not
only was the novel's extensiveness and sweep congenial to Victorian tastes but
shorter prose works were considered subordinate, uncertain fragments of a
meaningful whole, not generated by—or generating—any independent aesthetic.
For H.E. Bates, similarly, the dominance of the Victorian novel, with its Latinate
artificiality and seeming obligation to pedagogy and edification—its 'weight of
words' and 'weight of moral teaching' (1945, 37)—was responsible for the
failure of English writers to create a short fiction that was formally distinct. The
short story, he suggests, is a delicate, non-committed form requiring 'tender and
skilful hands' (ibid. 41); from the Victorian novelist it emerged bereft of its
defining subtlety, overblown with novelistic tropes, 'like a baby fed on a diet of
two-inch steaks and porter' (ibid. 41). It is Bates's contention that no English
writer applied to the short story 'a technique different from that of the novel'
(ibid. 23), an argument rehearsed by Elizabeth Bowen who suggests that Hardy
and the Victorians wrote stories as condensed novels: their short fictions contain,
she says in her introduction to The Faber Book of Modern Short Stories (1936),
'no urgent aesthetic necessity. ..Their shortness is not positive; it is non-
extension' (1950, 39).
'For a summary of this opinion see Baldwin 1993. See also Flora 1985, and the
essays by Baldeshwiler, Harris and Marler in May 1994.
28Like Frank O'Connor, Bowen contends that the failure of Victorian
writers to respond to the possibilities of the short story in the way Turgenev, for
instance, did, was the result of their lack of understanding of the 'positive'
qualities of shortness. Although many English writers wrote short fiction, they
still conceived of it in terms of novelistic practice. In his apologetic preface to
the 'Charles Dickens' edition of the Christmas Stories (1852) Dickens suggested
that the challenge of the form lay in how one could translate techniques of the
novel in it:
The narrow space within which it was necessary to confine these
Christmas Stories.. .rendered their construction a matter of some
difficulty, and almost necessitated what is peculiar in their
machinery. I could not attempt great elaboration of detail, in the
working out of character within such limits. (Dickens 1971,
xxix)
These comments reveal Dickens' frustration with the curtailment involved in
writing short and the difficulty he had in conceiving of an aesthetic of the short
story that was distinct from novelistic practice. He is certainly aware that
condensation 'necessitates' a different approach, but he is unable to consider this
other than in terms of a 'confinement' and 'limitation' of his full expressive
capacity. It is as though he has been asked to make a doll's house from the plans
to a mansion. That the form does not allow him to individuate character through
'great elaboration of detail' is a privation for Dickens rather than a stimulus to a
new conception of characterization.
Dickens's conments contrast tellingly with Henry James's praise of
Maupassant's gifts for characterization and description in his short fiction:
'These are never prolonged nor analytic', says James, 'have nothing of
enumeration, of the quality of the observer, who counts the items to be sure he
has made up the sum.. His eye selects unerringly...' (1905, 251). It is essential in
the short story to characterize through a highly concentrated metonymy: the
Dickensian catalogue, as Bates calls it, is not permitted; to describe the shape of
the hands is enough.
29More recent and rigorous theorizing of this issue has been undertaken
by Wendell Harris. Harris argues that it was the Victorian novelist's habit of
constructing his fiction around the twin axes of historical sequence and social
survey, what Harris terms the 'longitudinal tracing of sequence and the
latitudinal or comprehensive survey of interrelationships' (1994, 183), that
inhibited his ability to write short stories. The customary placement of
characters within an 'organic, all-encompassing'  (ibid) narrative structure
prevented Victorian writers from appreciating the formal distinctiveness of short
fiction: they simply applied to it the rules of novel writing, and to no great effect.
'Unfortunately,' writes Harris, 'the closer the tale approached the novel, the
furtfri it was forced to move from the essentially ahistorical, sonnet-like, and
highly focused vision, which is characteristic of the true short story'  (ibid. 187).
It is interesting that Hams should describe the 'true' short story as
sequestered, 'ahistorical', in contradistinction to the continuous and conclusively
'historicized' Victorian novel. As with Bates' description of the short form as
essentially non-committed, the implication would seem to be that if it is to
distinguish itself as something other than a miniaturized novel the story must
resist novelistic strategies of continuity and identification. Developing this idea
in Barthesian terms, I would suggest that what Robert Louis Stevenson termed,
in a letter of 5/6 September 1891 to Sidney Colvin, the 'full close' of classic
realist novelistic practice (Stevenson 1997, 464)—i.e. the limiting of
interpretative uncertainty, the resolution of contradiction and 'dissolution of
enigma through the reestablishment of order' (Belsey 1987, 70)—was the
controlling model for the Victorian story, and that the modern form is resistant,
directly or indirectly, to such closure: its aesthetic, by contrast, seeks for an
'open' or interrogative, rather than 'closed' or declarative effect. To demonstrate
this difference, and to reaffirm the point about the tardiness of English writers in
recognizing the possibilities of the short form, I want to undertake a comparative
30reading of a story by Hardy with one written some thirty-five years earlier by
Turgenev.
Hardy's 'The Three Strangers' (1883) is a story structured around a
series of enigmas, progressing towards an ending that resolves those enigmas by
instating closure at every level in the text. The plot is typical in its shape: order
is disrupted by the arrival of the eponymous, enigmatic strangers; confusion then
ensues until their identities are confirmed, which confirmation occasions the
reinstatement of intelligible order in the text. Revelation of the 'truth' about the
strangers is the raison d'être of the story; in Barthes's terms, it is 'what is at the
end of [the] expectation' generated by the narrative (1990, 76).
The first stranger arouses mild suspicion among the guests on account of
his rough attire and his request for some tobacco despite his obvious lack of a
pipe and a tobacco tin. The second stranger, dressed in cinder-grey, foregrounds
his enigmatic status by composing riddles as to his identity. Just as it is
discovered that he is a hangman there to carry out an execution at the
neighbouring jail, the third stranger comes to the door. 'Can you tell me the way
to—?' is all he says before fleeing, apparently at the sight of the hangman (1967,
16). News breaks that a prisoner has escaped from the jail and it is deduced that
the third stranger must be the escapee. The guests give chase and the third
stranger is caught. However, he proves not to be the escapee, but the escapee's
brother who had come to visit the condemned man on the night before his
execution. The condemned man is now identified as the first stranger, who has
by this time fled the cottage.
At the level of plot, the story is clearly organized towards closure—that
point of disclosure which functions to dissolve the enigma surrounding the
identity and purpose of each of the strangers. The disruption of their presence is
healed by a settling reinstatement of intelligibility both for the characters in the
story, who now have answers to their questions—'But what is the man's calling,
31and where is he of..?' (ibid. 13)—and for the reader in whom anxiety was
generated by the 'reticence' of the text in supplying the solution (which the text,
of course, always 'knows') to its enigma. Consequently we are able to attribute
function retrospectively to every narrative detail: we now know why the first
stranger had no tobacco, pipe or tin; we know why he was so poorly dressed; we
can even supply the destination sought by the third stranger, 'Can you tell me the
way to the—?': he was looking for the prison.
Yet Hardy engineers unity in his text more intensively still in an effort,
I would suggest, to recuperate the actual short story form for the conventions of
novelistic practice. Here is the first paragraph:
Among the few features of agricultural England which retain an
appearance but little modified by the lapse of centuries, may be
reckoned the long, grassy and furzy downs, coombs,or ewe-
leases, as they are called according to their kind, that fill a large
area of certain counties in the south and south-west. If any mark
of human occupation is met with hereon, it usually takes the form
of the solitary cottage of some shepherd. (1967, 1)
This passage would seem to bear out Wendell Harris's theory that Victorian
story writers were in thrall to novelistic conventions: the narrative is given its
longitudinal and latitudinal coordinates here, its place within a particular rural
history and topography, in an effort to attain the compass of the novel. Notably,
the passage occurs in a discourse belonging to the subject of the énonciation, the
subject who narrates the tale, imparting information that transcends the
comprehension of the subjects of the énoncé 2 This is significant in terms of the
text's movement towards closure. That privileged discourse recurs at the end of
the story, completing a narrative frame:
The grass has long been green on the graves of Shepherd Fennel
and his frugal wife; the guests who made up the christening party
have mainly followed their entertainers to the tomb; the baby in
whose honour they all had met is a matron in sere and yellow
leaf. But the arrival of the three strangers at the shepherd's that
2 Todorov, in 'Language and Literature', uses the terms énoncé and énonciation
to distinguish between 'two equally linguistic realities, that of the characters and
that of the narrator-listener duality' respectively (1970, 132)
32night, and the details connected therewith, is a story as well
known as ever in the country about Higher Crowstairs. (1967,
25)
The events in this story are here placed within a conclusive historical narrative.
Just as the enigma in the story was resolved for the subjects of the énoncé, so in
the frame the discourse of the subject of the énonciation seeks to resolve any
indeterminacy, tie up any conceivable loose ends, that the brevity of presentation
might have created. It is as though the short form presents a danger in that its
very shortness tends toward enigma, momentariness, open-endedness (the
'ahistorical' sequestration Hams identified above), as though the threat to order
in the lives of the characters is mirrored by the threat of an un-closed or
ultimately inconclusive narrative and so must be recuperated for the classic
realist novelistic enterprise whereby closure is ensured, historical continuity
established and interpretative uncertainty closed down.
It is clear that for Hardy the short story was essentially a plot-driven
form. Characterization is scant in his stories; the few details given are index-
linked to the end-point of the text. There is no superfluous gesture, no non-
functional or indeterminate unit of meaning—everything tends towards and is
recuperated by the 'truth' that is at the end of expectation. Reading 'The Three
Strangers' one is reminded of Beckett's comments on Baizac:
To read Balzac is to receive the impression of a chioroformed
world. He is absolute master of his material, he can do what he
likes with it, he can foresee and calculate its least vicissitude. He
can write the end of his book before he has finished the first
paragraph, because he has turned all his creatures into clockwork
cabbages and can rely on their staying put wherever needed or
going at whatever speed in whatever direction he chooses (1993,
119-20)
Like Balzac's, Hardy's world is rigorously teleological in structure. The details
of character and action are entirely subordinated to their plot functionality. The
difficulties Dickens describes above of achieving effective characterization in the
short story are writ large in Hardy: unable to grant them a cumulative reality, he
reduces his characters to 'clockwork cabbages' serving a pre-determined plot
33trajectory. Closure, coherence and unity govern his aesthetic of the short  form.
Hence the reinforcement of the deterministic plot by the historical and
topographical contextualization of the adventure of the strangers in a narrative
frame.
Hardy's determination to place the action of his story within a long-
range continuum of events, people, places—in effect, to make 'discourse' into
'history' (Benveniste 1971, 206)—suggests that he considered the short story a
potentially atomistic and discontinuous form. Henry James recognized its
potentially disruptive and inconclusive properties, too. However, for James it
was possible to understand the consequences of writing short in a far more
positive and productive way, as he makes clear in his preface to 'The Lesson of
the Master'.
In his preface, James envisages a short form in which it will possible
'to do the complicated thing with a strong brevity and lucidity—to arrive on
behalf of the multiplicity, at a certain science of control' (1934, 231). Crucially,
James's brevity of form does not entail any reduction in complexity or
multiplicity. In fact, he is proposing a disparity of extent between utterance and
meaning: though material statement in the short form is necessarily curtailed, for
James there should be no corresponding reduction in complexity or implication;
when we read we should be conscious of amplitudes, not economies. Whereas
the novelist's art may be centripetal—arranging scratches on a pierglass around
an ordering sun—James's formulation implies an aesthetic of the short story
which we might characterize as 'centrifugal', significance amplifying outward
from an inevitably reduced centre.
For Hardy and Dickens, writing short stories meant condensing the
principles of novel writing. Shortness was for them no positive feature; they
were unwilling to conceive of short fiction as a form in which dissident
meanings might arise, surplus to—in excess of—their acts of signification. In
34other words, they did not see the form as implicatory or, to use my own defining
term, interrogative in method. Hence the strict unity and closure evident in their
stories.
For an example of the kind of story that does exploit the suggestive
potential of writing short we can look abroad to a writer whom James
championed, and whose work was, surprisingly, known to English readers of
Household Words, Ivan Turgenev. Frank O'Connor once described Turgenev's
Sketches from a Hunter Album (1852) as 'the greatest book of short stories
ever written', a work largely responsible for 'the creation of a new art form'
(1963, 46). I would argue, rather, that Turgenev is the first writer to recognize
that the short form, by virtue of its shortness, could be governed by a poetics of
indeterminacy, that it might function without the clockwork paraphernalia of plot
and resist the militancies of unity and closure. Turgenev understood that the
formal curtailment of the short story might generate an implicatory 'openness' in
semantic terms—that 'multiplicity' might be achieved on behalf of 'brevity', as
James puts it. In other words, he treated shortness as a positive quality.
'Raspberry Water' offers a representative example of the way in which
Turgenev's narratives de-emphasise plot and actively resist formal closure. In
contrast to the Hardy, Turgenev's story refuses the kind of revelatory vantage
point at which function becomes attributable to every narrative unit and meaning
is stabilized. This is evident even in a summary of the story: the narrator, out
hunting on a hot August day, comes upon two old men, Stepushka and Foggy,
fishing the river Ista beside a spring known as 'Raspberry Water'. The narrator
embarks upon the first of many mini-narratives by telling of Stepushka's
connection with a gardener in the village of Shumikhino called Mitrofan. He
then relates some of the life of Foggy—a freed serf formerly in bondage to the
Count Pyotr Ilyich. The story of the Count's profligate lifestyle is picked up by
Foggy himself in a series of disordered, inconclusive recollections, until the
35arrival at the river of Vlas, a serf whose son has recently died and who is
struggling with debt. The others return to fishing while Vias, on the opposite
bank, gives way to his grief.
Even in summary form the story's plot structure clearly contrasts with
that of the Hardy. Most obviously, it is not a plot structured on the basis of
disruptive enigma, progressing towards resolution and the reinstatement of a
recognizable order. Moreover, there is a marked inconclusiveness about each of
the contained narratives in the story. For instance, in the relatively lengthy
retailing of Stepushka's life we find ourselves questioning the function of the
various details, and indeed of the narrative itself, in relation to the text as a
whole. But Stepushka's narrative does not build to a conclusion which signals
its significance and meaning. In fact, it peters out in physical description:
He had a small face, yellowish little eyes, hair down to his
eyebrows, a sharp little nose, enormous transparent ears, like a
bat's, and a beard shaved literally two weeks ago, never any
longer or shorter. ([1852] 1990, 45)
There is no confirmation of the significance of what we have been told about
Stepushka even at the end of the story; function does not become attributable in
this way. (In fact, Stepushka is asleep by the end.) In other words, the
information we are presented with about Stepushka is intended as self-sufficient.
The narrative interdicts our desire that this material be recuperated by the wider
text, that it function in meaningfiul relation to the dominant diegesis of the story.
Stepushka's life remains defiantly 'surplus'.
Yet the account of Stepushka is not dissident from an otherwise
unified narrative. All of the mini-diegeses in the story work in the same way:
each narrated life suffers from the same inconclusiveness, each fades in an air of
lost connections. The Count's story, for instance, conveyed in fragmentary
recollection by Foggy, ends with his death in an unspecified hotel room 'before
anything had been decided' (ibid. 46). Just as there is no resolution for the
Count before his moment of dissolution, so Foggy's recollections themselves
36suffer a lack of meaningful closure:
'Well, there'd be guests, you see, at a thing like that.
Entertainin' to see, but you got to observe decorum.. Oh it's got
away, dammit!' he added suddenly, jerking up his fishing rod.
(ibid. 47)
It is not only the fish that gets away here but the meaning and significance of the
story Foggy is telling.
The same is true of the ending of the wider narrative, based around the
grief and penury of Vias following his son's death. Once again, there is ellipsis
and interdiction at the very point where explanation and meaning are sought:
'...That's real bad, brother VIas,' Foggy announced, pausing
between the words.
'What's real bad about it? It's not. .' But Vlas's voice broke
at that point. 'Oh, it's bloody hot,' he went on, wiping his face
with his sleeve. (ibid. 50)
The potentially conclusive and significant utterance by Vias—the expression of
his understanding of his own condition—dissipates in wordlessness, a failure not
just to fix significance but to signify at all. Rather than offer any unifying
statement of the various threads of the story, the text opens out here in terms of
interpretative possibility. We cannot, in contradistinction to Hardy's story,
supply Vias's omitted phrase from the vantage point of closure: no such
privilege has been granted. VIas's statement intensifies rather than dispells
uncertainty. This lack of decisive utterance is sustained into the ending of the
story with a long exchange between the characters rendered in direct speech and
offering no narratorial mediation. Once again it is left to the reader to attribute
significance to these utterances; the narratonal voice does not attempt to enforce
a meaning:
'Who's your master?' I asked.
'Count—, Valerian Petrovich.'
'Pyotr Ilyich's son?'
'Pyotr Ilyich' s son,' said Foggy. 'Pyotr flyich, the late Count,
gave 'im VIas's village while he was still alive.'
'Is he well?'
'He's well, thank God,' Vlas answered. 'Gone all red, fat-
faced, he has.'
37'You see, sir,' Foggy continued, turning to me, 'it'd be all
right like if it were outside Moscow, but it's right here he's on
quit-rent.'
'How much?'
'Ninety-five roubles,' mumbled Vias.
'Well, you can see for yourself, can't you - just a little bit o'
land and all the rest's the master's woodland.'
'And that's been sold, they say,' remarked the peasant.
'Well, you can see for yourself...Give us a worm, Steve.. .Hey,
Steve, what's up? Gone to sleep, 'ave you?'
Stepushka shook himself. The peasant sat down beside us.
We fell silent again. On the opposite bank a voice struck up a
song, but it was protracted and sad.. .My poor VIas gave way to
his grief...Half an hour later we all went our separate ways.  (ibid,
50-1; Turgenev's ellipses)
Frank O'Connor has noted of another Turgenev story how it is "thrown away"
in a theatrical sense, how all the human agony emerges from that maze of
irrelevance' (1963, 50). The sense of 'irrelevance' arises because we are not
being directed towards a single ascendant meaning in the text. The narrator is
reticent at the point of closure about the significance of what is being said and
felt; the narrative techniques of deferment and withholding are sustained right to
the boundary of the text. The narrator's final comment seems to apply as much
to the form of the story as to the actions of the characters: 'Half an hour later we
all went our separate ways'. There has been no convergence of 'ways' at a site
of fixed meaning. The lack of arbitration between the speaking voices gives the
story a structure which we might visualize as centrifugal. As Bahktin says,
'Every concrete utterance of a speaking subject serves as a point where
centrifugal as well as centripetal forces are brought to bear' (1981, 272). Unlike
Hardy, Turgenev does not find that brevity of form requires a commensurate
curtailment of meaning through the imposition of a univalent plot resolution. In
fact, the equation is the reverse for Turgenev: the very shortness of the form
involves him in a suggestive and implicatory method of characterization and a
marked deemphasis of plot closure. Once again, Henry James's observations are
informative here: James notes in his essay 'Ivan Turgenieff' (1884) that
the germ of a story.. .was never an affair of plot.. it was the
representation of certain persons.. .The thing consists of motions
of a group of selected creatures, which are not the result of a
38preconceived action, but a consequence of the qualities of the
actions (James 1905, 3 14-5)
James's choice of the word 'motions' (no definite article) suggests precisely that
quality of action without definable consequence, 'purposiveness' without
purpose, that characterizes Turgenev's short fiction. For Hardy, shortness
involves the imposition of an absolute teleological structure in the action; for
Turgenev, it is achieved through the suppression of precisely those causal
relationships which facilitate teleology.
It should not be thought that 11 am claiming for Turgenev radical
modernist indeterminacy of the sort described in my introduction. Rather, I am
seeking to illustrate the structural and semantic differences between his
conception of the short story and that of Hardy and Dickens. Whereas for the
English writers the form entailed a miniaturization of novelistic effects of unity
and closure, for Turgenev shortness was inherently disunifying and tended
towards interrogativeness and 'openness'. For Dickens, writing short meant
simply suppressing his inclination towards 'great elaboration of detail', leaving
out what could be considered 'surplus' to the requirements of a satisfactory
resolution of action. Turgenev, on the other hanO, occhwies precise)y the
orientational material which would permit such closure. Perversely, as a result
of this withholding, the narrated history of the somnambulant Stepushka at the
start of 'Raspberry Water' emerges as 'surplus' to the dominant diegesis of the
story.
What we dealing with here are in effect two different notions of
shortness: one which involves merely the shrinkage of a preconfigured unity, and
the other which exploits its own interstices, reticences and occlusions. In Frank
O'Connor's terms, the difference is between a brevity motivated by
'convenience' and one motivated by 'its own necessities' (1963, 28). It is to the
latter that English writers eventually turn in the 1890s, and from which the
modernist interrogative form begins to emerge.
39Coming back to Barthes for a moment, it is clear how interrogative
short fiction bears out in a double sense his claim that '[the more plural the text,
the less it is written before I read it' (1990, 10). By written, of course, we
understand Barthes's own sense of the scriplible or infinitely plural text, an ideal
which cannot be committed textually—'the novelistic without the novel, poetry
without the poem' (ibid. 5)—but which exists at the opposite end on the plurality
continuum to the lisible, readerly or 'classic' text, the text 'devoted to the law of
the Signified' (ibid. 10). Barthes places texts on his continuum according to the
extent or 'proportion' of their plurality. Although we are dealing always with
'incompletely plural texts', it is possible to distinguish strategies of narrative
which generate a 'more or less parsimonious' plurality (ibid. 6). The
interrogative short story would clearly number among those 'less parsimonious'
texts because of its foregrounded ellipses, reticences and interdictions, in other
words because it is both less written in Barthes's special sense and because
literally less is written. The interrogative short story achieves its 'writerly' or
plural status by writing less; its shortness is what generates its plurality. Hardy,
by contrast, wrote less when he wrote stories, but he did not write less (i.e.
determine less) in Barthes's sense of the word.
In common with Barthes's 'writerly' texts, interrogative short fictions
in an obvious way augment the role of the reader who is called upon to supply,
to produce meaning from, that which the texts themselves withhold or suppress.
The reader becomes, in Barthes's words, 'no longer a consumer, but a producer
of the text' (ibid. 4). Umberto Eco, in his study of the 'open' work, investigates
at some length this co-productive capacity of the reader in relation to texts which
are markedly reticent and even materially incomplete. Within poststructuralist
critical discourse, of course, the differences between Eco's approach and
Barthes's are more important than any common ground. Whereas Barthes is
arguing from a post-Saussurean perspective that all texts are plural or
40indeterminate as a result of their being constructed in language, Eco still invokes
the stable subject of reception theory, the reader who fashions textual meaning
according to his own 'existential credentials' (1989, 3); all texts are in this sense
'open' because they are susceptible to readers' 'countless different
interpretations' (ibid. 4).
While mindful of this fundamental discrimination, I would nevertheless
argue for the continuing significance of The Open Work for the study of short
fiction. To a far greater degree than Barthes, Eco gives his theory historical co-
ordinates. In particular he identifies the late 19th century as the moment when
writers, composers and artists began consciously to adopt strategies of
indeterminacy and 'openness' in their work. Barthes, despite his synchronic
(rather than diachronic) predisposition—i.e. his interest in the total system of
language that makes signification possible at any one moment—actually
suggests something similar in his contention that texts can, by dint of their
devices, be more or less parsimonious with their plurality. Eco goes further in
placing this phenomenon within a developmental metanarrative of Western art.
He begins with a consideration of the 'incomplete' musical scores of
20th century avant-garde composers. These scores, Eco writes,
offer themselves not as finite works which prescribe specific
repetition along given structural co-ordinates but as 'open'
works, which are brought to their conclusion by the performer at
the same time as he experiences them on an aesthetic plane.
(1989, 3)
The performer (or reader) is invited to supply the missing parts in the score (or
text). In other words, he or she is involved in the 'writing' of the work—an act
coincident with his or her reception of it. Eco immediately concedes that all
works make co-productive demands on their audience, but argues that these
works are open 'in a far more tangible sense' (ibid. 4) because they are
materially 'incomplete'.
It is in the late 19th century, Eco claims, that we first see explicit
41attempts by writers to 'prevent a single sense from imposing itself at the very
outset of the receptive process' (ibid. 8). He cites Verlaine's Art Poétique and
Mallarmé's celebration of the pleasures of 'guessing' as the first statements of a
programmatic and self-conscious 'openness', of an effort to produce works that
will indulge the free play of interpretative possibility, that will seek out the 'free
response of the addressee' to their 'halo of indefiniteness.. .pregnant with infinite
suggestive possibilities' (ibid. 9). For major modernists—Eco cites Kafka, Joyce
and Brecht —'openness' and indeterminacy become central operative principles.
The development Barthes offers over Eco is in the location of this
indeterminacy and plurality in language itself For Eco, 'openness' in his special
definition is a supply-side effect, something generated by the author. The other
kind of 'openness' he identifies as inherent in all texts arises because of the
uncertainty of the expressive-receptive transaction between the subjectivities of
the writer and the reader. In other words, indeterminacy is not for Eco as it is for
Barthes a product of the inherently plural constitution of language. My theory of
interrogative short fiction depends on Barthes's corrective here. Although I am
entirely in agreement with Eco that in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries there arises a self-conscious interest in textual 'openness' on the part of
writers, I would suggest that very 'openness' arises in the first place because of
the potentially indeterminate nature of language, and that the strategies of ellipsis
and interdiction writers employ serve to exploit and intensify this plurality.
Despite these theoretical circumspections, Eco's historical placement of
the 'open' text at the end of the nineteenth-century marks its particular relevance
to a study of short fiction, for it was in the 1 890s that English writers first began
to explore effects of indeterminacy in the form. At the same time the critical
debate about the aesthetic of the short story and how it might be distinguished
from the novel and from novelistic practice started in earnest and engaged the
attentions of, among others, Henry James, Robert Louis Stevenson, and Brander
42Matthews, whose views crystallized into the pioneering theoretical work on the
form, The Philosophy of the Short-Sioiy (1901). Although Eco does not single
short fiction out in his study, I would argue that that is the form in which we see
best exemplified the emergence of the poetics of indeterminacy with which he is
concerned. I would like, therefore, to discuss the circumstances in which the
short story achieves modernity in England in the 1 890s and undertake some
readings from the period with a view to elucidating further how the form's
emergent aesthetic fits with this theory of indeterminacy.
There are by necessity several strands to my analysis here. In the first
place, it is important to consider the revolution in publishing in the second half
of the nineteeth century and how this helped bring about favourable conditions
for the growth of short fiction. Henry James' desire, expressed in a letter to
Robert Louis Stevenson (31 July 1888), to produce 'a multitude of pictures of
my time, projecting my small circular frame upon as many different spots as
possible' (Smith, J. 1948, 173) reflects, perhaps, not so much a JIn-de-siecle
'Paterian disinclination to take a cosmic or even expansive or longitudinal view
of the world' (Hams 1994, 188) as it does the then current publishing vogue for
shortness of form. According to Peter Keating in The Haunted Study, the
development of the short story in the last years of the 19th century—its wide
practice and emergent theory—had a great deal to do with commercial
necessities following the considerable expansion in the 1 880s of the already vast
Victorian periodical market. That growth had been made possible by improved
technologies in printing (such as machine-made paper and half-tone
illustrations), the repeal of mid-Victorian free-trade duties on paper and, more
importantly, by advertising revenue, changes in copyright law, and the
increasing professionalisation of authorship. Keating doubts whether short
fiction would have developed much at all in this period 'if the market had not
been so desperate to fill periodicals columns with fiction' (1989, 40).
43Book publishers themselves became involved in the periodicals market,
using it as a low-capital testing ground for previously unpublished authors, and
some, such as George Smith and Macmillan, began their own journals as a
means of securing new writers for their lists (Brake 1993, 89). The 'quickening
rhythm' (ibid. 88) of periodical publishing—monthlies, weeklies, dailies,
evening dailies—meant a vast increase in demand for fiction which could be
quickly written and quickly read. Cheap magazines and miscellanies such as  Tit-
Bits (to which Joyce, Woolf and Conrad all submitted work) and Answers began
carrying fiction and short sketches, while W.T. Stead's Review of Reviews
provided condensed version of new novels. By 1891 it was desirable for
magazines such as Strand and Black and White no longer to carry serialized
novels at all but instead to publish 'a complete short story by an eminent writer'
in each edition (Baldwin 1993, 32).
Keating suggests that this change in reading habits in favour of the
short story 'suited the commonly-expressed editorial belief that periodical
readers were becoming incapable of sustaining interest in the written word for
any length of time' (1989, 41). The greatly enhanced profile and marketability
of short fiction, along with the emergence of cheap one-volume 'well-made'
novels, left circulating libraries with surplus stocks of expensive three-decker
editions and so contributed to the eventual demise of that format in 1894. But
even if the story and single-volume novel did attract less-committed readers,
many authors were happy to see a decline in the influence of the lending libraries
whose powers of selectivity amounted to censorship:
Not only did the lending library exercise immense control over
the price, size and distribution of novels by mid-century,  but,
acting on behalf of what Thackeray referred to as 'my squeamish
public', even dictated to a considerable degree the actual subject
matter of fiction. (Bell 1993, 128)
Edmund Gosse in essays such as 'The. Influence of Democracy on
Literature' (1891), and Hardy in 'The Profitable Reading of Fiction' (1888) and
44'Candour in English Fiction' (1890), scorned the injunctions of the moralists
who took it upon themselves to protect the sensibilities of their subscribers by
endorsing only those titles they felt were suitable. But the influence of the likes
of W.H. Smith and Charles Mudie only reflected a more 'general climate of
censorship and control' (Bell 1993, 128) in Victorian England. Fear of offence
to public sensibility is evident as late as 1888 in Henry James's review of
Maupassant where James worries that Maupassant's short fictions will prove
'embarrassing and mystifying for the moralist' (1905, 254) and that it is the
Frenchman's 'licentiousness' that will be most noticed by the English reader
(ibid. 265). This is the climate in which Hardy struggled, most notably over the
publication of Tess, but even in tespect of a Sigct 'cc a 'Vce. Vcctci
Preacher' (1879) which he was obliged to conclude with the trite propriety of a
marriage between Lizzy and the minister, an ending which he, in a note attached
to the story in May 1912, described as 'almost de rigueur in an English
magazine at the time of writing' (1967, 120). Of course, when we examine the
ending Hardy wanted for the story—namely Lizzy and the smuggler Jim
marrying and emigrating to Wisconsin—it is obvious that it would have made no
formal difference to the text. The marriage ending occurs only as a coda to the
already concluded action of the plot. The revised ending would simply have
presented the characters with an alternative but formally equivalent destiny. The
published version makes no difference to the kind of highly plotted tale moving
towards conclusive and explicatory closure that Hardy sought to write.
Nevertheless, critics of the short story have since the beginning argued
that the climate of Victorian censoriousness impinged in particular upon the
development of that form. According to I-I.E. Bates, it was not until the I 890s
that conditions prevailed 'under which the short story could begin to thrive.. .free
from the poking of moral umbrellas' (1945, 44). Frank O'Connor, similarly,
argues that the English failure to embrace the modern form was the result of that
45culture's resistance to the 'marginal', the 'outlawed', the 'submerged population
group' in which the short story deals (1963, 18-19).
One can readily see how the non-committed or non-determinate
interrogative story might be considered morally evasive, relativistic, or, to use
James's word, deliberately 'mystif'ing'. By the very nature of its abbreviation
and 'opermess' it expresses a scepticism about the possibility of decisive or
conclusive utterance, in contradistinction to the Victorian novel's all-
encompassing histoncism and survey. The emergence of the form in the last
decades of the nineteenth century would appear to be consistent with the retreat
of Utilitarian and Evangelical prejudices about imaginative writing, and with the
countering of Victorian high seriousness by the 'art for art's sake' movement—
shifts in cultural values which made the 1 890s a decade especially propitious to
development of the short story.
That the story became in many ways the nonpareil form in the late
nineteenth century for the expression of this sense of cultural and ethical
reformation is clear from remarks that G.K. Chesterton made in 1906:
Our modern attraction to short stories is not an accident of form;
it is the sign of a real sense of fleetingness and fragility; it means
that existence is only an impression, and, perhaps, only an
illusion.. .The modems, in a word, describe life in short stories
because they are possessed with the sentiment that life itself is an
uncommonly short story, and perhaps not a true one. (1919, 69)
That sense of fin de siècle 'fleetingness and fragility' contrasts for Chesterton
with the mid-Victorian period of progress and 'hope' (ibid. 12) and, of course, of
the three-decker novel. His imagery recalls Pater's conclusion to The
Renaissance: 'the cohesive force seems suspended like a trick of magic; each
object is loosed into a group of impressions.. .unstable, flickering,
inconsistent.. .the whole scope of observation is dwarfed to the narrow chamber
of the individual mind' ([1868] 1980, 187). Not only is experience fissiparous,
formed of tenuous, infinitely divisible impressions, but we are each confined to
our own perceptive centre. What is lacking in this condition, as Chesterton
46laments, is the continuity of vision, the faith in public knowledge, the assurance
of certain certainties, that permits the novelist's art. For Chesterton, the
destruction of these values is directly expressed in literary form: under the new
condition we retreat into smallness: 'many a man calls himself contentedly "a
minor poet" who in the past would 'have been inspired to be a major prophet'
(1919, 16).
The idea that the short story's brevity and confinement suits it to such
modem scepticism and relativism as Chesterton identifies recurs in
contemporary criticism of the form. Nadine Gordimer, for instance, has called
the short story 'the art of the only thing one can be sure of—the present
moment'; an art in which a 'discrete moment of truth Is aimed at—not  the
moment of truth' (1968, 459). She goes on to describe the form as 'fragmented
and restless' and suggests that for this reason it may be seen as uniquely suited to
the articulation of the 'modern consciousness—which seems best expressed as
flashes of fearful insight alternating with near-hypnotic states of indifference'
(ibid. 460). More recently, Clare Hanson has argued that the modern short story
emerges from the late 19th century movement 'towards subjective
impressionism in literature and the visual arts and a hedonistic emphasis on the
value of the passing moment' (1985, 13). Her emphasis here on the fleeting and
fragile contingencies of experience is elaborated by Wendell Harris who
suggests that it was in response to Pater's vision that writers of the 1880s and
I 890s turned 'with relief to the isolable, the detachable' (1994, 189). Harris
claims that the emergence of the modem short story in the last decade of the 19th
century is bound up with a Paterian 'new vision' of reality 'perceived as a
congenes of fragments' (ibid. 190).
All of these elements—innovations in publishing and circulation, the
demise of the three-decker novel, changes in reading tastes and in public
morality, developments in the aesthetics of perception—form the circumstantial
47matrix from which the short stories of the I 890s emerge and to which they
contribute. What remains to be done is to relate these contexts to the theory and
practice of interrogative short fiction as I have defined it.
Both Hanson and Hams offer some diagnosis of the cultural changes
taking place in late Victorian society, and both suggest that these changes
impinge particularly upon the development of short fiction. However, they are
both surprisingly timid about the claims they are prepared to make for the formal
innovativeness of the fiction that is produced in the I 890s. Both observe the
new interest in significant moments of personal experience and the
corresponding de-emphasis of plot, but they therefter maintain that the short
fiction emerging from this upheaval is in effect as 'sta1the' ancX \iig\t\y oràereX as
the more conventionally plotted form. For Hanson, the new species of story
simply infiltrates a moment of 'heightened awareness' as 'structural equivalent
for conventional resolution of plot' (1985, 7); while under Harris's New Critical
examination the new, 'true short story' emerges as 'crisp, taut, lean, focused,
unified' (1994, 1 87)—a decidedly un-disruptive product when you consider the
apparent disorder of its inception. By their readings both these critics reduce the
significance of the changes in the I 890s to a series of limited, classifiable
modifications in form. It is as though they are unwilling to contemplate the full
significance of the claims they themselves are making for the period and are
content instead to recuperate the formal developments of the 1 890s for a highly
unified and un-disruptive aesthetic.3
One must be careful, on the other hand, not to overstate the radical
credentials of these new stones. Their importance lies in the way in which they
attempt to sustain their strategies of ellipsis, interdiction and reticence even at
points where disclosure is expected. In other words, they see shortness not
I am prefigured in this complaint against the 'unity aesthetic' of Hanson et al by
Head 1992, 18-21
48merely as the condensation of some pre-figured unity, but as positively
disruptive. The value of my theory of interrogative short fiction is that rather
than attempt to impose any one reading on the stories it recognizes how their
compositional techniques conspire in their plurality. This recognition, I would
suggest, is the key to understanding the subsequent developments of the
modernist interrogative form.
One important and recurring motif in many of the stories of the 1 890s
is that of the city and the experience of metropolitan living. Of course, the
metropolis figures strongly throughout modernist writing, both as a thematic
concern and a formal directive; in many ways it becomes 'the physical
embodiment of a decisive modern consciousness' (Williams 1973, 239). The
city is at once the wasteland, the domain of Eliot's anonymous, numberless mass
flowing over London bridge; yet it is also the place where, despite the proximity
of so many others, a sense of one's own subjectivity is most excited, where the
individual consciousness attains to poetry:
I am moved by fancies that are curled
Around these images, and cling
The notion of some infinitely gentle
Infinitely suffering thing
This dual response—an abhorrence of, and yet a willing and fascinated
indulgence in, the mass and the metropolis—is evident too in many of the
innovative short stories of the 1 890s. Indeed, it seems that for many writers the
short form in that decade emerges as ideally expressive of the excitements and
exigencies of modem city life.
The most influential testament to the metropolis for 1 890s writers (and
indeed for the modernists) was that of Baudelaire. For his poet, his painter of
modem life, Baudelaire had devised a 'sovereign' subjectivity that allowed him
to be in but not of the city crowd As he wrote in 'The Painter of Modem Life'
in 1863:
The crowd is his domain...His passion and his profession is to
49merge with the crowd.. .in the throng, in the ebb and flow, the
bustle, the fleeting and the infinite.. .The observer is a prince
enjoying his incognito wherever he goes (1972, 399-400)
The poet is exceptional but unnoticed, the writer of other lives who is himself
unwritten. As Keith Tester puts it, the poet 'is the centre of an order of things of
his own making even though, to others, he appears to be just one constituent part
of the metropolitan flux' (1994, 4).
Baudelaire's influence is felt strongly in many of the story writers of
the 1 890s. Often, however, it occurs as a forced and self-indulgent poeticism.
Writers like Hubert Crackenthorpe and Richard Le Gallienne, both of whom
were associated with The Yellow Book, attempted to translate the sensitized
perambulations of the flaneur to their stories of 1 890s London. London,
however, was a far more crowded and threatening space than Baudelaire's Paris
with its arcades and boulevards, and hardly suited for 'botanizing on the asphalt'
(Benjamin 1983, 36). Flánerie, as Tester points out, is really only possible if
you are not in danger of being knocked down. The problem for Le Gallienne
and other Francophile writers was that their sense of horror at mass metropolitan
existence readily overwhelmed their efforts to poeticize city life. In stories like
'A Poet in the City' and 'A Seventh-Story Heaven', Le Gallienne's poet-figure
cherishes the flower of his sensibility amid the anonymous civilian crush of faces
'no more like individual men and women than individual puffs in a mighty wind,
or the notes in a great scheme of music' (1896, 104). He must testify to his love
under dingy office blocks though 'harsh voices grate the air where Beauty sang'
(ibid. 19). Whereas for Baudelaire 'multitude and solitude' were 'equal and
interchangeable terms' (1991, 44), for Le Gallienne the multitude is a uniformly
hostile and consuming presence against which the writerly subjectivity must be
protected. Thus the refuge sought in an elevated bookish nostalgia—the poet's
'yellow-leaved garland.., an immortelle'—and in stylized romance—'Love and
Beauty would smoke their cigarettes together' (1896, 107; 17). The fascination
of the metropolitan crowd for Baudelaire's poet, his enchantment with its
50horrors, is replaced in Le Gallienne by a sense of the threat posed by submersion
in the mass, by banality and by the dehumanization of labour. Hence the retreat,
the deliberate distanciation, the reserve and antipathy his poet exhibits.4 1 890s
London, it turns out, is a place for the acuity of a Sherlock Holmes, not for the
limping autism of a Francophile rhapsodist.
Despite these failings, Le Gallienne's stories do at least contemplate
the plight of the writerly subject in the agglomeration of the modern metropolis.
And it is interesting that he should choose a form which by virtue of its brevity
can make no pretensions to plenitude or culmination. More accomplished
writers of his era, such as Arthur Morrison and George Gissing, also found short
fion ideally suited for writing about city life. Unlike Le Gallienne, however,
they were able to express their sense of the fleeting contingencies of
metropolitan existence in formal terms.
The desire for a form that would be intrinsically expressive of urban
experience was first stated by Baudelaire in the dedicatory letter to Arsène
Houssaye which prefaced the Prose Poems of 1862: 'This obsessive ideal,' he
wrote, 'springs above all from frequent contact with enormous cities, from the
junction of their innumerable connections' (1991, 30). Significantly, the form
Baudelaire conceives of 'has neither head nor tail, since everything, on the
contrary, is both head and tail, alternatively and reciprocally' (ibid). Gissing and
Morrison in the I 890s also found a form ideally expressive of city life, a form
which, like Baudelaire's, resisted or de-emphasised literary conventions of plot
and structure. That form was the interrogative short fiction.
Many of Gissing's stories, such as 'The Firebrand', 'The Poet's
Portmanteau', 'A Son of the Soil' are concerned with the effects on the
individual of urban experience, a theme he often explores through the encounter
4 Reserve and antipathy are, according to German sociologist Georg Simmel in
his 1903 essay 'The Metropolis and Mental Life', mental attributes without
which metropolitan life 'could not be carried on at all' (1971, 331)
51of a countrified sensibility with the complex realities of city life. In other stories
he is interested in the plight of the literary intelligence in the metropolis.
'Comrade in Arms', for instance, opens with a young writer, Wilfred Langley,
sitting in a London restaurant after lunch:
In this quiet half-hour, whilst smoking a cigarette and enjoying
his modest claret, he caught the flitting suggestion of many a
story, sketch, gossipy paper. A woman's laugh, a man's surly
visage, couples oddly assorted, scraps of dialogue heard amid the
confused noises—everywhere the elements of drama, to be fused
and minted in his brain. ([1898] 1977, 1)
Wilfred here, like Baudelaire's poet, is at the 'centre of an order of things' in the
metropolitan flux. He is the educated observer, the writerly intellect who will
gather the disparate urban materials into an orderly dramatic whole. The
fragments of dialogue, the smells and noises and strange matings, can be brought
to a point of significance and unity in the act of writing: the multiple and
uncertain 'suggestions' of the scene can be made into definite expressions of
meaning.
Clearly, there is a metafictional implication here that a similarly
unifying gesture will be performed by the host text, that an 'order of things' will
be made to prevail there too. However, when Wilfred and his lover Bertha meet
again at the end of the story after a long parting, there is an interdiction of that
expectation that the story itself has generated:
[T]hey came face to face on the pavement of the roaring Strand.
Their umbrellas had collided, and as they shook hands the
hurrying pedestrians bumped them this way and that.
'All right again?' asked Bertha merrily.
'Quite,' was the stalwart reply. 'Come somewhere and talk.'
'Can't. Appointment in ten minutes.'
'Move on, please!' shouted a policeman.
'Mustn't stop the way.' (ibid, 19)
Agency lies with the city now. The pressing motion of the Strand is irresistible:
its momentum brings the two accidentally together, and it acts, through the
regulations of clock and law, to keep them finally apart. The city Wilfred
thought he could meld into significant forms now dissipates his efforts to unite
52with Bertha. More importantly, however, the suggestion of a failure of artistic
intent is picked up in the form of the narrative itself: at the point in the story
where maximum potential energy has been gathered towards a conclusion it
breaks off and we are not granted the expected closure. The lovers are left in
their delicate poses of beginning, and we are left with a list of unanswered
questions which the text has enticed us to ask. It is as though the very
momentary, snatched intimacies of city life the story describes—bereft of
narrative and conclusive meaning as they are—are expressed in the form itself.
Obviously, one must be careful not to overstate the extent of Gissing's
achievement here. As was the case with the Turgenev example, I am not
claiming that he generates any radical indeterminacy. What is significant is that
he should seek, however simply, to interdict the kind of unifying conclusiveness
his story appears to have been preparing us for. In the context of the Victorian
story this is a notable development.
Like Gissing, Arthur Morrison began to exploit effects of 'openness'
and interdiction in his metropolitan Tales of Mean Streets (1896). Often the
sense of inconclusiveness is generated by focusing on an interior state,
sometimes in free indirect discourse, at the climax of an otherwise active and
externalized narrative: 'Was she coming? Night after night, and night after
night. But to-morrow...' (1896, 252). Elsewhere there appears to be a selective
withholding of information, a resistance to the lure of a totalized or unified
narrative. 'In Business', for instance, ends when Ted Munsey, an unemployed
moulder, deciding that his family will be financially better off without him, signs
over all his property to his wife and leaves under cover of darkness. The story's
central enigma—what can Ted do to save his family from ruin?—is thus
resolved, but the matter of where he goes, what happens to him, and, more
importantly, what happens to his family—precisely the kind of frame of
information Hardy would supply—is not entertained. Ted's mysterious (to his
53family) departure is reflected formally by the narrative which ends with a scene
of contemplative interdiction: 'Upstairs the girls began to move about. Mrs
Munsey sat with her frightened face on the table' (ibid, 170). Reticence, enigma,
withholding: these effects of interim suspensefulness are sustained to the limit of
the text.
Morrison found such interrogative narrative techniques particularly
effective for conveying a sense of the fleeting and ephemeral proximities, the
accidents of convergence, of city life. 'To Bow Bridge', for example, tells of a
well-dressed woman (we are not given her name) who, with her two small
children, boards a late-night tram mobbed with boisterous drinkers headed for
Bow and last orders. Opposite sits a prostitute who is brought into contact with
the woman when one of the children falls and she helps her up. The well-
dressed woman tries to overlook the proffered kindness (Simmel's 'reserve') but
is powerless to resist the prostitute's subsequent intervention as they disembark
from the tram:
The harlot, lingering, lifted the child again—lifted her rather high
and set her on the path with the others. Then she walked away
toward the Bombay Grab. A man in a blue serge suit was footing
it down the turning between the public-house and the bridge with
drunken swiftness and an intermittent stagger; and, tightening her
shawl, she went in chase.
The quiet mechanic stood and stretched himself, and took a
corner seat near the door; and the tram-car, quiet and vacant,
bumped on westward. (1896, 93)
In these final paragraphs, the sense of fleetingness in relations, of a proximity
which is physical only, of the arbitrariness and transitoriness of social character,
is ideally conveyed in a form which itself is transitory, open-ended, inconclusive.
There is no more to say about the quiet mechanic with which the story ends
because no more is known: he is a member of O'Connor's 'submerged
population, group'. It is appropriate that he should occupy the final scene of the
story—a symbol of 'human unknowableness' (Bowen 1962, 94) at the very point
where we as readers might expect meaning and significance to be declared.
54Morrison's text de-emphasizes, hides, narrative here because the narratives of
the lives it evokes are de-emphasized, hidden; its inconclusive and interrogative
form is appropriate because such is the nature of relations between the characters
in this city. The metropolitan dweller, as Georg Simmel points out, has
knowledge, understanding of, and intimacy with only a fraction of the many
people he encounters daily. To register each contact, to grant it emotional space,
would be to fall into 'an unthinkable mental condition' (1971, 331), hence the
self-preserving disinterest, the blessed unknowableness, into which the urbanite
retreats. Morrison's short fiction in its detachment and reticence performs
precisely this reality.
Both Morrison and Gissing acknowledge the potential discrepancy of
extent between what is stated in their fiction and what is meant; in other words,
they are beginning to exploit, in however obvious a way, shortness as a positive
(positively disruptive) quality. Their stories are not written on a principle of
miniaturization of a fully-formed and meaningful whole; rather their 'missing
parts' are productive of a desirable interrogativeness. This is true also of writers
like Ella D'Arcy and George Egerton who find that the disruptive reticence of
the form makes it possible to convey a sense of the complexities of psychology
and the workings of the mind. Unlike Morrison and Gissing they are not
concerned with the multiplicity and ephemerality of relations in the modern city;
rather they are interested in depicting the inner lives of small groups and the
intimacies of their relations.
At first sight, it may appear counter-intuitive to suggest that
interrogative short fiction could be amenable to the investigation of mental
states. From what we have seen of Turgenev, Morrison and Gissing, the point
would seem to be that the form does not pursue these kinds of depths but instead
maintains an oblique and 'scrupulous meanness', as Joyce put it. However,
D'Arcy and Egerton found that the de-emphasis of plot in the form brought
55about an intensification of interest in mood and character psychology. Once
again, it is the discovery of that discrepancy of extent between utterance and
meaning—multiplicity on behalf of brevity—that is at the heart of the matter.
Ella D'Arcy was associated with The Yellow Book throughout its years
of publication, and many of the stories collected in her Monochromes (1895)
were initially published there. 'Irremediable', which I want to examine at some
length, appeared in the first issue of The Yellow Book in April 1894. The story
concerns a young bank clerk, Willoughby, who while on holiday in the country
meets an imploring, passionate girl, Esther Stables, whom he marries and takes
back to London. Three months into the marriage and Esther has sunk into
depravity and petulance. The story ends with Willoughby's realization that he
hates his wife, regrets bitterly their marriage, but that he harbours an obsessive
'passion' for her. Such is the 'irremediable' plight under which he must now
live.
The preceding summary is accurate in terms of the plot and structure of
the narrative. However, the real interest of this story lies in its complexity of
characterization. Once we begin to account for that, and for the manner of its
presentation, it becomes far harder to get the story straight. Take for instance the
following reflections on Willoughbys attempts to educate Esther:
It is so natural to think you may make what you will of the
woman who loves you. But Esther had no wish to improve. She
evinced all the self-satisfaction of an illiterate mind...He gave up
the attempt, and, with humiliation at his previous fatuity,
perceived that it was folly to expect that a few weeks of
companionship could alter or pull up the impressions of years, or
rather of generations ([18951 1977, 118)
At first sight, this passage would seem to confirm the summary account of
Esther's negligence and blameworthiness in the troubled marriage. In fact, many
complicating and contradictory elements in Willoughby's character converge
here and threaten that simple conclusion. We are told earlier that Willoughby's
initial attraction to Esther was based on her being so refreshingly unlike his
56previous lover, Nora Beresford. Whereas Nora was 'cultured', a model of
'feminine refinement', Esther is a 'working daughter of the people'. The failure
of his relationship with Nora had 'indissolubly associated in his mind ideas of
feminine refinement with those of feminine treachery', hence his pleasure in
meeting a girl like Esther with whom he might 'dispense with the formalities'
(ibid. 88-9).
What unites both women, however, is that they turn out to be other than
as Willoughby had imagined. Throughout the story we see Willoughby
constructing romanticized and fictionalized scenarios for himself, distorting and
resisting reality. We are told that he 'had always been given to much
daydreaming, and it was in the silence of his rooms of an evening that he turned
his phantasmal adventures into stories for the magazines' (ibid. 117). The Nora
Beresford of his imagination 'had nothing whatever in common with the Nora of
reality'; Willoughby, we are told, idolized her 'with the wholeheartedness of the
true fanatic' (ibid. 115-6).
The statement in the passage, then, that it is natural to think you may
make of the woman who loves you what you will, refers not simply to
Willoughby's attempted education of Esther. It also carries connotations of his
deep-seated need to fictionalize, to make the women in his life other than as they
are. Similarly complex is the conclusion Willoughby reaches in the passage that
it was 'folly to expect that a few weeks of his companionship could alter or pull
up the impressions of years, or rather of generations'. The rendering of this
through free indirect discourse is significant. Willoughby's suffixed opinion that
Esther's stupidity is not just a matter of the failures in her education and
upbringing but is in fact a symptom of heredity further dismantles the political
idealism he is earlier credited with. We are told that he had 'dabbled in
Socialism' but on being jilted by Nora had come to the conclusion that women
should be subject to the same privations of labour as men:
57Always in reference to the woman who, fifteen months before,
had treated him ill, he had said to himself that even the breaking
of stones in the road should be considered a more feminine
employment than the breaking of hearts. (ihid, 91)
His initial attraction to Esther was partly based in his socialist idealism—she as
'working daughter of the people'—and the empathy he felt with her as a fellow
worker. However, it is clear that his socialism is no match for his fear of
humiliation by women, on whom, in the above passage, he wishes the toils of
fruitless labour as punishment for their infidelity. Thus he uses his 'socialism' as
a justification for his interest in Esther, then disavows it when that interest
wanes.
Our story about a young, hopeful, idealistic man marrying a woman
turns out to be a deplorable sloven has been considerably disrupted. The
various climaxes of 'realization' for Willoughby—the little epiphanic moments
he creates for himself—are for the reader sites of convergence for complex and
contradictory elements in Willoughby's character. The sense of certainty in
summarizing this story is evaporated by the sense of interpretative openness that
the focus on psychology has brought. It is not just that D'Arcy has de-
emphasised action in the plot but that the interrogative quality of the character
presentation, the way in which we are left to do the detective work in
understanding Willoughby's motivations, problematizes our conclusions about
this story.
The complexity and interpretative uncertainty of D'Arcy's story arises
because of her refusal to arbitrate between the various possible readings of
Willoughby's character. His essential 'unknowableness' is the product of her
abstemiousness. It is not just that she writes 'short' but that what she omits is
the very orientational material required to fix meaning in the text. 'Abridge,
brother, abridge!' wrote Chekhov (1924, 72), but the art is in knowing what to
abridge. Like D'Arcy, he was fascinated by the ways in which short fiction
58could convey a sense of the inscrutable nature of human motivation. Although
his fiction did not become widely available to the English reader until Constance
Garnett's series of translations (1916-22), Chekhov's example is worth
considering here because his stories are, like D'Arcy's, based on narratorial
reticence and suggestion, a tactic which leaves it to the reader to state the
meanings (risking always reductiveness) that he withholds. Typically, Chekhov
will reveal character through a focus on external detail, the deployment of
symbol, a neglect of authoritative narratorial comment, an intrigue in perspective
or point of view. Thus a story like 'Misfortune' (1886), ostensibly about a
woman's struggle to decide between her husband and her lover, quickly becomes
a puzzling study of self-representation and possibly even delusion. Central to
the complexity of Chekhov's effects is the 'objective' nature of his narrative
presentation—the technique which eschews the intercession of authoritative
comment of the sort that would 'fix' significance. By seeking to manifest, to
'show forth', rather than to attribute meaning and close down interpretative
possibility, his texts remain interrogative. In such a system symbols will clearly
tend to attract a multivalent significance, as we are not directed towards any one
privileged reading of them. In 'Misfortune' several of the central symbols are
reiterated in various contexts and with explicitly different associations. A
railway line, for instance, at one point seems to represent a means of escape, later
comes to represent the limiting threshold of the characters' lives, then seems to
stand for a sense of inevitable and unalterable doom. Similarly, a fir tree gathers
possibilities: from its status as a calligraphic sentry on the horizon it moves to
being a symbol of passion in the mind of one of the characters. And the same
uncertainty attends the presentation of character. In 'Misfortune', as in D'Arcy's
story, the central character undergoes several 'resolutions', several little
epiphanies of heightened awareness, yet these are always the site of
contradictory strands in the character. The objective presentation never allows
59these to be graded or made explicit: it is down to us to distinguish between
delusion and actual self-knowledge, between truth and falsity.
Instability and plurality are conspicuous in the stories of the final—and
arguably most accomplished—I 890s writer I want to look at here. In her
collections Keynotes (1893) and Discords (1894) George Egerton (pseudonym of
Mary Chavelita Dunne) developed a technique of radical ellipsis that allowed her
to omit from her stories information that would usually be considered central. It
was this sense of what Egerton didn 't do in her fiction that troubled early
reviewers: 'Discords has been called a volume of stories; it is a misnomer, for
the book contains merely varying episodes in lives of men and women, with no
plot, no beginning nor ending.' 5 The echoes of Baudelaire's ideal for :i are
obvious, but more significant still is the sense that plot has been abandoned and
narrative confined to a series of discontinuous episodes. The idea in Pater and
Chesterton of experience and knowledge becoming narrowed and confined to the
fragmentary and impressionistic would appear to have found its ideal literary
form.
Frequently in her stories Egerton will omit important background
information: 'A Psychological Moment', for instance, concerns a woman who is
being blackmailed, yet we are never told why she is subject to this. In 'A Cross
Line' the central character is pregnant, yet that fact is never explicitly stated: we
eventually infer the crucial matter through oblique comments made to another
woman about children. At a more local level, Egerton radically excises basic
orientational material, often to startling effect:
'Do not I understand you a little?'
'You do not misunderstand me.'
'That is something.'
'It is much!'
'Is it? (searching her face). It is not one grain of sand in the
These comments by the Boston Traveller were quoted in promotional material
for the book promulgated by the publishers, Roberts Brothers. They are
reproduced on the endleaves of D'Arcy [189511977.
60desert that stretches between you and me, and you are as
impenetrable as a sphinx at the end of it. This (passionately) is
my moment, and what have you given me?' ([1893] 1983, 25)
It is not made explicit here whom the woman is talking to: we may infer that it is
the fisherman met at the beginning of the story from what she says of him and
from the mention of his grey-clad appearance. Nor is any of the background to
this conversation filled in: we have no knowledge of the previous dealings that
have brought them to this point in their relationship. The text is simply
presented to us as self-sufficient. The sphinx-like impenetrability described is
enacted in the presentation, too. The omission in the passage of reporting
clauses (a technique Hemingway takes to its extreme) creates a vivid plurality.
Is the 'searching her face' an action of his or a reflection (i.e. 'how searching her
face is')? Does he actually say 'passionately' in his final statement or does it
report the manner of his saying? The distance between narrative voice and
character thought and speech has collapsed through Egerton's abstemiousness,
her excision once again of basic orientational material.
The effect of this kind of elliptical writing is to break down any sense
of causality in the narrative. Compare for a moment the plot structure of the
Hardy with any story by Egerton for a sense of how radical the short story has
become. One is put in mind of Virginia Woolf s famous statement on the need
to suppress facile cause and effect in modem narrative. Egerton's short stories
prefigure much modernist innovation in form and reflect the impressionist sense
of reality as a 'congeries of fragments' apprehended by the individual mind.
Clare Hanson groups D'Arcy, George Egerton and Frances E. Huntley
together as specialists in the 'psychological sketch', a variety of short fiction
which typically deals with an apparently trivial incident made significant by
'what it reveals of a character's inner mood or state of mind' (1985,  15). Often
some deep change of feeling is the subject of these fictions, 'but this will be
conveyed obliquely, through symbol and repeated imagery, and will not be
61directly stated' (ibid). I would concur with Hanson's identification of the
oblique manner of presentation in these stories and their use of symbol and
interior monologue. However, I see a contradiction in her attempt to claim that
this 'impressionist' or 'plotless' fiction, with its oblique and suggestive manner
of presentation, is expressive of a world in which 'there are no absolutes', while
at the same time wanting to depict these stories as ultimately decisive and
unified (ibid. 7). The value of my interrogative theory is that it alerts us to the
fact that these techniques of interdiction, ellipsis and reticence in fact produce an
instability in meaning and an uncertainty about authorial intent. In other words,
it does not seek to recuperate the texts for some notion of unity of purpose or
effect; rather it validates their plural constitution.
In all the interrogative stories examined here shortness figures as a
positive—if positively disruptive—quality. The Hardy story by contrast was
merely truncated: its abbreviation was an external control. The value of the
interrogative approach will become clearer in relation to modernist writers who
put shortness to ever more radical uses. But for now I would return to Henry
James's preface to 'The Lesson of the Master' (discussed above) from which my
title for this chapter comes. I hope now that the implications of James's
description of the new short fiction he was witnessing are clearer: the aim is for
'brevity', but in a form that sustains 'multiplicity'. Shortness is to be allied with
possibility and amplification, not economy and confinement. The 'science of
control' is a science of implication, rather than of limitation. The significance of
such a science in the emergence of modernist writing I have already hinted at
and will elaborate in subsequent chapters. The development of short fiction
from the reductive artifice of Hardy and Dickens to the intense psychological
realism of George Egerton I have outlined here is perhaps best summed up by
Elizabeth Bowen in her introduction to Ann Lee 's, with which I concur and
conclude:
62Up against human unknowableness, I made that my subject - how
many times? The stories are questions posed—some end with a
shrug, others with an impatient or dismissing sigh.. .Yet I cannot
consider those trick endings; more, it seemed to me that from
true predicament there is no way out (1962, 94)
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The biologist Richard Dawkins once attended a lecture on the fig—not a
botanical enquiry but a literary one examining the fruit's textual and symbolic
history, its life as a metaphor, 'changing perceptions of the fig, the fig as emblem
of pudenda and the fig leaf as modest concealer of them' (1997, 1). He heard
about the fig in Genesis and D.H. Lawrence, social constructions of the fig, 'fig'
as a term of insult, how to 'read' the fig, and, indeed, 'the fig as text.' After a
time, Dawkins found himself provoked to literal-mindedness, and not just by the
lecturer's elegant, equivocating idiom. Rather, his discomfort was with a way of
seeing that overiooked so much. For in his search for symbol and significance
the lecturer was missing the most informative story of all—that of the fig itself,
the very matter of its existence, in which, suggests Dawkins, lurks the 'genuine
paradox' and the 'real poetry' (ibid).
Like the fig, Joyce's Dubliners has been ill served by a particular kind of
literary inquiry. While poststructuralists have celebrated the materiality of the
signifier in Ulysses and Finnegans Wake, testifying to the marvel of the fig itself,
critics of Dubliners have continued to focus on the symbolic values attaching to
the stories and how collectively these express the central theme of 'Irish
paralysis'.' Comments on the language of the text have been largely restricted to
an observation of its modest ambiguities. In part, of course, this critical
deprivation is the means by which the radical credentials of the later, greater
works are established, and a developmental metanarrative of Joyce's career put
in place. However, reading Dubliners against my theory of interrogative short
The interest in 'paralysis' emanates principally from Joyce letters to C.P.
Curran, early July 1904, and Grant Richards, 5 May 1906, where he talks of
Dublin as a 'centre of paralysis' (Ellmann 1975, 22; 83). 'Irish paralysis' also
crops up in Stephen Hero, where it is symbolized by a row of 'brown brick
houses' (Joyce 1950,188), and in Dubliners, where Eveline, in her story, lives on
such a row, as does the narrator of 'Araby'. 'Paralysis' readings are ubiquitous.
For a recent extended treatment of the theme see Heller 1995.
65fiction reveals the radical grammar of the text, how it cultivates indeterminacy
and plurality by its interstitial and interdictive narrative techniques and by the
use of free indirect discourse. In addition, I want to advance an argument that
throughout the stories Joyce in fact offers a validation of his own practice in
what he says about other texts and about language.2
Though an irregular witness to his own work, Joyce's readings of other
writers are never less than advisory. In a letter to his brother Stanislaus, dated 3
December 1906, he offers a slighting summary of Hardy's 'On the Western
Circuit' (from Life 's Little Ironies, 1894) which he concludes by asking: 'Is this
as near as T.H. can get to life, I wonder? 0 my poor fledglings, poor Corley,
poor Ignatius Gallaher. . .What is wrong with these English writers is that they
always keep beating about the bush' (Ellmann 1975, 137).
Richard Ellmann reads these comments as indicative of Joyce's 'moral
nature': the criticism Joyce is making of Hardy, according to Ellmann, is that he
lacked 'the courage to break through'—a 'moral fault' which in turn 'breed[sI a
literary one' (ibid. xiv). Ellmann's speculations here perhaps miss the point:
Joyce's judgement might as well be taken, in conjunction with the sardonic plot
summary he offers, as pertaining specifically to Hardy's formal shortcomings.
Joyce was, after all, engrossed in the theory and practice of the short story
throughout the first decade of the century, as his correspondence with Stanislaus
and Grant Richards reveals.3 Looking again at his retailing of the Hardy, it is
clearly a sense of the story's structural and representational failings that provides
the substance for his derision:
21n the 1998 volume Re.Joycing, Sonia Basic makes a similar proposal that we
should begin to examine Dubliners as a text of many 'uncertainties and
indeterminacies' and forego the temptation to 'rush to conclusions about facts'
(1998, 13). I discuss Basic's reading of 'A Painful Case' later in this chapter.
See, for instance, the letters on Dubliners to Stanislaus c.24 September 1905
(Elimami 1975, 75-8) and, in particular, to Richards 5 May 1906, where he
defends his style of 'scrupulous meanness' (ibid. 83), and 31 May 1906 on why
in the short story the slightest omission or effacement 'may be fatal' (ibid. 86).
66One story is about a lawyer of the circuit who seduces a servant,
then receives letters from her so beautifully written that he
decides to marry her. The letters are written by the servant's
mistress who is in love with the lawyer. After the marriage
(servant is accompanied to London by mistress) husband says
fondly, 'Now, dear J.K.-S-&c., will you write a little to my dear
sister, A.B X. etc and send her a piece of the wedding-cake. One
of those nice little letters you know so well how to write, love.'
Exit of servant wife. She goes and sits at a table somewhere and,
I suppose, writes something like this 'Dear Mrs X—I enclose a
piece of wedding cake.' Enter husband—lawyer, genial.
Genially he says 'Well love, how have you written' and then the
whole discovery is found out. Servant-wife blows her nose in the
letter and lawyer confronts the mistress. She confesses. Then
they talk a page or so of copybook talk (as distinguished from
servant's ditto). She weeps but he is stern. (ibid. 137)
Notably, criticism here is made through a parody of form. The details of the
wedding cake and the nose blowing are, of course, imported, but make the point
that the plot elements, like the character nan1s and types ('Mrs X', 'lawyer,
genial'), are interchangeable and dispensable. The plotty artificiality and
tricksiness of Hardy's story entail no necessity in the formation of character or
meaning. Joyce's impatience with the laziness of Hardy's practice is evident in
the cursory, variable summaries he is able to offer of the cuspidal scenes ('She
confesses'; 'writes something like this'), in the easy binary of the
characterization ('She weeps but he is stern') and in the mannered redundant
piece of dialogue that rounds off sleepily this very textual affair.
In part Joyce is arguing here for a more 'real' realism in much the same
way as Virginia Woolf, in 'Modern Fiction' and 'Mr. Bennett and Mrs. Brown',
would later for the novel. And it is the same revisionary anxiety that motivated
his infamous criticism of George Moore's The Untilled Field. As he wrote to
Stanislaus 19 Nov 1904 about Moore's 'The Wild Goose', 'A Lady who has
been living for three years on the line between Bray and Dublin is told by her
husband that there is a meeting in Dublin at which he must be present. She looks
up the table to see the hours of the trains. This on DW and WR where the trains
go regularly: this after three years. Isn't it rather stupid of Moore' (Ellmann
671975, 44)•4 But we can equally read his comments on Hardy as arising from his
contemplations on the short story. Joyce is arguing for an aesthetic of the form
that is radically different from Hardy's and, by implication, from the genre of
traditional plot-based story writing with which Hardy's text consorts. Indeed, he
would seem to be rehearsing here precisely the critical distinction outlined in the
preceding chapter. His summary of how in the Hardy 'the whole discovery is
found out' is, as we have seen, the climactic moment of disclosure in that sort of
story, and it is the moment when Joyce's patience runs out.
All of which raises the question of what Joyce proposed to do with the
short form himself now that, as Ellmann puts it, the idiom of twentieth-century
fiction was so clearly established in his mind (1983, 233). Joyce claimed
indifference to the stories of Gissing and Morrison (and downright hostility to
Moore's impressionistic, Iocal-colounst sketches), but his own practice in
Dubliners suggests that he was alert to their methods. Like the 1 890s writers
Joyce was interested in what effects could be produced by 'scrupulous
meanness', that is, by interdictive and interstitial narration and the de-emphasis
of plot structure. However, he was prepared to make the reader's entry into the
interpretative process far more problematic than were these earlier story writers.
With Joyce, it is not simply a case of the reader supplying missing information
or being left to speculate about consequences alluded to but not stated in the text.
Rather, as Cohn MacCabe suggests, Joyce's practice occasions a radical 'refusal
of agreement between text and reader' (1979, 30).
To demonstrate how this 'refusal of agreement' comes about I want to
look in detail, first of all, at one of the more blatantly interdictive and elliptical
stories, 'The Boarding House', which has been described by Fritz Semi as a text
of 'multiple misdirection and general discomfiture' (1988, 129). It proceeds,
4Joyce's scrupulousness in these matters is surely the inspiration behind Hugh
Kenner' s extra-textual reading of Frank as disingenuous in 'Eveline': Kenner
suggests that Frank could not have been intending to elope to Buenos Ayres as
direct sailings are not to be had to there from Dublin's North Wall (1972, 34-9).
68Senn argues, by leaving the reader out of the main events of the narrative: 'we
are detained by moments in between; the actions are off-stage.. .the overall
narrative agency and all three main characters are in harmonious collusion in
withholding the facts from us' (ihid, 121). Senn' s analysis accurately describes
the restricted viewing position given to the reader in the text, most clearly
demonstrated by the various 'interviews' which are said to take place between
the characters but which are never directly retailed to us. We find ourselves
always on the margins of understanding, never sure what exactly has transpired
off-stage, as it were. The 'open complicity' which is said to be lacking between
Polly and her mother is missing too in the relationship between the reader and
the text. Take, for instance, Mrs Mooney's initial intervention over her
suspicions about Polly and Doran:
When the table was cleared... [Mrs Mooney] began to reconstruct
the interview which she had had the night before with Polly.
Things were as she had suspected: she had been frank in her
questions and Polly had been frank in her answers ([1914] 1988,
69)
What were the questions asked and what were the responses given? What was
the nature of Polly's frankness? Was she upset or relieved at being discovered?
The reader must conjecture. Just as Mrs Mooney is said to deal with her moral
problems 'as a cleaver deals with meat' (Dub, 68), so the narrator is clinical in
his excision of information here.
Now, clearly this withholding is the means by which suspense and
intrigue are usually generated in narrative. However, Joyce sustains this
reticence throughout the text, even when he is describing scenes in which
matters are being resolved between the characters. This technique of instating
questions and enigmas while ostensibly providing answers is most clearly
demonstrated as the story moves to the climactic interview between Mrs Mooney
and Doran. We are not made privy to what transpires at that meeting; instead
we join Polly in Doran's room for a final scene which, while resolving matters
5Hereafter abbreviated as Dub
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and conduct of the interview between Mrs Mooney and Doran are left to
conjecture, that the decisive action happens, as Senn puts it, 'off-stage', but that
the narrative deliberately shifts focus on to a false centre:
Polly sat for a little time on the edge of the bed, crying. Then she
dried her eyes and went over to the looking-glass. She dipped
the end of the towel in the water-jug and refreshed her eyes with
the cool water. She looked at herself in profile and readjusted a
hairpin above her ear. Then she went back to the bed again and
sat at the foot. She regarded the pillows for a long time and the
sight of them awakened in her mind secret amiable memories.
She rested the nape of her neck against the cool iron bedrail and
fell into a revery. There was no longer any perturbation visible
on her face (Dub, 74).
The description of Polly in Doran's room directs attention to the hitherto
suppressed layer in the narrative which concerns Polly's motivations in the
affair. But instead of elaborating this or offering any explanation through the
medium of interior thought—a privilege we have enjoyed in relation to the
thoughts of Mrs Mooney and Doran—the narrative withdraws here into a
declarative, paratactic third-person mode. When thoughts come, the passive
constructions give the impression that they act upon her, not the other way
round. Polly is only active when she is physically doing something. A notion of
interiority is played with here, but the focus remains resolutely on the surface,
the performative. By the end of the scene Polly will have achieved the desired
state of passive expectancy whereby she does not know what it is she is gazing at
or waiting for. The important point to note here is that an intrigue in the
narrational perspective has occurred: we now view Polly without any
interpretative commitment from the narrator. Her 'amiable memories' and
'intricate' 'hopes and visions' remain 'secret' because the narrative, which has
up to this point given access to character motivations, now pointedly refuses any
such intimacy. This refusal can only strike us as interdictive because the text has
hitherto been prompting questions and instating enigmas concerning Polly's
70motivation, for instance through the song she sings, 'I'm a naughty girl' 6, and her
saying that she would 'put an end to herself, a comment clearly made for effect
given her blitheness once Doran has gone downstairs. In contradistinction to the
motivations of Doran and Mrs Mooney, Polly's are not being revealed. At the
crucial point, the narrative has become reticent.
We can now see the disruptive purpose of the text's earlier withholdings.
It was vital, in order to establish at the centre of the story the enigma of Polly's
mind, that we be given no access to her thoughts or explanations of her own
conduct. Accordingly, we are left with this curious discrepancy at the end of the
story: Polly emerges in our suspicions as the prime mover in the affair, yet she is
the character about whom we know least, whose motivations are kept from us.
Where earlier we were given the partial recollections of Mrs Mooney or Doran
(the occasion of the lovers' first congress is related through his recollections, not
Polly's), we now have a consciously thoughtless' third-person narration,
emulating stylistically the wilful passivity Polly herself adopts. The 'open
complicity' absent earlier on between Polly and her mother is, of course,
established now that she has made her confession. However, the reader is not
admitted to the circle of their familiarity. Thus, when we reach the close of the
story, the sense of an ending is attenuated by the feeling that the text mocks us
and our expectations of narrative closure and resolution:
At last she heard her mother calling. She started to her feet
and ran to the banisters.
-Polly! Pollyl
- Yes, mamma?
- Come down, dear. Mr Doran wants to speak to you.
Then she remembered what she had been waiting for. (Dub,
75)
That last line is reminiscent of the Calvino story quoted in chapter 1 above where
the reader is left counting how many pages are left till the end. Like Polly, we
too have been 'waiting'. The narrative may resolve for us on one level—it
6 As Zack Bowen illustrates, the song from which she sings describes a situation
very close to that narrated in the story, prefiguring, among other things, 'impish
Polly's contentment on Doran's bed' (1975, 17)
71person (1978, 18; 16).
Kenner's interest in Dubliners is limited, however, and he cites from
'The Dead' only as part of a wider developmental thesis about Joyce's stylistic
innovativeness. Clare Hanson has more recently attempted to expand on the
kind of observational formalism Kenner favours by arguing that the use of free
indirect discourse in modernist short fiction is expressive of an essentially
'relativist philosophy' underlying the form. Unfortunately, she does not get
further than Kenner in her account of how the technique itself operates and her
analysis of its local effects is limited to claiming that it creates a certain
'epistemological confusion' (1985, 58) in the stories. Moreover, she does not, as
Dominic Head points out, consider the ways in which free indirect discourse
may compromise or complicate the simple unity of the epiphany (Head 1992,
18-20), which she takes to be 'a structural equivalent for conventional resolution
of plot' (Hanson 1985, 7).
Head himself is author of by far the most ambitious and important
analysis of the effects of free indirect discourse in the short story to date. His
concern is with how the technique challenges the central 'unity' and 'epiphany'
tenets of short story criticism.7 According to Head, many of Joyce's epiphanies
are falsified. Rather than revealing a momentary, essential truth about a
character, he suggests, they convey a decided 'lack of illumination' (1992, 50)
and even a disruptive contradictoriness: 'The determining factor is the
consciousness that is taken to be experiencing the revelatory moment, and this is
considerably complicated by the destablilizing narrative technique of free
indirect discourse' (ibid). Head argues that Joyce's use of free indirect discourse
creates radically dialogic narratives. In his reading of 'Eveline', for instance, he
suggests that we should understand as self-conscious, romanticizing melodrama
the epiphany of Eveline as 'helpless animal, captive in Dublin' (ibid. 70). The
Head is not the first to question these canonic principles. See Zack Bowen's
important essay on the compromised revelations in Joyce's epiphanies (Bowen
1981).
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presented, Head argues, in 'the exaggerated language of romantic fiction' (ibid.):
'All the seas of the world tumbled about her heart. He was drawing her into
them: he would drown her. She gripped with both hands at the iron railing'
(Dub, 42). Her epiphanic moment here can be read as 'a strategy of self-
preservation, a wilful act of self-delusion' (Head 1992, 71) in which Eveline
protects herself from a dreadful acknowledgement of the unreality of her
elopement.
Such an analysis as Head offers here moves us on from the established
readings which focus on Eveline as victim of an oppressive social and familial
code of behaviour.9 Despite the importance of this breakthrough, however,
Head's thesis is flawed by an unwillingness to realize in his readings the full
consequences of the theory he devises. While rightly arguing for a designation
of the Joycean epiphany as 'a nexus of a variety of forces rather than a single
effect' (ibid. 49), he insists that no 'principle of undecidablilty is operative;
rather, specific kinds of ambiguity are examined in specific ways'  (ibid. 14-15).
For Head, ambiguity does not connote...a principle of undecidability' (ibid. 71).
Several difficulties emerge from this distinction, not least Head's failure to
define precisely how he understands the term 'ambiguity' in this context. As I
outlined in my introductory chapter, 'undecidability' is exemplified for Head in
Frank Kermode's The Genesis of Secrecy, with its argument about the final
inscrutability of all narrative. Contesting Kermode's reading of Kafka's 'Before
the Law' Head says that the story is 'ambiguous' rather than 'inscrutable'; but
this quality of ambiguity he is content to define simply as the fruit of Kafka's
'deliberate cultivation' (ibid. 15). Head's argument pivots on the suggestion that
'ambiguity' is something writers consciously generate, while 'inscrutability' is a
8 Head's analysis of 'Eveline' can usefully be read as a reply to, and
development of, those by Kenner 1972, 34-9, and Chatman 1978, 204-7
See for instance the essay by Clive Hart (1969, 48-52), and, more recently,
Harold Bloom's introduction to his own volume of studies (1988,1-30)
74critically unhelpful observation about the instability of signification. Clearly this
is insufficient, and it leads Head into some reductive readings which seem to run
counter to his initial assertions about the multivalence of Joyce's practice.
An example of this is his analysis of 'Clay'. Head distinguishes between
those stories whose epiphanies he calls 'external' or 'empiricist' and those he
calls 'internal' or 'relativist.' 'Clay' belongs (along with 'Counterparts' and
'Two Gallants') to the first category because its 'moment of revelation is
perceived to be beyond the consciousness of the central character'  (ibid. 54).
('Eveline' would be an instance of the 'relativist' epiphany by virtue of its focus
on a 'phase of the mind' (ibid)). The external epiphany in 'Clay' arises because
of the impercipience of Maria (she is blindfolded when she gets the clay in the
children's game) and because, Head asserts, the symbolic value attaching to the
clay (i.e. death) is a 'calculated detail' and 'the product of a literary
consciousness' (ibid, 56). Head is content to conclude that Maria is 'oblivious to
the cruelty [of the children's joke] and continues happily to enjoy the party'
(ibid, 55). In other words, Maria misses the point of the story, but the reader gets
it. She is metaphorically as well as actually 'blind' at the moment of revelation
of meaning in the text; significance is grasped by the reader in consultation with
the 'immanent authonal presence' (ibid. 56).
There are important shortcomings in Head's reading here that bear out
the general limitations of his approach. His insistence that modernist
practitioners of the short story sought to generate 'specific types of ambiguity' in
their texts has led him to conclude of 'Clay' that it is expressive of a 'lurking
traditionalism' in Joyce (ibid. 54) because it does not display a cultivated
ambiguity: its epiphany contains none of the invalidating details which
characterize the 'relativist' form (ibid. 56). In fact, 'Clay' is a radically unstable
narrative. Head's supply-side 'ambiguity' theory has blinded him to the real
'openness' of Joyce's story. As Margot Norris states in her brilliant analysis of
the story, Joyce sets up the reader as the compliant narratee of 19th century
75fiction, 'the putative listener who believes that Maria's life is simple, but good
and admirable' (1988, 148), but goes on to distress that construct by cultivating
indeterminacy at crucial junctures in the text. Take, for example, the following
passage from near the beginning of the story:
Maria was a very, very small person indeed but she had a very
long nose and a very long chin. She talked a little through her
nose, always soothingly: Yes, my dear, and No, my dear. She
was always sent for when the women quarrelled over their tubs
and always succeeded in making peace. One day the matron had
said to her:
—Maria, you are a veritable peace-maker!
And the sub-matron and two of the Board ladies had heard the
compliment. And Ginger Mooney was always saying what she
wouldn't do to the dummy who had charge of the irons if it
wasn't for Maria. Everyone was so fond of Maria. (Dub, 110)
Deciding the origin and status of particular judgements and observations in this
passage is highly problematic. The technique of free indirect discourse creates
doubt about how we are to understand the various utterances (MacCabe's 'lack
of agreement' between reader and text). The repeated intensifiers in the first
paragraph, particularly where they are attached to diminutives ('very, very
small'), echo Maria's underlexicalized mind-style with its clichés and tag-
phrases ('very big barmbracks', 'very nice people' etc.). Accordingly, we may
read these statements as expressive of Maria's (perhaps self-deceptive) sense of
herself as delightfully inoffensive, charmingly slight and beloved. This would
tally with her later feelings on viewing herself in the mirror in her 'little
bedroom': 'she looked with quaint affection at the diminutive body which she
had so often adorned. In spite of its years she found it a nice tidy little body'
(Dub, 113). However, there are other possibilities in the interpretation of the
quoted passage. The description of Maria may be an appropriation of a general
opinion about her: it may be the expression of a communal voice—the voice of
the other women who work with, indulge and tolerate her. As Norris suggests,
'the narrative voice.. .describes Maria as she would like to catch someone
speaking about her to someone else' (1988, 146). Certainly, it seems to be a
more objective point of view which takes over the remainder of that first
76paragraph, describing Maria's 'soothing voice' and relating it in free direct
speech. This uncertainty in deciding the origins of the various utterances
crucially affects how we take the comment at the end of the passage: 'Everyone
was so fond of Maria'. The polysyndeton throughout the last paragraph would
again seem to suggest that we are in the grammatically hobbled voice of Maria.
However, that final sentence, partly through the objectifjing effect of using her
name, floats free from certain attribution to Maria. Once again, we question if it
is Maria's opinion of herself—how she believes others think of her—or if it
relates a generally voiced opinion about her, emanating from the workers or the
board ladies. Alternatively, it might be read as narratorial judgement for or
against Maria, or for or against the others. Indeed, it could be all of these things
at once, and more. The point is that we have no measure for judging whether
this statement is ironic or said out of sympathy, irritation or tolerance; nor can
we be certain from whom it emanates and to what end it is being stated. In the
absence of a guiding meta-language the extent of the 'fondness' or otherwise in
which Maria is held is an impossible ledger to draw.
We have, then, a complex of possible readings of this apparently simple
old woman caused by a strategy in the narrative which denies ascendancy to any
one analysis. Far from understanding Maria as a poor old woman moved by
forces beyond her, there exists the possibility that she is entirely conscious of her
own status and the impressions she gives. The narrative fluctuates between
possible accounts of Maria as pitiably twee and intensely self-aware; between a
picture of her as duped in ignorance by life, working with ex-prostitutes for a
pittance, and one of her as author of a superior strategy of self-preservation
based on a version of herself as cultured, superior and of independent means.
We have to mediate between these various interpretations of Maria—and the
many in between—for ourselves.
At the point of closure this absence of an advisory perspective is
intensified by being manifest within the details of the story. The trick the
77children play on Maria in the divination game is conveyed 'blindly', the
narrative refusing to make explicit what is happening:
They led her up to the table amid laughing and joking and she put
her hand out in the air as she was told to do. She moved her hand
about here and there in the air and descended on one of the
saucers. She felt a soft wet substance with her fingers and was
surprised that nobody spoke or took off her bandage. There was
a pause for a few seconds, and then a great deal of scuffling and
whispering. Somebody said something about the garden, and at
last Mrs Donnelly said something very cross to one of the next-
door girls and told her to throw it out at once: that was no play.
Maria understood that it was wrong that time and so she had to
do it over again: and this time she got the prayer-book (Dub, 1 17)
The account of this event is conspicuously gap-ridden and interstitial. As Norris
points out, the critic who fails to interrogate 'the reason for the gaps or
[question] the function they serve risks being manipulated into narrative
collusion' (1988, 154). Norris goes on to relate the gaps in the narration here to
the protagonist's psychology, suggesting that they represent 'metaphorically, the
blind spot that marks the site of Maria's psychic wound, her imaginary lacks and
fears' (ibid. 156). 1 would suggest that the gaps serve to heighten the formally
indeterminate nature of the text, in keeping with the strategy observed above in
the discourse. At the very point in the story where the questions about Maria and
the extent of her self-knowledge could be answered (by representing her reaction
to the revelation of her true status as aged, close to death, and the dupe of
children) the narration goes, as it were, under cover, withdrawing, as with Polly
in 'The Boarding House', into a studied impercipience. It is not simply that we
are confined behind Maria's blindfold: interiority would still be possible despite
this. Rather, Maria is depicted quite simply as having no awareness of the
significance of touching the clay. The point of epiphany, in other words, does
nothing to settle the extraordinary conundrum in our feelings towards Maria: is
she utterly, pitiably ignorant or is she in control of the meanings of all she sees,
allowing others to carry off the awkward realization of the moment for her? We
cannot decide because at the very moment when we would expect a revelation of
Maria's self-awareness, the narrative makes absolute the impercipience it
78describes.
The story concludes by exemplifying the reader's predicament in relation
to this indeterminacy in the family's reaction to the incomplete 'text' of Maria's
song. The song Maria sings comes from Balfe's opera The Bohemian Girl and,
like Polly's song in 'The Boarding House', its context and content correspond to
details in her story.'° But where the resemblance was simply informative in
Polly's case, Maria's song interrogates meaning in the text of which it is part and
re-configures the process that the reader of 'Clay' is himself experiencing. The
verse that Maria omits to sing goes:
I dreamt that suitors sought my hand,
That knights on bended knee,
And with vows no maiden heart could withstand,
They pledged their faith to me.
And I dreamt that one of that noble band,
Came forth my heart to claim,
But I also dreamt, which charmed me most
That you loved me all the same (Gifford 1982, 80-1)
Joe, we are told, is 'very much moved' after Maria's rendition. But it is not clear
if it is Maria's mistake that moves him (to affectionate pity, perhaps), the
sentiment of the song, the fact that it is she who sings it, or indeed the quality of
her singing. Whichever, no one tries to show Maria her error, and no one
considers it other than a 'mistake'. Thus the function and significance of the
song is not decoded for the reader, and this is important in several ways. Most
obviously, the verse Maria sings relates to her own impoverished social position
by summoning a fantasy of wealth and class recognition. But in Balfe's opera
the song is sung by Arlene, a princess abducted by gypsies in her infancy who,
as an adult, is haunted by dreams of her former nobility. Taken this way the
song would seem to confirm the suggestion that Maria harbours a vision of
10 Cf. 'Eveline': Frank takes Eveline to see The Bohemian Girl, one of the
correspondences between the two stories which has led critics to read Maria as a
mature Eveline. See, for instance, Brandabur 1971, 67-73
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laundry, and even to the girl in the cake shop, confirming in turn the possibility
of Maria as author of a defensive strategy of self-denial. The omitted verse
creates more uncertainty still. Joe perhaps reads Maria's missing the verse about
the wooing of a suitor as a more or less conscious error on the part of this poor,
blameless spinster. But other hints lead us to another interpretation of the
mistake: we are told, as Mrs Donnelly plays the prelude to the song, that Maria,
'blushing very much, began to sing in a tiny quavering voice' (Dub, 118). The
last time we saw Maria so demure was with the gentleman on the Drumcondra
tram, a scene that again functions as a site of conflict and paradox in the account
of Maria. We are told that 'none of the young men seemed to notice her' on the
tram, but then 'an elderly gentleman made room for her' (Dub, 114). It is she
who elaborates his appearance, thinking of him as 'colonel-looking'. In fact he
is a fat, red-faced drunk. Maria favours him with 'demure nods and hems'
(ibid), and when she leaves the tram we read that 'while she was going up along
the terrace, bending her tiny head under the rain, she thought how easy it was to
know a gentleman even when he has a drop taken' (ibid). That 'tiny head'
echoes Maria's other observations of her own endearing littleness, adding to the
sense in the story of a very precise (and effective) self-consciousness at work.
The important point in this analysis of Maria is that the text does not
mediate between the conflicting versions that its techniques elicit. At the
conclusion of the story, we are presented not with arbitration but with another
unstable (and interstitial) text. We want to read the song as a key to decoding
the 'openness' generated by the free indirect discourse, but instead we get a text
full of holes that only serves to redouble the sense of indeterminacy. That 'no
one' shows Maria her mistake implies, of course, that everyone notices it,
including the reader. We all of us fall through the gaps in the text(s). Joe
becomes our metafictional representative at the end, offering a 'reading' of what
he has heard but more concerned by what he cannot find. As Patrick Parrinder
80puts it, 'Joyce's story is very like a bottle for which someone has hidden the
corkscrew' (1984, 53).
As was noted above, Dominic Head distinguishes between those stories
whose epiphanies he considers 'empiricist', like 'Clay', and those he terms
'relativist'. My analysis of 'Clay' has, I think, exposed the arbitrariness of the
distinction. This is not, however, to say that Head's theory of the 'relativist'
epiphany, as a term for describing the disrupted and disruptive nature of many of
Joyce's 'significant moments', is invalid. Rather, the weakness in Head's
argument lies in his limiting his readings of individual stories by an insistence on
'ambiguity' in contradistinction to what he terms 'unreadability'. In the case of
his 'relativist' texts this can lead him into the reductive practice of attributing
indeterminate utterances to particular characters or to the narrator. An example
of this would be his analysis of the final paragraph of 'A Little Cloud':
Little Chandler felt his cheeks suffused with shame and he stood
back out of the lamplight. He listened while the paroxysm of the
child's sobbing grew less and less; and tears of remorse started to
his eyes (Dub, 62)
Head considers the scene 'staged', with the language here belonging to
Chandler's 'own "poetic" turn of phrase' (1992, 62). The description of the
cheeks 'suffused with shame' is, Head argues, 'chosen for its alliteration,
without regard for the weariness of its cadence which is inappropriate for a scene
of highly charged emotion'. He concludes that 'the epiphany is thus a
falsification, designed to suggest that a magnanimous spirit of remorse allows
[Chandler] to display contrition for the hurt he has caused, despite the great
burden of artistic restriction he has to bear'  (lb Ed).
Head is right to suggest that Chandler's epiphany can be read as falsified,
his tears as crocodile—or at least as tears of self-pity for the failure in his artistry
and in his life. The problem is that in his effort to overturn the 'innocent'
readings which see Chandler's emotion as genuine, Head ends up closing down
the play of possibility that is inherent in Joyce's use of free indirect discourse. In
81other words, he simply displaces one reading by another, instead of recognizing
what Joyce's practice invites us to recognize, namely the plural constitution of
the text. As Roland Barthes puts it, 'To interpret a text is not to give it a (more
or less justified, more or less free) meaning, but on the contrary to recognize
what plural constitutes it' (1990, 5). Simply to impose a reading of Chandler's
epiphany as falsified rather than genuine is to sell short the plurality the narrative
generates at this crucial point. For Head the phrase 'suffused with shame'
betrays, by its alliteration, its origin in the poetaster Chandler with his 'attraction
to the surface qualities of words' (Head 1992, 62). From this he argues that the
'shame' and 'remorse' are constructs of Chandler's, not real emotional responses
befitting the scene. But Head has no grounds for attributing these words to
Chandler. They could as easily have emanated from the voice which narrates
parts of the story in straight third-person, without any trace of indirect thought.
That voice, too, is attracted to the surface of words: 'His hands were white and
small, his frame was fragile, his voice was quiet and his manners were refined'
(Dub, 76) contains alliteration and assonance within its balanced affectation—
traits evident, too, in the narrator's description of Gallaher with his lips
'shapeless and colouriess' and his 'thin hair at the crown' (Dub. 81).
Accordingly, we might well take the 'shame' and 'remorse' to be directorial
comments from the narrator (a point reinforced by the presence of the
objectifying 'Little Chandler' at the beginning of the paragraph) imposed in
contest with the facile poeticism belonging to Chandler.
My point here is not to try to reinvigorate the case for Chandler
undergoing a genuine revelation, but to insist that we recognize the matter as
undecidable (unreadable, if you wish) and that it is Joyce's narrative strategy that
has made it so. Rather than argue about who signifies 'remorse' at the end of the
story, we should acknowledge that we cannot be sure and enjoy the full
possibilities of the text's ultimate 'plural'. Rather than assert, as Head does, that
Chandler's feeling of remorse here is not a 'plausible emotion' (1992, 62) we
82should concentrate on allowing this valent signifier to play out its full potential
in our minds. Perhaps Chandler's remorse is a construct, but it might also be a
genuine revelation signalled by him or by the narrator—'a revelation of
imprisonment' as one critic has called it (Beja 1983, 10). Equally the narrator
may be stating it ironically, indicating that Chandler's tears come because, as the
child's sobbing subsides, another 'poetic' moment has been felt but not
realized." Or perhaps, as Edmund Epstein suggests, Joyce was already aware of
the various etymological siftings in 'remorse' (which include 'biting',
remarkably) and that there is meaning to be gathered from these too (1983, 60).
Once again, it is Joyce's narrative technique that has created these possibilities
and it is the critic's job, as Barthes suggests, to acknowledge the full extent of
this 'openness'.
The resistance evident in Head to any poststructuralist suggestion of
'unreadability' or 'indeterminacy' is a feature too of Phillip Herring's study,
Joyce c Uncertainty Principle (1987). Herring employs the term 'uncertainty'
explicitly to distance his thesis from 'indeterminate' deconstructionist
approaches (1987, xii). The 'uncertainty principle' states that although Joyce
produces 'ambiguous texts' he also provides 'the keys to interpreting them'
(ibid. 3). Herring adapts Joyce's use (in 'The Sisters') of the word 'gnomon',
applying its dual sense to the text of Dubliners as a whole.'2 The Euclidean
'guomon' is defined as a parallelogram that has had another small parallelogram
removed from one of its corners, and Herring advances this as Joyce's structural
' Michael Patrick Gillespie elaborates on the narrative technique which 'leaves
us to decide upon the amount of irony and of sympathy we wish to assign to the
situation' in relation to 'The Boarding House' (Gillespie 1989, 32).
12 He is by no means the first to harness the gnomonic concept. It has been
variously, identified with the 'impaired', atrophied characters who people
Dubliners, used as an interpretative key to their recomposition, and applied to
the text as a whole in order to explain its elliptical and interstitial structure and
language. See for instance Friedrich (1957), Fabian (1968), Leigh, J. (1983) and
Day (1988)
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the sense, however, of 'pointer', or 'indicator' and this in turn provides Herring
with the germ of his idea that the stories in Dubliners simultaneously 'point' to
the way in which they are to be interpreted. As he puts it elsewhere, 'Joyce
intended to give aid and comfort to the enemy'; accordingly, he 'provided
guideposts to interpretation' (1988, 40). In other words, Joyce generates only a
certain amount of uncertainty in the reader about what things mean in his stories,
and if that reader follows the clues he will eventually be apprised of the text's
theology.
Herring's is clearly a strident thesis and difficult to defend. Obviously it
runs the risk of becoming schematic in its readings, and this is something
Herring falls foul of, applying the geometric 'gnomon' to everything from the
lowered window shade in 'Araby' to the newspaper article relating Mrs Sinico's
death in 'A Painful Case'. More importantly, Herring supplies the 'theological'
meanings (in case we should ourselves miss them) for 'gnomon' along with
'simony' and 'paralysis', the celebrated triumvirate of feral signifiers from the
first page of Dubliners. They represent, respectively, the uncertainty principle,
the 'Church's role in Ireland's oppression' and the 'complicity of the Irish in that
oppression' (1987, x). Herring unites the three interpretations under the flag of
political subversion, suggesting that Joyce adopted his gnomonic approach in
order to facilitate 'embittered social commentary' in a time of censorship:
Readers alerted to the implications of the three key words from
the first.. could feel more deeply the political impact they
contain. In theory the author then need not fear censorship
because libelous thoughts are in the reader's mind, not in the text
(ibid, 7-8)
In essence, Herring is arguing that the 'openness' of the Joycean short story is
the result of the author's need to indulge in political euphemism. This theory
depends on fixing the meanings of Joyce's three signifiers: if they signify other
than what Herring says they signify—or indeed, if they represent, as Cohn
MacCabe suggests, a 'surplus of meaning' (1979, 34), or signify nothing certain
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because, like Head, he is intent on resisting poststructuralist 'indeterminacy'
readings. Herring wants to say that uncertainty is a feature of some texts, but not
every text, and of some language, but not all language (1987, xii). This leaves
him with the barbed matter of determining which words in which texts are
certain, and which are not. He is, to give one example, content that there is no
'uncertainty' about the presentation of Maria in 'Clay': as she looks in the mirror
'she seems totally lacking in self-awareness. ..in her innocence she cannot
comprehend the image or its implications' (ibid, 63-4). As with Head, this is to
stifle analysis with inflexible theory, to miss entirely the effect of Joyce's
narrative tactics and succeed only in displacing one reading by another equally
contestable one.'3
The theoretical debate I have established here between 'ambiguity' and
'indeterminacy' readings was usefully rehearsed on the pages of  Poetics Today
some years ago by Shiomith Rimmon-Kenan and J. Hillis Miller. Responding to
Miller's avowedly deconstructionist reading of Henry James's 'The Figure in the
Carpet', Rimmon-Kenan challenged the use of the term 'undecidability', which
Miller argued was preferable to 'ambiguity'. In reply Miller wrote that, whereas
Rimmon-Kenan employed 'ambiguity' as 'a specialized tool needed.. .to get hold
of certain stories by James and others', he sought an approach that demonstrated
'the impossibility of mastery...by such an analytical tool' (1980/1, 190).
'Undecidability' or 'unreadability' were preferred because they defined the
'impossibility of deciding whether or not a given text is 'decidable' or
'determinate' in meaning, that is, 'readable' according to a common definition of
readability' (ibid).
' To Head and Herring's theses might be added Cordell Yee's (1997) which
challenges the poststructuralist approach (particularly Cohn MacCabe's) by
resurrecting a principle of authorial intentionahism, claiming that the 'historical
Joyce sees language as a means to certainty, not doubt' (1997, 29). Yee's
observations on MacCabe and 'The Sisters' are touched on later in this chapter.
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status and the function of textual interpretation. In Head's and Herring's
readings 'ambiguity' is the necessarily refined critical instrument for
determining meaning in Joyce's stories. Neither critic applies their observation
that the texts are disruptive to the their own reading practice; they still
confidently impose limits on the 'openness' and polysemy of the stories, closing
down the plurality of their articulations. This is because they both approach
Joyce's texts from the point of view of their 'meaning' (however complex or
disruptive) rather than from the point of view of their textuality. Their interest is
not in the text as a 'galaxy of signifiers' but as a 'a structure of signifieds'
(Barthes 1990, 5).
The argument i am developing in my readings is that, as with Dawkin's
fig, justice can only be done to the full effect of the Joycean story if the critic
seeks to 'disentangle' rather than 'decipher', as Barthes puts it, its multiplicity
and materiality (1977, 147). Indeed, given what Joyce leaves out of or
suppresses in his texts, decipherment will always involve the critic in a
speculativeness that will itself be necessarily gap-ridden and suppressive of the
stones' plurisignificance and undecidability, a fact borne out by the quite
remarkable quantity of contradictory readings Dubliners has produced. Sonja
Basic suggests that this critical confusion arises because determinate readings of
the stories repeatedly encounter the 'stubborn resistance' (1998, 14) of Joyce's
text and that we must accordingly find another way of making our assessments
of it. The value of my theory of interrogative short fiction is that it does not seek
to decipher 'a truth or an origin which escapes play and the order of the sign' as
Derrida says in 'Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human
Sciences' (1978, 292), but instead attempts to credit the full significance (the
plurisignificance) of Joyce's writing 'short'.
Of course, the complaint I am making here against symbolist and
'ambiguity' readings of Dubliners was levelled long ago at critics of Ulysses
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acknowledge the ways in which Joyce's texts 'refuse to reproduce the relation
between reader and text on which literary criticism is based' (1979, 3). That
conventional relation is manifest in the procedures of classic realist fiction where
the narratorial meta-language is able to 'state all the truths in the object-
language(s)' and place the reader 'in a position of dominance with regard to the
stories and characters' (ibid. 14; 16). Thinking back on the complex experience
of reading 'Clay' we can readily see the ways in which Joyce's stories refuse to
conform to this convention. As Margot Norris says, the reader who believes in
Maria's innocence and essential goodness is like the docile narratee constructed
in 19th century fiction (1988, 148). Such a reader fails to become critic of his
own reading practice in the way Joyce's story demands he does. Throughout
Dubliners the reader's sense of dominating or mastering the story in front of him
is troubled and challenged.
MacCabe argues for a focus on the textuality and materiality of Joyce's
stories, for some recognition of their plural status. Taking 'The Sisters' for
exemplary analysis, he concentrates on the 'surplus of meaning' generated by the
story's 'excess' of signification. The famous three signs from the first
paragraph—' paralysis', 'gnomon', 'simony'—are the salient examples of
'signifiers which are not determined in their meaning by the text' (1979, 34). Jn
this gap between the act of signification and determining what is signified the
reader circulates, 'play-producing meaning through his or her own activity' (ibid,
35). MacCabe has been criticized by Cordell Yee for granting the material of
language primacy over meaning, which, Yee argues, must not be 'outlawed' or
relegated in this way (1997, 19). But Yee, in service of his argument that
Joyce's alleged 'intentions' can be used to establish his true meaning, misses
MacCabe's point that these signifiers are not determined in their meaning  by the
text. Like Phillip Herring, Yee elides the fact that the text itself does not explain
or fix the terms, and instead argues a case for his own interpretations of them,
87closing down the play of meaning in an analysis which is necessarily exclusive
and speculative.
Indeed, the confident attribution of meaning to the three signifiers in the
studies by Herring and others is no real advance on the drab symbolist accounts
offered by earlier critics, such as John William Corrington, who took the sisters
to represent 'the Irish Church', the chalice 'the Irish people', and so on in service
of a reductive symbolic schemata (Hart 1969, 2 1-22). A glance through recent
criticism of 'The Sisters' reveals no abatement of this habit. 'Paralysis', to take
just one example, has been variously interpreted as a euphemism for syphilis, a
physical manifestation of the 'gnomon' (in the sense of a partial lacking) and so
of the 'rhetoric of paralysis' (ellipsis etc.) characterizing the narrative style
(Heller 1995, 14); as expressive of 'dissolution' or 'unbinding' (from para-lyein:
to release, unbind) and linked toparesis, meaning 'to let fall' (Rabaté 1982, 53);
and, most popularly, as a metaphor for the doomed and self-defeating life of
Dublin (Parrinder 1984, 53). Fascinating as some of these readings may be,
lighting on any one of them to the exclusion of others is, I would argue, a
necessarily partial and unsound basis on which to form a generic theory of the
Joycean short story.
'The Sisters' is an important text, however, not only because of its
evident plunsignificance but because it contains within itself, I would suggest,
an argument, for the necessity of its indeterminacy, its reticences and
withholdings, interstices and interdictions—in short, for the plurality of its
discourse. My argument here arises from the observation that in this story, as in
every story in Dubliners, there is some commentary on the nature of language
and the status of texts. It is my contention that through this Joyce is expressing a
scepticism about the possibility of final or decisive meaning, a scepticism that is,
as I have been arguing, the central operative principle of his short story
technique. In other words, I am claiming that in his metalingual and intertextual
referencing Joyce is offering a validation for the interrogativeness of his own
88texts. Once again, it is only be recognizing the Dubliners stories as interrogative
short fictions that this perspective becomes available.
Like 'The Boarding House' and 'Clay', 'The Sisters' is an indulgent text,
foregrounding its gaps and enigmas and unanswered questions and challenging
the processes the reader undertakes and the expectations he brings to the site of
narrative. The characteristically elliptical presentation, however, is subject to a
further torsion, for the story is very much about knowledge and knowing and
about the quest for understanding. Throughout the story the narrator mirrors the
reader's interpretative activity, probing for meaning in the interstitial utterances
of Old Cotter and the sisters themselves, utterances more notable for what they
withhold than what they avow (Joyce's ellipses throughout):
—No, I wouldn't say he was exactly.. .but there was
something queer.. .there was something uncanny about him. I'll
tell you my opinion.... (Dub, 7)
*
—I have my own theory about it, he said. I think it was one
of those. peculiar cases.. .But it's hard to say.... (Dub, 8)
*
—Wide-awake and laughing-like to himself... So then, of
course, when they saw that, that made them think that there was
something gone wrong with him... (Dub, 17)
That last statement is the story's conclusion and comes amid a silence which has
taken possession of the house as it has the priest. The 'something' that went
wrong with Father Flynn looks back to Cotter's something uncanny' (literally
'unknown') at the beginning of the story. Similarly, the narrator feels that he
'has been freed from something' (Dub, 11; my emphasis) by the priest's death.
What these 'somethings' are is not made clear to us. What is more, even if
Cotter's 'something' could be identified, it would still be 'unknown'. As with
the estranging 'surplus' signifiers—paralysis, gnomon, simony—we are left to
conjecture as to meaning and significance from the contexts of reference and
utterance. According to Jean-Michel Rabaté, the boy narrator supplies the reader
'with a figure mirroring his own interpretative process' (1982, 49), drawing the
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(and, in the opening paragraph, of the priest's window, his attempts to 'read' the
steadiness of its illumination) and the reader's activity in relation to the signs of
the text. This is to take no account, however, of the differences between the
narrator's position in relation to the facts of the case and the reader's. The
narrator may indeed be left to read the silences of the other speakers, but the
reader is doubly distanced as he must read the narrator's silences about his own
understandings too. The narrator in fact plays the same game of withholding
from the reader as do the adults with him. What is the 'something' the narrator
feels freed from? What is the nature of his 'interest' (Dub, 8) in the news of
Father Flynn's death? Why his contempt for Old Cotter? Is it because the old
man knows or suspects that the boy's relationship with the priest was
'unhealthy'? Why does he think the priest in his dream smiles? What relation, if
any, does he perceive or intend between the three signifiers in the first
paragraph? Why does his story peter out in the meaningless coffin-side chatter
of the two sisters? What has he to hide? The narrator does not offer to explain
or clarify any of these questions he himself prompts. Although he implies that
he is, like the reader, involved in a process of learning and acquiring knowledge,
the narrator in fact acts to suppress recognition of the meanings lodged in his
own text.
Of course, readers of the jam doughnut school (can't see a doughnut but
they must fill the hole) are maddened by these deletions and withholdings and
seek to plug the gaps with their own extra-textual preserve. But rather than
speculate on how the narrator's relationship with the priest was constituted pre-
text, as it were, I think it can be argued that the story contains a justification of
its silences in the consideration it gives to the status of text and discourse.
There are several texts and documents alluded to (in various ways) in
'The Sisters'. In addition, the story also has things to say about the activity of
interpreting written forms. The narrator's recollections of time spent with Father
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the boy Latin, telling him stories about Napoleon Bonaparte, explaining the
ceremonies of the Mass to him and quizzing him on moral dilemmas, the priest
tells of how
the fathers of the Church had written books as thick as the Post
Office Directory and as closely printed as the law notices in the
newspaper, elucidating all these intricate questions. Often when
I thought of this I could make no answer or only a very foolish
and halting one upon which he used to smile and nod his head
twice or thrice. Sometimes he used to put me through the
responses of the Mass which he had made me learn by heart...
Dub, 11-12)
The priest's texts are authoritative, theological; their discourse is monologic,
patriarchal, patristic. These are texts (at least for Father Flynn) to rote learn, like
the responses to the Mass, their meaning transparent, unequivocal, transcendent;
texts which seek to displace multiplicity of interpretation by unity of
understanding, determining, for instance, what is sin and what is not, and
whether 'such and such sins [are] mortal or venial or only imperfections' (Dub,
ii). These texts pronounce; they are determinate.
However, many forces in the 'The Sisters' combine to undermine the
special status of these intertexts, among them the trajectory of Father Flynn's life
and death. His fall into delinquency and madness is charted against the doctrine
of his religious code. He is found by his sister, 'his breviary fallen to the floor'
(Dub, 16), and this idea of the facts of his life contradicting the textualized edicts
of his faith is captured in the description, again given by his sister, of the crucial
event in his demise: 'It was that chalice he broke.... That was the beginning of it.
Of course, they say it was all right, that it contained nothing, I mean. But still....'
(Dub,17). The sisters intend this as an expression of absolute belief (i.e. that
only the 'appearance' of wine was spilt, not Christ's blood and body), but the
statement is disturbed by a suggestion that such rituals may ultimately be found
to be meaningless—that the cup may be truly empty, after all. The point here is
that the disruption of the religious certainty is manifest in linguistic slippage.
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push against the pietistic (and, indeed, readerly) attempts to control or
consolidate meaning. As Joseph Valente states (adapting Bahktin), the
centrifugal forces 'tend toward heterogeneity, contingency, and freedom',
threatening the effort for 'conformity and control' characteristic of the sacerdotal
discourse (1988, 57). This threat to unity and certainty is finalized in Father
Flynn's deranged confessional: 'After that he began to mope by himself, talking
to no one and wandering about by himself.. .sitting up by himself in the dark in
his confession-box, wide-awake and laughing-like softly to himself' (Dub, 17).
The priest's retreat into meaninglessness occurs in a place where words are have
the special status as medium for the conferment of divine grace. In his personal
dissolution we see the unity and order of religious office exposed to the secular
contingencies of language.
In the narrator's observations, too, we find a mischievous resistance to
any discourse claiming to be conclusive or ultimate. For instance, his
recollections (quoted above) of Father Flynn's texts are juxtaposed with his own
reading of the 'theatrical advertisements' in the shop windows and his attendant
'sensation of freedom' (Dub, Ii). Similarly, the priest's death notice in the
window has replaced one normally stating 'Umbrellas Re-covered'. Reading it,
the narrator is 'persuaded' that Father Flynn is dead, though the notice presents
itself as unequivocal (Dub, 10). Even at prayer the narrator notices the presence
of other voices and acknowledges the pressure they exert on his own: 'I
pretended to pray but I could not gather my thoughts because the old woman's
mutterings distracted me' (Dub, 13). The effect of these juxtapositions and
interruptions and ironic downward conversions is to force each discourse—even
the narrator's—into dialogue or competition with others. The story ends with
the narrator taking on the silence of the house and letting Eliza speak, her final
'something' and concluding ellipsis as good as any other.
In this light of this reading, we might then take the gaps and withholdings
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story's culture of scepticism about authoritative utterance. Just as the technique
of free indirect discourse compromises an otherwise inviolable omniscient
perspective, so the narrator's reticence here may be taken as expressing an
awareness of the partial and incomplete nature of any point of view and of the
ultimately relativistic nature of any attempt at absolute definition.
The relationship between the narrator and Father Flynn is 'The Sisters' is
reminiscent of that which exists between Stephen and his ecclesiastical mentors
in A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man. There too we see a cultivation of
'linguistic heterodoxy' (Epstein 1983, 58) threatening the fixtures of religious
discourse. In his conversation with the priest early in part 4, immediately
following his religious amendment, Stephen encounters a troublesome signifier,
les jupes, which the priest uses in reference to Capuchin dress, but which
suggests to Stephen '[tjhe names of articles of dress worn by women' and an
attendant 'delicate and sinful perfume' ([1916] 1988, 158). In his subsequent
conversations with the dean, the same difficulties of containing association are
evident:
—One difficulty, said Stephen, in esthetic discussion is to
know whether words are being used according to the literary
tradition or according to the tradition of the marketplace. I
remember a sentence of Newman's in which he says of the
Blessed Virgin that she was detained in the ftill company of the
saints. The use of the word in the marketplace is quite different.
I hope lam not detaining you.
—Not in the least, said the dean politely.
—No, no, said Stephen, smiling, I mean...
—Yes, yes: I see, said the dean quickly, I quite catch the
point: detain (ibid, 192)
Stephen's juxtaposition of a literary discourse with that of the market-place, is
similar to the narrator of 'The Sisters"s bringing Father Flynn's religious texts
and dogma into contact with theatrical advertisements and shop notices. As one
critic of Portrait has put it, by flaunting the materiality of discourse Stephen
seeks to bring about 'relationship rather than control' in the text's community of
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fugitive—that there is an instability in the relationship of signifier and
signified—the dean here misunderstands (misreads) Stephen's meaning, which,
of course, itself emanates from another text—Newman's. Indulging the creative
instability of language becomes Stephen's real salvation as it does Joyce's
career.
I would argue that the refusal in 'The Sisters' and in A Portrait to accept
the monologic or authoritative declaration of meaning exemplifies the reader's
relation to these texts themselves. The reader should not seek to impose a
limiting 'certainty', the texts seem to caution, where indeterminacy has been
generated by the techniques of radical ellipsis and free indirect discourse. The
gaps in meaning are not there to be filled, the argument follows, but to be
embraced as essential to the economy of the texts. ThroDghoiit Dvbiiners we
feel the pressure of other points of view, other voices, other representational
methods whenever any one discourse seeks authority over meaning—and that
includes our own interpretative discourse. The concerted effort throughout the
text to resist the decisive or monological perspective applies equally to the role
of the reader of interrogative short fiction. Certainty is not on offer; our
interpretative gestures must be plaintive rather than declarative, pointing, like
Old Nannie in 'The Sisters', 'upwards interrogatively' (Dub, 12).
In every story in Dubliners there is some reference to or use made of
other texts or documents. In 'The Boarding House' and 'Clay', as we saw,
popular song was used both to consolidate and interrogate our readings of the
narratives in which they occur. In 'An Encounter' and 'Araby'—along with
'The Sisters' the other stories of childhood' 4—the intertexts function both to
question the idea of authoritative discourse and to reveal the devices which
narratives (including those of the stories themselves) use to generate meaning.
14 See Joyce's letter to Stanislaus, c.24 Sept 1905, for his division of the
collection into stories of childhood, of adolescence, and of 'mature life'
(Ellmann 1975, 78)
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reference to The Bohemian Girl, though the story also, arguably, parodies at its
epiphany the idiom of cheap romantic fiction. 'After the Race' makes glancing
reference to a song whose words are advisory (Cadet Roussel) while the use of
Silent, 0 Moyle in 'Two Gallants' has generated much critical speculation on the
symbolic and political meanings in that story.'5 'A Little Cloud', as noted above,
is explicitly concerned with the activity of textual composition in the mind of
Little Chandler, while Farrington's working day in 'Counterparts' involves the
transcribing of texts (and the occasional contemplation of their linguistic
structures). Books line the ordered shelves of Duffy in 'A Painful Case': his
mind reverberates with ideas gleaned from them, while poor Mrs Simco's death
is related to him in a newspaper article. 'Ivy Day in the Committee Room' ends
with the full text of an amateur poem; 'A Mother' includes references to texts
important to the Irish Revivalists; 'Grace' worries over the interpretation of Luke
16: 1-9; and Gabriel Conroy in 'The Dead' is exercised by the appropriateness or
otherwise of certain textual allusions. We might also add to this list of texts
present in Dubliners Stamslaus Joyce's claims that his brother based many of the
stories on his (Stanislaus's) diary entries and letters (1954, 526-7).
Patrick Parrinder has suggested that the insertion of all this documentary
material creates an effect rather like a Cubist collage (1984, 45). Despite the
questionable cross-cultural comparitivism, Parrinder is right to point out how
when placed in Joyce's textual environment ordinary referents, like signs and
notices, 'lose their purely instrumental function and can be appreciated simply as
items of language' (ibid). I would go further and say that what we are being
directed to is the material nature of language, the fact that a word's meaning is
not deposited within it trans-historically and immutably but arises from its
differential relation to other words (and, of course, from the differences between
the letters that make it up). Joyce directs our attention to this materiality and to
' SeeDay 1988
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by virtue of their extended sense-making structures an illusion of transparency,
meaningfulness, truth.
The story which most clearly demonstrates the consequences of this
awareness is 'An Encounter'. From the beginning of the story texts are placed in
conference with one another. In Joe Dillon's comic-book collection we have an
alternative library and literature to the officially prescribed classroom reading.
Text is set against text when Leo Dillon is found reading a number of the The
Halfpenny Marvel instead of Caesar's Commentaries on the Gallic Wars. The
hierarchy of reading matter is confirmed in Father Butler's rebuke:
—What is this rubbish? he said. The Apache Chief' Is this
what you read instead of studying your Roman History? Let me
not find any more of this wretched stuff in this college. The man
who wrote it, I suppose, was some wretched scribbler that writes
these things for a drink. I'm surprised at boys like you, educated,
reading such stuff...(Dub, 19)
The narrator feels a pang of guilt about his own secret reading on hearing this
statement of authority. However, he is conscious of the 'sometimes literary'
(Dub, 19) quality of the comics and it is this sensitivity that allows him to resist
the pedagogical imposition. Tellingly, the 'plot' of the narrator's adventure
begins the next day with an act of liberation from these official discourses when
he hides his school books in the grass (Dub, 20). But the subsequent adventure
does more than simply confront the bookish adolescent imagination with a
reality more threatening and feral than any text. The narrator's encounter with
the old josser revolves around textual allusion and some consideration of
language. It is important to the narrator to distance himself from the prankish
Mahony and establish his credentials with the old josser as a 'bookworm'
conversant in the works of Sir Walter Scott and Lord Lytton (Dub, 25). Thus the
narrator at once wishes for imaginative liberty from the officially endorsed
canon, yet at the same time desires admittance to the charmed circle of its
familiars. The strange last pages of the story focus on the mantra-like
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He gave me the impression that he was repeating something
which he had learned by heart or that, magnetized by some words
of his own speech, his mind was slowly circling round and round
in the same orbit. At times he spoke as if he were simply
alluding to some fact that everybody knew, and at times he
lowered his voice and spoke mysteriously as if he were telling us
something secret which he did not wish others to overhear. He
repeated his phrases over and over again, varying them and
surrounding them with his monotonous voice. I continued to
gaze towards the foot of the slope, listening to him  (Dub, 26)
As well as a passion for reading the narrator shares with the old josser a desire to
narrate and a sensitivity to the strategies for tale-telling. But although the
narrator listens his gaze is elsewhere. Repeatedly he refers to the old josser's
speech as a 'monologue' and by the end of the story his resistance to it has
hardened into 'agitation' and he seeks a 'stratagem' for escaping it (Dub, 28).
As in his relationship to Father Butler and the officially sanctioned canon, the
narrator desires the textual knowledge—and is fascinated with the language—of
the old josser. Yet there is also a need to resist their points of view, the attempts
they make at domination of both text and language through the establishment of
a canon and the 'monologue' of their opinions. Just as Stephen in A Portrait
must raise his own literary voice in response to the great monologue of the
Hellfire Sermon, so must the narrator of 'An Encounter' in his denial of the
priest and the old josser's efforts to prevail in language. It is not enough to
attribute the narrator's wish in 'An Encounter' to escape simply to his distaste
for the old josser's lecherous conduct. The construction of the adventure around
a shared textual world and yearning to narrate is indicative of his need to make
his own story, in his own way.
The resistance shown in 'An Encounter' and throughout Dubliners to
impositions of determinate meaning and textual prepossession is reflected in the
reticent, elliptical and interdictive narrative techniques employed. These
interrogative devices deny the reader's interpretative efforts any sovereignty over
the text's meaning. It seems to me that a critical theory geared to the recognition
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demands Joyce is making of us as readers but offers us some explanation of why
the Dubliners stories have generated such a wealth of contradictory
interpretations. The advantage of the approach I am advocating here is that it
allows us to embrace all of these legitimate readings without exclusion or
privilege. Moreover, it offers a formal justification based in the text itself for
why we should seek to ratify the plural constitution of these stories.
That demand for ratification is most clearly put in 'Ivy Day in the
Committee Room', arguably the most self-consciously elliptical text in the
collection. It is the story which most conspicuously disavows omniscient
perspective and narratonal metalanguage. Indeed, the narrator is unable even to
name characters as they appear in the story until one of the other characters
addresses them by name. As Colin MacCabe has pointed out (1979, 30), only
once is the flow of oblique and tangential dialogue interrupted by narratorial
comment, and even then only to explain a silence:
Mr Crofton sat down on a box and looked fixedly at the other
bottle on the hob. He was silent for two reasons: The first
reason, sufficient in itself, was that he had nothing to say; the
second reason was that he considered his companions beneath
him (Dub, 146)
This subtle passage, far from explaining anything, contains, I would suggest, a
self-referential joke. Crofton's magisterial 'silence' equates both with the role of
the narrator i this story (i.e. his interrogative reticence) and with the traditional
status of the narrator in general (the superiority of his discourse in relation to the
characters). Crofton, if you will, adopts here the pose of the author in A Portrait
who 'remains invisible, refined out of existence, indifferent, paring his
fingernails'. Thus, the one conspicuous entrance of the narrator in 'Ivy Day' can
be read as an exposure of the story's narratonal procedure—its 'silence' in spite
of its immanence.
The consequences of this 'silence' for us as readers attempting to fix
meaning in the story are manifest in the difficulties we have in ordering and
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story. If we are to conclude that Crofion is a right-winger or Lyons a
conservative liberal then we have to do so by inference. Fittingly, the central
character on whose behalf they are all campaigning and debating, Tierney,
remains off-stage, another immanent, 'invisible' presence whose failure to
signify at all reflects the refusal of any finally authoritative or mediative
perspective in the story. The difficulty we have in negotiating between the
voices in this ungraded polyphony is intensified when the intertext appears at the
end of the story in the form of Hynes's poem on Parnell. As with the characters'
speeches themselves we have no indication as to how we should take the poem:
literally? ironically? Our position in relation to it is reminiscent of how we felt
about Joe's response to Maria's song in 'Clay'. And as with 'Clay' we are
offered no assistance from the reactions of the characters: 'The applause
continued for a little time...' we are told. 'When it ceased all the auditors drank
from their bottles in silence' (Dub, 152). There is that silence again, played with
this time by juxtaposition with the description of the men as 'auditors'. We too
audit the conversations in this text, but the one voice that could verify our
audit—that of the superintending narrator—does not give us anything to listen
to. We cannot even read the extent of the characters' applause securely: how
long exactly is a 'little time' and how does that length of time, whatever it is,
gauge the men's feelings to what they have heard? The final sentence completes
the relationship between the intertext and the reader's encounter with its host:
'Mr Crofton said that it was a very fine piece of writing' (ibid). This final
statement, about writing, is unreadable. We cannot possibly know what Crofton
(a conservative Orangeman, from what we can gather) means by what he says
here. We feel even doubtful about what text these words refer to—Hynes's or
Joyce's. The use of the intertext has served both to intensify and exemplify the
reader's troubled relation to Joyce's interrogative short fiction.
'Ivy Day' is a story explicitly about a committee and the contrariness of
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the form of refusing coalescence of these voices. As we have seen, however,
those stories which focus on a single character are no more securely readable.
An exception to this, it has been claimed, is 'A Painful Case', which even the
committed poststructuralist Sonja Basic feels is a story with a stable and easily
recuperable thematic structure:
['A Painful Case' is] a story where the theme—the rejection of
life and love—is not only clearly outlined but also firmly related
to character motivation. We are not surprised by the ending of
the story: it seems to have been encoded in the protagonist.
(1998, 20)
It is odd to find Basic making this concession when her study has been about
overturning symbolic and thematic readings of the Dubliners stories. One can
certainly see where her conclusion that the story's central theme is the 'rejection
of love and life' emanates from. Duffy's 'epiphany' would appear to involve his
coming to realize the extent of Mrs Sinico's loneliness and his own culpability in
her death. His final inarticulate apprehension of himself delivers the complex
ironic realization that he is now as he said he wanted to be—alone—but that that
solitude and sequestration will one day be absolute and not of his making, as it is
now for Mrs Sinico.
To read Duffy's epiphany in this way (or in some other way that takes it
as a genuine moment of self-awareness) involves, however, suppressing the role
of free indirect discourse and the fact that Joyce has clearly compromised all
certainty regarding Duffy's character and motivation. Once again, the intertexts
that litter the story offer a starting point for my analysis.
Duffy, we know, is a voracious reader. His shelves are full of
informative intertexts and he is very conscious of his own role in relation to what
he reads and of the status of his own voice. In his copy of Hauptmann's  Michael
Kramer, we are told, 'a sentence was inscribed from time to time and, in an
ironical moment, the headline of an advertisement for Bile Beans had been
pasted on the first sheet' (Dub, 119-20). His relationship with Mrs Sinico
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with her the theories he has gleaned from them. Significantly, however, he is
unwilling to allow his own ideas expression in textual form:
She asked him why he did not write out his thoughts. For what,
he asked her, with careful scorn. To compete with
phrasemongers, incapable of thinking consecutively for sixty
seconds? To submit himself to the criticisms of an obtuse middle
class which entrusted its morality to policemen and its fine arts to
impresarios? (Dub, 123)
Duffy does not wish his own writings to be brought into debasing contest with
other voices. He does not want them contaminated by juxtaposition with adverts
for bile beans, for example. His passion, like that of the old jossers and the
priests in other stories, is for monologue, for the authority of his own utterances
to remain unchallenged, basking above the morass of enquiring dialogue. And it
is not only in the written form that DufFy desires the inviolability of his own
voice. In his conversations with Mrs Sinico he is sometimes aware of himself
'listening to the sound of his own voice' (Dub, 124). Tellingly, the break comes
with Mrs Sinico when she brings his words into conflict with her own: 'Her
interpretation of his words disillusioned him' (Dub, 124). He drops her because
she threatens the refinement of his dominant discourse by exerting the
'centrifugal' influence of her own ideas, thoughts and desires on his.
Of course, the irony that drains at Duffy's linguistic puritanism begins
with the central conviction he adopts to justify ending the relationship with her,
namely that 'friendship between man and woman is impossible because there
must be sexual intercourse' (Dub, 125). This idea is an appropriation from
Nietzsche, whose volumes stand on Duffy's shelves.'6 Ironically, the ideas and
tenets Duffy holds to and defends as his own are in fact borrowings by him. His
precious monologue is in fact pieced together from the texts of others; it is
already dialogi:ed. Later he is forced to read of Mrs Sinico' s death in the
'threadbare phrases' (Dub, 128) of a newspaper columnist, despite his best
16 The Nietzsche passage is in Thus Spake Zarathustra, I: xiv
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'inane' expression of this 'commonplace vulgar death' (Dub, 128).
Now, in order to read the epiphany as genuine we need to accept that
Duffy achieves some degree of self-realization, that he does indeed feel that his
'moral nature [is] falling to pieces' (Dub, 130). In other words, we need to
believe that the text foregoes the ironic undermining it has perpetrated
throughout and summons finally a determinate appraisal of Duffy which the
reader can take privileged possession of Well, I do not think any such thing
happens in this story; Joyce does not make that kind of concession. I would
argue that one crucial sentence undermines all possibility of a determinate
reading of Duffy's epiphany:
He had an odd autobiographical habit which led him to compose
in his mind from time to time a short sentence about himself
containing a subject in the third person and a predicate in the past
tense (Dub, 120)
The whole of the epiphany scene is conveyed through free indirect discourse,
much of it in the kind of short sentences described in this passage. Here is the
final paragraph:
He turned back the way he had come, the rhythm of the engine
pounding in his ears. He began to doubt the reality of what
memory told him. He halted under a tree and allowed the rhythm
to die away. He could not feel her near him in the darkness nor
her voice touch his ear. He waited for some minutes listening.
He could hear nothing: the night was perfectly silent. He listened
again. He felt that he was alone (Dub, 131)
The possibility exists, tantalizingly, that Duffy's epiphany is one of his
fictionalized constructions. Certainly, that would seem to be what Joyce is
suggesting by the preponderance here of short sentences containing a third
person pronoun and a predicate in the past tense. The effect of the free indirect
discourse is to undermine certainty of attribution in the language. We do not
know that these constructions originate in Duffy, nor do we know that they do
not. By slipping into free indirect mode here, Joyce is deliberately challenging
our interpretative certainties. If the various intertexts militated against Duffy's
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sovereignty over meaning. The semantic core of this story remains interrogative.
It is important to say something here about the concept of the epiphany in
general and the use critics of Dubliners have made of it. As was mentioned
earlier, the epiphany is often taken to represent a moment of revelation or
inscape which stands, in the economy of the 'plotless' short fiction, in place of
'conventional' plot closure. As Clare Hanson puts it,
Each of the stories of Joyce's Dubliners (1914) is structured
around an epiphany (literally, a showing-forth), and in many
'plotless' fictions a moment of heightened awareness acts as a
focus, a structural equivalent for conventional resolution of plot
(1985, 7)
Implicit in Hanson's analysis here is the idea that the epiphany represents the
structural centre of the Joycean story. In her subsequent readings she suggests
that the epiphany acts to unify the disparate materials of its text. Dominic Head,
as noted above, has done important work in challenging this assumption through
his notion of the 'internal' or 'relativist' epiphany which functions  against the
unity aesthetic. But he, like Hanson, fails to give the crucial context for the
definition of the epiphany offered in the Stephen Hero manuscript, which is as
follows
He was passing through Eccles Street one evening, one misty
evening, with all these thoughts dancing the dance of unrest in
his brain when a trivial incident set him composing some ardent
verses which he entitled a 'Vilanelle of the Temptress'. A young
lady was standing on the steps of one of those brown brick
houses which seem the very incarnation of Irish paralysis. A
young gentleman was leaning on the rusty railings of the area.
Stephen as he passed on his quest heard the following fragment
of colloquy out of which he received an impression keen enough
to afflict his sensitiveness very severely.
The Young Lady—(drawling discreetly).. .0, Yes.. .1 was. ..at
the.. .cha. ..pel....
The Young Gentleman—(inaudibly). . .1.. (again inaudibly).. .1...
The Young Lady—(softly). . .0...but you're...ve. . .ry...wick.. .ed....
This triviality made him think of collecting many such
moments together in a book of epiphanies. By an epiphany he
meant a sudden spiritual manifestation, whether in the vulgarity
of speech or gesture or in a memorable phase of the mind itself
(1950, 188)
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given in that final paragraph. Doing so, however, they omit to consider that the
illustrative epiphany offered is composed around a fragmentary colloquy. This
is an important point to note because it suggests that at the heart of this theory is
an awareness of the contingent nature of discourse, of the way in which, as
Bakhtin says, every utterance enters 'the dialogically agitated and tension-filled
environment of alien words, value judgements and accents' (1981, 276). Several
of the 'Epiphanies' are constructed in this way around passages of unmediated
dialogue:
High up in the old, dark-windowed house: firelight in the narrow
room: dusk outside. An old woman bustles about, making tea;
she tells of the changes, her odd ways, and what the priest and
the doctor said.....I hear her words in the distance. I wander
among the coals, among the ways of adventure.......Christ! What
is in the doorway9.....A skull—a monkey; a creature drawn hither
to the fire, to the voices: a silly creature.
—Is that Mary Ellen?-
-No, Eliza, it's Jim-
-o....0, goodnight, Jim-
-D'ye want anything, Eliza?-
-I thought it was Mary Ellen.....I thought you were Mary
Ellen, Jim— (1991, 165)
These other voices are not subsumed in the discourse of the narrator: there is no
'explanation' of them as object-languages, no privileging of the reader's relation
to them by an interpretation of their relation to the world. The voice of the
subject of the énonciation does not attempt to efface its own materiality or status
as discourse in relation to the subjects of the énoncé; it does not attempt to place
them or transcend their comprehension.
Obviously, the 'Epiphanies' are slight texts to construe a theory from.
Nevertheless, it is important to acknowledge, I think, that in the theory of the
epiphany there is an evident sensitivity to the dialogic nature of utterance. With
respect to Dubliners, it is obvious that such an awareness accords with the use of
free indirect discourse, the deployment of other texts and documentary
perspectives in the stones, and the exposure of the instability of signification, all
of which are ways of resisting the monologic point of view, of revealing the
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interrogative short fiction, then, the Joycean epiphany represents not a moment
of unity or resolution or even of ambiguity; its function is interdictive. It is a site
of conflict in the text which creates indeterminacy, where not only the dominant
diegesis of the story but also the reader's desire to impose his sense-making
structures are refuted.
*
To all I have said in this chapter about Joyce's interrogative short fiction I would
add finally, for closure, the example of 'Araby'. There is much to say about its
epiphany, in which the narrator's moment of self-awareness is precipitated by his
contact with perspectives which conflict with his own. As readers we must
negotiate, too, between our sense of what was actually felt and experienced by
the narrator in his childhood and what we take to be emanations from the
perspective he constructs in his maturity.
There is much to say, too, about intertexts—The Devout Communicant,
signifying, perhaps, the restrictive education and upbringing against which the
boy's passions are in such uproar; Walter Scott's The Abbot with its hero's
transformation from inconsequential youth to chivalric guardian of the queen's
secrets; the The Memoirs of Vidocq, memoirs of a criminal turned informer and
detective—very, much the career trajectory the narrator is pursuing against his
former self in this story. All of these, as one would expect, make their uncertain
demands on us as readers and vitally affect our understanding not only of this
best-remembered episode of the narrator's youth, but of his act of remembering.
But why I particularly want to end with 'Araby' is because of its initial
paragraph and what this reveals to us about Joyce's achievement in Dubliners:
North Richmond Street, being blind, was a quiet street except at
the hour when the Christian Brothers' School set the boys free.
An uninhabited house of two storeys stood at the blind end,
detached from its neighbours in a square ground. The other
houses of the street, conscious of decent lives within them, gazed
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The Street 5 blind in the sense that it is a dead end. That is, of course, a
metaphorical use of 'blind', but there is a further metaphor implied in this
context—'impercipience' (ironically, the literal meaning of the word, and
suggested by the sensory 'quietness' of the street) in the sense of 'ignorance' or
even 'moral' blindness. The 'dead-end' meaning establishes itself, but is then
quickly compromised by the return of the 'seeing' metaphor in which the houses
are described as 'gazing' at one another. Again, this carries a literal descriptive
meaning of houses standing opposite each other, but it also suggests lives
looking, perhaps censoriously or voyeuristically, in on one another. Later in the
story, the narrator watches from behind a blind in one of these houses Mangan's
sister, for the love of whom he is blind to his own better judgement. Finally,
there is the narrator in his maturity, 'watching' his former seIf percipient in
memory, seeing seeing.
I mentioned at the beginning of this chapter the reluctance among critics
to credit the revolution of the word in Dubliners. Reading through this
paragraph from 'Araby', one becomes conscious of just what Joyce did achieve
in his short fiction. Virginia Woolf's delighted realization, in 'Craftsmanship',
that it is not in the nature of words to 'express one simple statement but a
thousand possibilities' and her celebration that 'at last, happily, we are beginning
to face the fact' (1942, 126-7), is something we should recognize and celebrate
in Dubliners, not just in Ulysses and Finnegans Wake. Joyce did not simply
perform some formal innovation in short fiction, some modification of existing
practice. Rather he understood how the plurality and instability of language
could be exploited to radical effect by the interrogative short form, how
multiplicity could be achieved on behalf of—not in spite of—brevity. If nothing
else, I hope that the theory of interrogative short fiction I have brought to bear
here directs attention to the fact that Dubliners is born of language.
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'[Wjhat does one do with a writer like Hemingway,' John Updike has asked, 'so
impeccably modernist in his short stories and so grossly popular as a novelist
and cultural personality?' (1992, 695). Updike's question is rhetorical, of
course: he is showing what we do with Hemingway—we discriminate, select,
classif\j. And so we must, for Hemingway's status within modernism is not
secure. Joyce and Stein loom large as the originators of techniques of which he
is often considered a mere popularizer, a 'practical writer' as Frank O'Connor
described him (1963, 164), drawing on the experimental 'research' of his more
difficult and intellectual forebears. Indeed, John Barth is happy to omit
Hemingway entirely from his history of literary modernism, granting not even,
as Updike puts it, 'a "Terra Incognita" to mark his spot on the map of twentieth-
century letters' (1992, 695).1 If we are to argue for Hemingway as a significant
modernist then we will, it seems, have to admit straight away to the partiality of
our account.
In part the problem lies with the variable quality of Hemingway's output,
exacerbated by the habit he had later in his career of disavowing the very
techniques and devices on which his radical modernist work was based. If one
compares, for instance, the awkward, mitigating narrative fill-ins and flash-backs
of 'The Short Happy Life of Francis Macomber' (1936) with the beguiling, de-
stabilizing interstices and perspectival shifts of 'Cat in the Rain' (1925) then one
is forced to question even the assumption that Hemingway was 'impeccably
modernist' within the corpus of his short fiction.
Some critics, well provided for by the many biographical studies of
'Barth's conspicuous non-mention occurs in 'The Literature of Replenishment',
(1997, 193-206)
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positivist developmental narratives of the author's career. Michael Boardman,
for instance, argues that the variability of Hemingway's writing in the years
following the publication of A Farewell to Arms (1929) was in part the result of
his annoyance with readers who had failed to understand his earlier work.
According to Boardman, Hemingway's response to criticism that his work
represented a wilful and politically negligent 'avoidance of difficult social
problems' (1992, 164) was to divide his readership into the 'worthies and the
fools' (ibid. 147). The fools (largely, it would appear, subscribers to
Cosmopolitan magazine) were unable to grasp the subtleties of his implicative
method and so misconstrued his work as politically docile. The technical
crudities of later stones such as 'Francis Macomber' (1936) are to be read, then,
as expressions of Hemingway's anxious conviction that he would be
misunderstood, that he could not trust his readers, and that he had to explain his
meaning in spite of the cost artistically of such authonal intrusiveness.
Whether the technical shortcomings of 'Francis Macomber' are the
product of authorial contempt, or compositional anxiety, or some other distant
impulse, I am not concerned to pursue here. The imposition of the biographical
metanarrative shifts attention unhelpfully away, I would suggest, from how
Hemingway's modernism is configured textually. Of much more interest than
any real life party against whom Hemingway may be said to have contrived is
the notion of readership that his texts, especially the short fictions, construct for
themselves. We saw in the preceding chapter how Joyce used the interrogative
form to resist determinate constructions of meaning: he did not allow us to feel
that in the climate of uncertainty pervading his stories we as readers were
somehow in possession of a superior knowingness or point of view.
Hemingway's stories, at their best, are similarly interdictive of our desires to
impose interpretative unity. However, they differ from Joyce's texts in that their
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are established only to be subverted.
In the discussion which follows I will concentrate first of all on stories
from In Our Time. My interest here will be in how a theory of interrogative
short fiction can inform the controversy that has surrounded that text's generic
classification, i.e. whether it is to be considered an anthology, a novel or a hybrid
form. I will examine how the constituent stories subvert those readings that
locate novelistic continuities of extent in In Our Time, and from this give some
further consideration to the critical relationship between the novel and short
story that I introduced in chapter 1. For the remainder of the chapter, I will
consider a range of stories in which Hemingway exploits the interdictive and
elliptical strategies of the form, and offer a re-reading of his much-quoted
statement on 'omission' within my theory of interrogative short fiction.
Of sustaining interest to critics of In Our Time has been the difficulty of
deciding on a generic grouping for the text. The stories that make up the volume
are frequently anthologized as separate, self-sufficient works; yet at the same
time it is obvious—especially with regard to the Nick Adams stories—that an
awareness of their interdependence in the volume as a whole is crucial, even if
each text is to be encountered distinctly. The interchapters, for a start, seem to
offer some sort of unifying context, though precisely how they relate--if at all—
to many of the stories is not clear. Simple contiguity generates other suggestive
interrelations, especially so when we take account of the chronology that moves
us from stories of boyhood, through adolescence, the experience of war and
convalescence, to a certain reflective maturity. Add to this the recurring
presence of Nick Adams and it is clear that In Our Time is more than an
assembly of otherwise disunited texts.2
In his letters Hemingway showed irritation at the complacencies of
20n the general history of interrelated story collections and cycles see Luscher
(1989) and Goldberg (1996)
110editors and publishers who were insensitive to the importance of the arrangement
of texts in the volume. In a letter to John Dos Passos, 22 April 1925, he
complained of Liverright's desire to cut 'Indian Camp' and the interchapters,
stressing the violation that would entail of the work as a whole: 'Jesus I feel all
shot to hell about it. Of course they can't do it, because the stuff is so tight and
hard and every thing hangs on every thing else and it would all just be shot up
shit creek' (1981, 157). In his later correspondence with editor Maxwell Perkins
concerning the preparation of The First Forty-Nine Stories, he again sought to
defend the integrity of the text's organization: 'A book of stories,' he wrote, 'is
just as much a unit as a novel. You get the overtones by the juxtaposition of the
stories or by what you put in between them' (Bruccoli 1996, 188).
Comments like these have led many critics to read In Our Time as an
episodic Bildungsroman centring on the character of Nick Adams.
Unfortunately, this has entailed suppressing the many contradictory and
indeterminate elements generated by the constituent stories. Reading  In Our
Time as an episodic novel not only tends to reduce the disruptiveness of its
structure but also invites interpretative abuses. The novelistic readings depend in
particular on establishing thematic continuity through the wounded psychology
of the Nick Adams character. As David J. Leigh puts it, 'the shifting
relationships between the stories and interchapters. . [are] a structural
manifestation of the psychological coherence of the work' (1975, 2). The
progression in that statement from 'shifting relationships' to 'coherence', from
disruption to recuperation, exemplifies this approach. Leigh goes on to claim
that the book's patterning is directly expressive of the 'existential neurosis'
(ibid) from which Nick suffers. This centralizing of Nick's psychology is the
main device by which Leigh and others make In Our Time cohere. Though only
seven of the fourteen stories in the volume are explicitly about Nick, it is
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Foremost among the novelistic critics is Philip Young, who compiled the volume
The Nick Adams Stories (1972) in an effort to sort the incommodiously 'jumbled
sequence' of Nick's adventures by restoring to them a 'coherence' which had
hitherto been 'obscured' and 'fragmented' (Hemingway 1972, 5). In an essay
originally intended as the introduction to the volume he argues that Nick Adams
is readable as a continuous character whose developing psychology can be
followed through five distinct stages from callow youth to contemplative
maturity. For Young, Nick stands as 'the most important single character in all
[Hemingway's] work' (1975, 31). In particular, he suggests that 'The End of
Something' and 'The Three-Day Blow' 'are as closely related as chapters in a
novel' (ibid. 40) and that the latter story completes and explains the former
which is somewhat elliptical and evasive in meaning. In other words, the
atomistic nature of the stories (if treated as stories) can be subsumed in a
governing novelistic unity which situates them as 'chapters', as instalments in a
developing series concerned with the 'unifying consciousness' (Moddelmog
1988) of Nick Adams. Young's desire is in effect to recuperate the short form
for novelistic practice and for modes of reading which seek out patterns of
character development and other structural coherences, to privilege novelistic
serial continuities over the disparate, inconclusive properties of the short story.
Negotiating between these two approaches is a fraught matter.
Hemingway himself was equivocal, apparently emphasizing both the continuity
and discontinuity of In Our Time. In a letter to Maxwell Perkins concerning The
First Forty-Nine Stories he insisted that the interchapters not be run together as a
continuous narrative, in the way Perkins was proposing, that their effect
3Some critics even identify Nick Adams in stories in other collections. For
instance, Phelan (1998) is confident that although the Nick in 'Now I Lay Me' is
never given a surname, readers will 'automatically supply' that and the
'accompanying identity' (1998, 48).
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chapters give' (Bruccoli 1996, 262). Notwithstanding his excitement over the
suggestive contiguities and patterns in the text, Hemingway was clearly
determined that the stories from In Our Time retain their disruptive,
discontinuous individuality. As he cautioned Ernest Walsh, '[i]f you mention it
just call it short stories' (1981, 152).
Of course, it is possible to pursue some putative middle ground that
accounts for the text as a hybrid. Examples of this approach can be found in
Kruse (1967) and Slabey (1983). The problem with the hybrid theory, however,
is not only that it tends to predetermine equilibrium between the two constitutive
forms in the hybrid but that it implies that the purpose of their conjunction is to
create a new unity from the existing dichotomy. The 'hybrid' theory merely
reinstates coherence on different terms. It rules out the possibility that the
conjunction might be disruptive of the preconceptions and expectations attaching
to the two forms; it is insensitive to the reading that sees multiplicity of effect
rather than unity of purpose in the text.
Each of these generic characterizations satisfies particular aspects of In
Our Time but none is entirely sufficient. The reading of it as a simple anthology
is clearly impoverished, but by the same token the novelistic approach
suppresses the disruptiveness of the short story compositional method. The
'hybrid' argument is equally limiting (as such syntheses usually are) because of
its attempt to resolve the complexity of formal relations in the text by invoking a
principle of unity of purpose. Faced with this kind of critical uncertainty I am
prompted to wonder if in fact the answer to the question is determinable at all,
and whether we might not be able to embrace this uncertainty as something
4Nevertheless, E.R. Hagemann still seeks to do with the interchapters as Philip
Young does with the Nick Adams stories by examining them 'as an artistic unit',
arguing that they 'become an entity when rearranged chronologically' (1980,
255)
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Time arises from the disruption of its narrative continuity by the interdictive and
interstitial nature of the stories that comprise it. We are invited at various points
in the text to enlarge upon the emotional and psychological development of Nick
Adams, yet at the same time the naturally atomistic short story texts act to
undermine this effort. In other words, I am suggesting that it is the aesthetic of
the interrogative short fiction that causes the text to abdicate its novelistic
unities.
The first four stories in In Our Time—'Indian Camp', 'The Doctor and
the Doctor's Wife', 'The End of Something', 'The Three-Day Blow'—are
frequently treated as an episodic Bildungsroman. Readers seeking to understand
In Our Time on novelistic terms take these stories as consecutive instalments
tracing stages in Nick Adams's psychological development from youth through
to adolescence. Such an approach requires that we establish Nick as the centre
about which each individual text coheres; his presence as a continuous character
is the means by which unity is established.
The problem with this reading, however, is that it has the effect of eliding
the dissident or non-successive elements generated by the short stories
themselves. My contention is that the stories are in fact disruptive of the
apparent invitation to read the text continuously. Consider the first two stories,
'Indian Camp', and 'The Doctor and the Doctor's Wife', which recount two
separate scenarios in which Nick appears as a boy. The first tells of his
accompanying his father, a doctor, to an Indian camp where a squaw is about to
give birth. The labour is complicated and the doctor is required to improvise a
caesarean section using, as he later boasts, 'a jack-knife and sewing it up with
nine-foot, tapered gut leaders' ([1944] 1993, 88). After the birth it is discovered
that the father of the new-born has slit his own throat. The discovery of the
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something of what Hemingway called, in Death in the Afternoon, a 'wow
ending' quality about it.6 The suicide is a startling turn, occasioning an abrupt
revision of the father's bravura and boasting. However, Hemingway refuses to
allow this sensational turn of events to predominate. Rather, the story is
prolonged in a contemplative dialogue between Nick and his father which, while
seeming to analyse meanings in what has just happened, in fact is fashioned to
restrict articulation and, through this, to complicate possible significances in the
action:
'Why did he kill himself, Daddy?'
'I don't know, Nick. He couldn't stand things, I guess.'
'Do many men kill themselves, Daddy?'
'Not very many, Nick.'
'Do many women?'
'Hardly ever.'
'Don't they ever?'
'Oh, yes. They do sometimes.'
'Daddy?'
'Yes.'
'Where did uncle George go?'
'He'll turn up all right.'
'Is dying hard. Daddy?'
'No, I think it's pretty easy, Nick. It all depends.'
They were seated in the boat, Nick in the stern, his father
rowing. The sun was coming up over the hills. A bass jumped,
making a circle in the water. Nick trailed his hand in the water.
It felt warm in the sharp chill of the morning.
In the early morning on the lake sitting in the stern of the boat
with his father rowing, he felt quite sure that he would never die.
(Stories, 88-9)
The dialogue clearly reveals aspects of the doctor's character—his sense of a
particularly male grief and vulnerability that is the price of fortitude and
adventurism—but crucially it does not disclose anything of Nick's understanding
of what has happened. The reader sees the earlier posturing by the doctor (his
joking about the make-shift caesarean, his description of the birth as a 'little
6The description of the 'wow' ending comes in response to the Old Lady's
disappointment at the conclusion to a story the narrator has told her. 'Ah,
Madame,' he explains, 'it is years since I added the wow to the end of a story.
Are you sure you are unhappy if the wow is omitted?' ([19321 1994, 160).
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the woman's screams 'because they are not important') now give way to regret
and reflection and, even, an apology to Nick for having taken him to the camp in
the first place. But any recognition or appraisal on Nick's part of the
counterblast his father's self-approbation has just suffered is conspicuously
withheld. Nick asks questions that probe his father's earlier statements—about
the suffering of men and, differently, of women—but it is not signalled whether
he has acknowledged or even registered the exposure of his father in the way the
reader has. The reader considers again Uncle George's tellingly ambivalent
statement 'Oh, you're a great man, all right' (Stories, 88) but is not told how the
central character, Nick, reads that statement and George's subsequent
disappearance. The possible irony of George's words is neither certified nor
refuted by Nick; instead the penultimate paragraph slips away in a description of
the lake and the distractions of fish, details which may be functioning
metaphorically but which are certainly evasive of the central questions the text
itself is posing. The final paragraph then compounds the ancertainty by stating
Nick's conviction that he will never die. How we read this statement depends on
the extent to which we credit Nick with awareness of the corrosion of his father's
image—about which the text is, of course, reticent. The construction of that
final sentence seems to suggest that Nick's conviction that he will not die arises
from the comforting, controlling presence of his father. But the text seems to be
concerned with undermining the father's status, so is this statement perpetrating
an irony against Nick? Or does his feeling that he will never die arise from his
awareness of the weakness and fallibility of his father, from a realization that his
father is not always right, will not always be alive, and cannot answer all his
questions?
According to Thomas Strychacz, the doctor's answers to Nick's
questions leave the boy feeling 'oddly content' (1996, 63), but how can
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to Nick's thoughts. That closing statement is deliberately impercipient of Nick's
perceptions. We do not know what he knows or understands of his father. The
narrative creates a torsion between what we have seen of the doctor and what
Nick is said to appreciate or acknowledge. As with Joyce's 'The Boarding
House' and 'Clay', the text has withdrawn at the very point where collusion and
explanation are sought
The characteristic procedures of the interrogative short story have an
added dimension here because of the status of Nick as a quasi-novelistic
character. The invitation to read In Our Time with Nick as its centre conflicts
with the interrogative story aesthetic which typically resists such identifiable
character continuities; the 'open' form of the story, with its concentrated
uncertainties about Nick, works against the desire to read it as an instalment in a
concerted character development. Nor is it simply, as is the case with the
impressionist novel, that the various initially desynchronized scenes' will
ultimately come together to form a total picture of Nick. Rather, the interstices
in these stories will persist across the entire text.
As though to underline the refusal to centralize Nick as novelistic hero,
the second story, 'The Doctor and the Doctor's Wife', confines him entirely to
the periphery of the action. The story is intriguingly structured, with Nick
appearing afiei the closural moment in the main action of the story. Once again
there is a disjunction between the reader's sense of meaning in the text and what
Nick is permitted to know. Our 'central' character remains on the ignorant
margins of the text. The reader's understanding of the main action—the doctor's
confrontation with Dick Boulton and his humiliating climb-down—delivers
another 'lesson' about the father, but this time it is not simply that Nick's
feelings go undisclosed but that he is excluded from the demonstration itself
When Nick meets his father in the woods at the end of the story the scene
117probes at possible metaphorical meanings lodged in the main action, but Nick, of
course, has no notion of what has just occurred with his father and so cannot
follow these suggestions. Thus we see the doctor's act of placing Nick's book in
his pocket in relation to the medical journals that lie unopened in his bedroom
and thought of which irritates him after the scene with Dick Boulton. The book
furthermore alludes to his wife's telling treasury of texts: the Bible, Science and
Health, Quarterly. The doctor's reaction to his humiliation was, of course, to
reach for another kind of 'magazine': one full of shotgun shells. His ritualistic
cleaning of his weapon hints at a latent violence, a suggestion furthered by the
slamming of the screen door and his walking out into the cool of the woods to
calm himself. The final scene reads:
He walked in the heat out the gate and along the path into the
hemlock woods It was cool in the woods even on such a hot
day. He found Nick sitting with his back against a tree, reading.
'Your mother wants you to come and see her,' the doctor said.
'1 want to go with you,' Nick said.
His father looked down at him.
'All right Come on, then,' his father said. 'Give me the
book, I'll put it in my pocket.'
'1 know where there's black squirrels, Daddy,' Nick said.
'All right,' said his father. 'Let's go there.' (Stories, 96-7)
For the reader, following the shotgun scene, the 'hemlock woods' picks up on
the suggestions of violence and suicide. Of course, in so elliptical a narrative
these are suggestions only, but the important point is that we do not know if Nick
comprehends their significance. Nick, our central character, has been excluded
from the main action of the story. Thus he cannot know the emotional
significance or indeed the irony in his approbation of his father ('I want to go
with you'). Nor can he follow, as the reader does, the possible significance of
his father's taking the book from him. The doctor—intellectual, reader—has
encountered the will of male violence and found it beyond his control. His
cleaning of the shotgun, his refusal of reading matter, can be seen then as an
attempt to recover some sense of his own physicality. Nick's final comment
about the squirrels is intriguing because it is unclear whether the interest is in
118looking at them or hunting them. The reader can follow the trail of these
possibilities in relation to the events of the story; Nick does not, or, rather,
cannot. In other words, the reader is led into feeling that he knows more than
Nick. But the all-important thing about which we know nothing is Nick himself
Our central character is benighted, a marginal figure in the text, but we are in the
dark too about what he knows and feels and understands. Hemingway
encourages us to believe that Nick is the central interest of the story: 'Nick's
father' is how the doctor is referred to throughout. Yet not only is his centrality
undermined by the interrogative story form that does not afford him familiarity
with the events of his own narrative, we as readers are led towards an
interdictive blank centre. What does Nick know and feel about his father's loss
of face, his latent violence, his impotent rage? What does his approbation of his
father signify? And is it approbation, or pity, or fear? That which matters most
in this story—the centre to which we are led to believe everything tends—is not
articulated.
Those critics who would argue for the continuity of In Our Time as a
novel are required to suppress this troubling indeterminacy. Thus, Joseph M.
Flora, in his reading of 'The Doctor and the Doctor's Wife', cannot reconcile his
desire to read Nick as a developing consciousness with the story's glaring
evasion of Nick and ends up trying to fill the gaps and secure the novelistic
structure with his own extra-textual adhesive. 'Nick,' Flora suggests, 'probably
witnesses the scene of his father's humiliation in the confrontation with Nick
Boulton, though the narrator never mentions Nick's presence and Nick speaks no
words' (1989, 18). This startling act of wishful thinking is the result of a failure
to acknowledge the disruptive uncertainties created by the interrogative short
form. With In Our Time we are not reading chapters in a novel but a series of
autonomous texts; and it is this autonomy, this ability of the short story to
generate contrary signals, cutting across the continuous novel form, which gives
119the text its radical appeal.
The interdictiveness of 'The Doctor and the Doctor's Wife', its refusal to
disclose that information which it itself creates the desire for, exemplifies the
structure of In Our Time as a whole. Functioning against our desires to read for
coherence and determinacy in the text are the indeterminate and interrogative
constituent stories. As Beckett puts it in another connection, 'the units of
continuity have abdicated their unity' (1983, 49). Had Hemingway inserted the
generic designation 'novel' in what Derrida calls, in 'The Law of Genre', that
'most peculiar place' (1992, 232) below the title, then we would be justified in
recuperating these uncertainties and inconsistencies for our continuity reading.
But he did not, and the fact that he did not needs to be validated in our readings.
The two stories set in Nick's adolescence, 'The End of Something' and
'The Three-Day Blow', consisting of an account of Nick's break up with
Marjorie followed by a partial recitation of that event through an analysis of
possible reasons for it, are usually cited in support of a novelistic reading of  In
Our lime. Philip Young goes as far as to assert that the stories are 'as closely
related as chapters in a novel' (1975, 40), suggesting that the first requires the
second in order to reveal its full meaning. What controls Young's reading here
is the assumption that the second story exists in order to elucidate and augment
the first, that there is a continuity between them of the sort achieved by chapters
in a novel. What 'The Three-Day Blow' seems to offer is an exploration of
Nick's motivations in breaking with Marjorie, an expansion on the shifting,
laconic vagueness of his explanations to her. According to the novelistic
reading, 'The Three-Day Blow' arises principally from the insufficiency of
Nick's account of himself in 'The End of Something'. The presumption is that
as a novelistic hero Nick's motivations and psychology require amplification,
not concealment in the diffusions and Iacunae of a short story. The indirectness
of 'The End of Something' on this matter is an irritant to the novelistic reading.
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elaboration of Nick's character when his friend Bill begins to supply in the
process of their conversation possible justifications and explanations for Nick's
actions. Nick, however, is notably non-committal in respect of any of Bill's
suggestions:
'It was the only thing to do. If you hadn't, by now you'd be
back home working trying to get enough money to get married.'
Nick said nothing.
'Once a man's married he's absolutely bitched,' Bill went on.
'He hasn't got anything more. Nothing. Not a damn thing.
He's done for. You've seen the guys that get married.'
Nick said nothing.
'You can tell them,' Bill said. 'They get this sort of married
look. They're done for.'
'Sure,' said Nick.
'It was probably bad busting it ofT,' Bill said. 'But you
always fall for someone else and then it's all right. Fall for them
but don't let them ruin you.'
'Yes,' said Nick. (Stories, 115-6)
Once again, Nick's consciousness has been occluded. When the story does retail
his thoughts on the matter it is only to restate the facts of the case: 'It was all
gone. All he knew was that he had once had Marjorie and that he had lost her.
She had gone and he had sent her away' (116). The reader coming to 'The
Three-Day Blow', as Philip Young suggests we do, the better to understand 'The
End of Something' will be disappointed: the interstices which impeded the
novelistic centralization of Nick in 'The End of Something' are only multiplied
here. Furthermore, the turn in Nick's resolution with which the story concludes
amounts, I would suggest, to a refutation of the whole idea of these stories as
significant episodes in the Bildungsroman of Nick. 'The Three-Day Blow' ends
with the realization that 'Nothing was finished. Nothing was ever lost' (118).
This both promises a continuation of the Marjorie affair (which, of course, will
never be related to us) and a refutation of the controlling thematic of the two
stories expressed in the title 'The End of Something'. Nothing has ended; there
is no egress on offer here. Rather, we are presented at the end with a
reinstatement, another beginning which, in this highly interstitial text, will not be
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Some critics, such as Kruse (1967), Putnam (1984) and Comley and
Scholes (1998), have sought to establish the unity of these two stories by reading
the historical account of Hortons Bay given at the beginning of 'The End of
Something' as 'a poetic metaphor against which the story of Nick and Marjorie
resonates' (Putnam 1984, 74). The metaphorical reading arises, oddly, from the
conviction that the Hortons Bay history is anomalous and excessive, a violation
of the balanced unity and purposefulness of the short story. Underlying this
conviction, of course, is an established ontology of the short form that argues,
after Poe, that everything in it should tend towards a single effect. The Hortons
Bay narrative is spurious according to this theory and a way must be found of
recuperating it or the story will be deemed to be flawed. Hence the metaphorical
reading, the normalizing of the Hortons Bay story as an 'analogue for the
subsequent plot' involving Nick and Marjorie (Kruse 1967, 156).
It is strange considering Hemingway's modernity that anyone should
read the Hortons Bay passage as though it were a piece of Hardyesque historical
contextualization, placing the immediate drama of the story within a latitudinal
frame of reference. But that is precisely what Kruse, Putnam and others do.
Challenged by the seeming disparity of the Hortons Bay account they contrive a
method by which it can be made to 'belong'. I would suggest that rather than
seek to resolve jt as a metaphor, we can read the Hortons Bay account in such a
way as to sustain its curiosity, to acknowledge as meaningful its mark of non-
belonging. Here is the passage in its entirety:
In the old days Hortons Bay was a lumbering town. No one who
lived in it was out of sound of the big saws in the mill by the
lake. Then one year there were no more logs to make lumber.
The lumber schooners came into the bay and were loaded with
the cut of the mill that stood stacked in the yard. All the piles of
lumber were carried away. The big mill building had all its
machinery that was removable taken out and hoisted on board
one of the schooners by the men who had worked in the mill.
The schooner moved out of the bay toward the open lake
carrying two great saws, the travelling carriage that hurled the
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wheels, belts and iron piled on a hull-deep load of lumber. Its
open hold covered with canvas and lashed tight, the sails of the
schooner filled and it moved out into the open lake, carrying with
it everything that had made the mill a mill and Hortons Bay a
town.
The one-story bunk houses, the eating-house, the company
store, the mill offices, and the big mill itself stood deserted in the
acres of sawdust that covered the swampy meadow by the shore
of the bay.
Ten years later there was nothing of the mill left except the
broken white limestone of its foundations showing through the
swampy second growth as Nick and Marjorie rowed along the
shore. (Stories, 101)
The history of Hortons Bay is here presented as a unilinear narrative, or what
Gerald Prince in A Grammar of Stories terms a 'minimal story'. According to
Prince the minimal story 'consists of three conjoined events' the first and third of
which are 'stative' while the second is 'active' (1973, 3D The events are
'conjoined by conjunctive features in such a way that (a) the first event precedes
the second in time and the second precedes the third, and (b) the second causes
the third' (ibid). One example Prince offers is: 'John was rich, then he lost a lot
of money, then, as a result, he was poor' (ibid, 24). Notice that the final event
represents a reversal of the first. The Hortons Bay history accords with these
minimal story criteria: the town was rich on lumbering revenue (stative), then
there were no more logs to lumber (active), therefore the mill and its dependant
businesses fell away (stative reversal). The minimal story type clearly leads
towards decisive closure, and I would suggest that this is its function in relation
to the episodes concerning Nick and Marjorie. Rather than presenting simply a
background analogy to that story, as Kruse and Putnam would have it, the
Hortons Bay account offers a model of narrative closure from which Hemingway
has the Nick and Marjorie narrative aberrate. The description of everything
being taken from Hortons Bay on the schooner is picked up with Marjorie's
departure by boat at the conclusion to 'The End of Something'. That title and
that allusion, however, are undermined by 'The Three-Day Blow' which re-
establishes, as we have seen, the viability of the relationship. All that is resolute
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Nick and Marjorie story. The passage's non-belonging is in fact quite real: it
represents a model which is never obeyed, a discursive form which is
everywhere countered.
In a discussion of Prince's notion of the 'minimal story', Shlomith
Rimmon-Kenan cites as a counter-example a prototypical modernist short story,
Chekhov's 'Lady With Lapdog', offering the following paraphrase of it: 'Gurov
meets Anna Sergeyevna in Yalta, then they have an affair, then he returns to his
family in Moscow, she to her husband in a provincial town, then Gurov goes to
seek her out, then they resume their affair in Moscow' (1983, 19). Chekhov's
text, Rimmon-Kenan observes, suppresses the causal connections between
events. Furthermore, the chain of events 'does not display any obvious inversion
or closed cycle: the state of affairs at the end is different from the initial one, but
they are not symmetrically related (the characters are not 'happy' as opposed to
'unhappy' or vice-versa)' (ibid). The same might be said of Nick and Marjorie's
relationship in Hemingway's two stories. What Hemingway does that Chekhov
does not, however, is provide the reader with the model 'symmetrical' narrative
from which his texts subsequently diverge. Just as his stories court novelistic
continuities only to disrupt them, so determinate narrative models are instated in
order to be refuted by the host texts.
The determinate/indeterminate opposition arises because Hemingway is
using interrogative short forms to counteract narrative models of resolution,
closure and continuity. This is interesting in the first place because it
demonstrates clearly how the interrogative story functions. But more
significantly, it indicates a resistance to the kind of reading (and writing) that
seeks to determine meaning in texts. What the novelistic readers do is seek to
establish the continuities of In Our Time at the expense of the disunitying
occlusions and reversals in the constituent stones. In other words, they do not
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of reader seems to me to be the target of Hemingway's text.
Applying this argument to the issue of genre, I mentioned earlier how
Hemingway does not offer an explicit designation for In Our Time anywhere in
the text. That is, he does not seek to pre-determine our reception of it. For
many, this reticence is a challenge, like the gaps and silences in Joyce's stories,
to produce a defining taxonomy. But perhaps the point about In Our Time is that
it evades this effort. I do not just mean that it is an unclassifiable text in genre
terms, rather that its resistance to determinate readings is partly what it is about.
What the novelistic readings do is follow the text's genre marks: the insertion of
the nomination 'Chapter' between episodes, for example, the consistent naming
of a principal character, the apparent undertaking to follow through a
chronology, all condition the reading of the text as novelistic in purpose and
effect. As Jonathan Culler says, these genre marks are the means by which we
relate a story 'to a series of other stories, identif[y] it with the conventions of a
genre' (1981, 115): so 'Once upon a time', for example, establishes certain
expectations that the text will 'have a point to it, a moral which will govern the
organization of detail and incident' (ibici). The genre marks in Hemingway's
text operate in the same way, arousing expectations of a novelistic entailment,
but the interrogative components elude this teleological structure. As with the
Joycean story's refusal to provide the information which it has itself created the
desire for, so Hemingway's short fiction invites a mode of reading only to
interdict that mode's contingencies and insufficiencies. The novelistic genre-
marks and the closural narrative models seem to promise access to a kind of
determinate discursive practice. However, the constituent stones confound this
expectation. The enduring dispute over the generic classification of In Our Time
arises from the conflicting and irreconcilable signals that the text sends out. As
with Joyce, we need to recognize that this instability is the desired product of the
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away. The cultivated indeterminacies of Dubliners and In Our Time are not to
be superseded by some finally determinate reading of them. The reader is not
placed in that position of superiority in relation to these texts. Indeed, in
Hemingway's case it is precisely this readerly presumption that matters will be
made determinable that is subject to interdiction. Once again the interrogative
short form requires that we validate the plural constitution of the text.
That Hemingway himself valued this condition of undecidability is made
clear in his essay, 'The Art of the Short Story'. Written in  1959, this piece was
originally intended as a preface to a projected student's edition of his short
stories. Discussing his story 'Fifty Grand' he tells of how he there introduces
two women characters only to drop them again, seemingly without consequence
or significance. He writes to his student readers caddishly:
This is unlike what you will hear from your instructors, that if a
broad comes into a story in the first paragraph, she must reappear
later to justify her original presence. This is untrue, gentlemen.
You may dispense with her, just as in life. It is also untrue that if
a gun hangs on the wall when you open up the story, it must be
fired by page fourteen. The chances are, gentlemen, that if it
hangs upon the wall, it will not even shoot. ..Yes, the unfireable
gun may be a symbol. That is true. But with a good enough
writer, the chances are some jerk just hung it there to look at.
Gentlemen, you can't be sure. Maybe he is queer for guns, or
maybe an interior decorator put it there. Or both (1990, 4).
Hemingway here argues against the normative aesthetic of the short form which
states not only that 'everything must count' but that it must do so in accountable
ways. He demands the freedoms of inconsequentiality, subjunctivism,
interrogativeness. His reference to Chekhov's famous dictum is interesting
because it involves freeing the details of narrative from any obligation to
securely signify. He values as the best kind of story writing that which eludes
the teleological structure of symbolism—i.e. the means by which each element is
index-linked to a total meaning in the text. We saw the same desire for
plurisignificance throughout Joyce's stones, despite the best efforts of his
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furthermore, does not want there to be a choice of more or less determinate
readings of his texts: as he says at the end of the passage, it is not a case of
either/or but of 'both' interpretative possibilities being maintained at the same
time—possibilities both inextricable and immiscible. Notably, Hemingway
assumes that readerly acumen will run counter to such a radical programme, that
certainties of symbol and significance will, inevitably and irrepressibly, be
sought. As I have suggested in my readings above, it is against this construct of
readerly inclination that the short story discontinuities in In Our Time are
perpetrated.
At this juncture it is appropriate, I think, to consider how my reading of
In Our Time might impinge upon that most durable of controversies surrounding
the definition of the short story as a genre, namely its relationship to the novel.
In chapter 1 I described how in nineteenth-century England the dominance of the
novel largely explains the tardiness of writers in embracing the interrogative
short story there until the 1890s. This notion of the novel as dominant is picked
up by Mary Louise Pratt in a challenging essay, 'The Short Story: The Long and
the Short of It'. Pratt argues that the novel is by necessity, rather than as a result
of historical contingency, the preeminent prose form; the short story and the
novel, she says, occupy a relation not of 'contrasting equivalents' but 'a
hierarchical one with the novel on top and the short story dependent' (1994, 96).
Pratt's 'conceptual' validation for this is that 'shortness cannot be an intrinsic
property of anything, but occurs only relative to something else' (ibid). She goes
on to say that historically the novel has prevailed because it is self-evidently 'the
more powerful and prestigious of the two genres', with the short story the
'training or practice ground' for the apprentice novelist  (ibid, 96-7). The
attempts by theorists since Brander Matthews to establish what are the unique
properties of the short form should now, Pratt contends, give way to a
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story and novel' (ibid. 98).
Lurking behind Pratt's thesis is a somewhat populist appeal to the fact
that many writers begin their careers with a collection of short fictions before
moving on to the reputation-making business of writing novels. This
phenomenon is not, of course, unique to the twentieth-century: as we saw in
chapter 1 the rise in popularity of the short story in Victorian England was in
part fuelled by the demand from publishers for a low-investment testing ground
for talent that might find its full expression in longer work.7 But it is certainly
the case that throughout this century the 'pattern of working in the short story,
building a reputation, and advancing to the novel' (Barth 1973, 123) has been a
common one. Indeed, it is a struggle to name very many writers of note whose
careers and reputations have rested solely on short fiction. In English the list
would not run much beyond Katherine Mansfield, Frank O'Connor, Donald
Barthelme, Raymond Carver, and Alice Munro.
More serious objections to Pratt's argument, however, concern her claim
that the relationship between the two forms is one of 'dependence' rather than
'interdependence'. She states that '[t]he novel has through and through
conditioned both the development of the short story and the critical treatment of
the short story, but the reverse is not so' (1994, 96). There are two problems
here, one theoretical, the other historical. In the first place, Pratt is putting
forward a principle of non-contamination of the novel by the short story. She
sees the novel as self-sufficient, a totality, with the short form dependent or
supplementary to it. As Demda has pointed, however, the notion of a totality
based on this kind of expulsion, or 'supplementation', is illogical: the very
presence of the supplement corrupts the idea that we are dealing with a self-
7A comparative study of the importance of periodical publishing in the
establishment of the American short story in the 1 850s can be found in Marler
(1994).
128sufficient totality at all.8 The principle of non-contamination is already
compromised.
Arising from this theoretical demurral is the historical objection that short
fiction was indeed conceived of by modernist writers as distinct in theory,
practice and effect from the novel, and that in many cases the short story became
the aesthetic model by which novelistic practice was revolutionized, rather than
the other way around. Dominic Head points out, in his contestation of Pratt's
essay, that both Ulysses and Mrs Dalloway began life as short stories (1992, 6),
an observation that probably confirms Pratt's thesis if anything, as it suggests
that the story version was preparatory merely to the novels. Of far more
significance in the case of Woolf is the extent to which short fiction led her out
of the 'exercise in the conventional style' of her early novels. She wrote to Ethyl
Smyth of the story 'An Unwritten Novel':
[That] was the great discovery.. That—again in one second—
showed me how I could embody all my deposit of experience in
a shape that fitted it—not that I have ever reached that end; but
anyhow I saw, branching out of the tunnel I made, when I
discovered that method of approach, Jacobs Room, Mrs
Dalloway etc—How I trembled with excitement; and then
Leonard came in, and I drank my milk, and concealed my
excitement, and wrote I suppose another page of that
interminable Night and Day (which some say is my best book)
(1975-80, IV: 231)
That Woolf conceived of her major experimental novels from the practice of
writing radical short fictions is surely evidence at least of interdependence
between the two forms. Her diary entry for 26 January 1920 (a few months
before she began work on Jacob 's Room) confirms the importance of her
discoveries in the short story for the writing of her novels. She tells there of how
she 'arrived at some idea of a new form for a new novel. Suppose one thing
should open out of another—as in An Unwritten Novel—not only for 10 pages
but for 200 or so...' (1978, II: 13). This new kind of novel will be marked by its
8See 'Plato's Pharmacy' (1981, 61-171) and '...That Dangerous Supplement...'
(1992, 78-109)
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be seen':
Then I'll find room for so much—a gaiety—an inconsequence—
a light spirited stepping at my own sweet will. Whether I'm
sufficiently mistress of things—that's the doubt, but conceive
'Mark on the Wall', 'Kew Gardens' and unwritten novel taking
hands and dancing in unity (ihid, 13-14)
The effectiveness of the inconsequential narrative sequence was revealed to
Woolf through her experimentation with the short story, itself the result of what
she described in Moments of Being as her 'scenic' manner of recollection.9 The
'little separate incidents which one lived one by one' that Mrs Ramsay considers
in To the Lighthouse might well describe the episodic, 'scenic' structure of
Jacob 's Room. That these episodes could remain as self-sufficient narratives in
Woolf's mind is borne out by the story 'A Woman's College From Outside'
which originally formed a chapter in Jacob 's Room but which subsequently was
removed and allowed to stand as a story in its own right. That it could do so
suggests a process of composition the reverse of the dependence relation Pratt
argues for. If anything, the interrogative short fiction was the controlling generic
model in Woolf's manner of seeing, remembering and writing.
Pratt's assertion that the short form has never altered the theory or
practice of the novel is confounded not only by the inherent falsity of the non-
contamination principle but by the practice of modernist writers. Indeed, one
can see how important interrogative short fiction would be for modernism's
attack on teleological structuration, temporality and causality in narrative. In
Hemingway's case, short fiction was the form in which he explored effects of
textual indeterminacy and epistemological doubt. As Updike indicates above,
Hemingway's radical formalism is to be found in his short texts rather than his
novels, a point reaffirmed recently by Paul Smith who goes as far as to suggest
9cj could collect a great many more floating incidents—scenes in Kensington
Gardens...What then has remained interesting? Again those moments of being'
(1976, 77-8).
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tell stories' (1998, 1). What I would argue is that this distinction between
Hemingway's novels and his stories is critically configured in  In Our Time,
where the novelistic continuities of identity and extent are challenged by the
occlusions and indeterminacies of the interrogative short form. The notion of the
short story as docile dependant is invalidated by this central modernist text.
It is important to acknowledge, I think, that there are stories in In Our
Time in which Hemingway falls short of achieving the kind of fiction he praises
so highly in the letter to the students quoted above. Notably, however, these are
stories which divert most markedly from the Nick Adams character and so lack
that critical interaction with novelistic continuities. Those less successful stories
are constrained by precisely the sort of modest impressionism Hemingway is
critical of and depend for their effects upon often simplistic ironies and
inversions. 'Mr and Mrs Elliot', for instance, tropes on the idea of pre-nuptial
purity—'He wanted to keep himself pure so that he could bring to his wife the
same purity of mind and body that he expected of her' (Stories, 1 53)—only to
have that purity translated into sterility within the marriage, with a young
girlfriend functioning as surrogate child for the wife while the husband's nights
are spent fathering poems away from the marital bed. 'A Very Short Story' and
'The Revolutionist' avoid the 'wow ending' only by replacing it with a crudely
self-conscious bathos. The former concludes: 'A short time after he contracted
gonorrhoea from a girl in a ioop department store while riding in a taxicab
through Lincoln Park' (Stories, 136), while the revolutionist, proclaiming the eve
of global insurrection, finds himself ignominiously jailed by, of all nationalities,
the Swiss (Stories, 150). 'Soldier's Home' plays on the convalescent
suggestiveness of that title to work out its metaphor of confinement and
impotence, expressed ultimately in the image of the soldier going to watch his
young sister play indoor baseball! (Stories, 146). In these stories, Hemingway
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of the Short Story'. He achieves none of the plurisignificance and indeterminacy
in these stories of which he says the 'good enough' writer should be capable.
Where Hemingway does attain to his own ideal of the short story, it is by
virtue of his omitting from the text any governing symbolism or thematic
fixtures. In these texts there are no riddles or reversals that can be readily
assimilated by the vigilant reader. As with Joyce, the reader is not set in pursuit
of a buried key that he can then use to unlock the secret of the text's meaning.
Rather the very orientational material that would allow us to ascribe determinate
meaning is occluded. In this way the stories become interrogative rather than
just 'open' or inconclusive.
A useful text to illustrate how Hemingway achieves interrogativeness is
'Out of Season'. As is well known, this story originally carried an ending in
which the main character Peduzzi committed suicide. Hemingway's subsequent
omission of that ending was a crucial stage in his engagement with the short
story, as he explained in A Moveable Feast:
It was a very simple story called 'Out of Season' and I had
omitted the real ending of it which was that the old man hanged
himself. This was omitted on my new theory that you could omit
anything if you knew what you omitted and the omitted part
would strengthen the story and make people feel something more
than they understood ([1964] 1994, 63-4)
If we apply that ending to the story as it stands then we can see how significant
the omission is in confounding our efforts to ascribe a thematic or symbolic
order to the text. Peduzzi's suicide would make details such as his elaborate
greetings (which go unreciprocated), his reiteration of 'tomorrow', his joy at the
thought that '[d}ays like this stretched out ahead'  (Stories, 170), significant as
ironies. The young man's hesitation about joining Peduzzi the next day would
become afocus for the story's moralism, as would his giving Peduzzi four lire
instead of five in response to what would be his last request. The young man's
mysterious argument with his wife might then, by its very lack of foundation, be
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The couple's promising youth ('young gentleman', 'girl' etc.) would contrast
with his defeated maturity. His daughter's seeming disregard for her father as
the three pass her house would hint at a motive for his action, and perhaps for his
upset at the departure of the young wife. We can go on attributing significance
to the details of the narrative this way if we include the original ending: it
becomes a unifying force in the text. If we omit it, however, we find ourselves
at a loss to secure any such meaning in the story. The omission sacrifices, as one
critic has said, 'the logic of traditional narrative and rhetorical modes in order to
present the incoherence and incompleteness of action' (Strychacz 1996, 60). As
with the Nick Adams stories, the text presupposes that we will as readers seek
out significance and determinacy. The story is constructed in such a way as to
lay these trails, courting expectations of finality or resolution, only to divert from
them.
Paul Smith has suggested that 'Out of Season' is structured in such a way
as to centralize the conversation that takes place between the young couple in the
hotel. He derives a weight-centred ABCBA symmetry from the text: Peduzzi
and husband together (A), walk to the hotel (B), couple's conversation alone in
hotel (C), walk to the river (B), Peduzzi and husband together (A) (1996, 43).
This is interesting because that central scene—the conversation between the
couple—is marked out as perversely enigmatic: 'I'm sorry I talked the way I did
at lunch. We were both getting at the same thing from different angles' (Stories,
167). What thing? What angles? The scene is wilfully interstitial, creating a
desire for information that the text refuses to supply. With significance
displaced from the ending we may look for another ordering centre to the text,
and if we light on the conversation between the couple, as we seem to be invited
to do, what we find is simply another gap-site, a scene which remains interstitial
in itself and indeterminate in relation to the rest of the text. Indeed, we may feel,
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surplus of signification: it raises questions which the text will fail to resolve or
even engage with. The unity reader will be left uneasy and speculating, feeling
more than is understood. As Hemingway desired, the text will have resisted its
reader.
'Big Two-Hearted River' is another story from which Hemingway
withheld the original expository conclusion. Composed in the three months to
August 1924, it took another three months of rewriting for 'Big Two-Hearted
River' to realize its final published form (Smith, P. 1996, 42). The revisions
involved removing a long concluding passage in which Nick Adams meditates
on writing and on subjects which figure in other stories in In Our Time, such as
marriage and bullfighting. The omission of this material also meant that it was
no longer possible to establish Nick as the narrator of 'My Old Man'. Again,
Hemingway seems to have been intent on disrupting emergent continuities in his
text. Philip Young, however, recovers the omitted passage for his novelistic
enterprise, l'he Nick Adams Stories, printing it as a separate piece entitled 'On
Writing'. Whereas the published version of the story concludes with a
descriptive account of catching and gutting trout which is abstemious in respect
of interiority or psychological contextualization of Nick's actions, the omitted
ending involves the surface action of the narrative in a retrospective of the other
stories along with some contemplation of the art of writing. We are presented, in
other words, with an ending to which the detailed deferments of the preceding
narrative can be seen as tending. The laboured detail, the apparent descriptive
excess which characterizes the story and which has appeared to lack function in
plot terms is now made meaningful: Nick has been learning to write, learning 'to
write about country so it would be there like Cezanne had done it in painting'
(Hemingway 1972, 239). The text has been an argument in support of a thesis
which is now revealed.
134In the published version of the story, this significance is withheld. As
Scott Fitzgerald stated in a review in May 1926, the story is unusual because it
has 'no tail, no sudden change of pace at the end to throw into relief what has
gone before' (Meyers 1982, 72). Fitzgerald senses the way in which the story
continues at its end to defer significance, to refuse to unify or 'throw into relief',
all which has gone before. The omitted ending would have provided that
significance, hence its attraction to Young and his project. Hemingway,
conscious of refuting such reading practice, thought better of it.
Michael Boardman has suggested that the highly interstitial nature of
'Big Two-Hearted River' was the result of Hemingway's 'complete trust in his
reader': the text is so 'open' that the author depends on his reader to close its
circle, and that, for Boardman, is a relationship of trust (1992, 149). Implicit in
this reading is the notion that the text is a puzzle missing a piece, and that when
that piece is supplied (by the reader) the puzzle can be solved. Furthermore, it is
assumed that Hemingway 'trusts' his reader to locate and identify the vital,
occluded element. Such an assumption underlies the multitude of readings of
Hemingway's stones which seek to break their symbolic and semantic codes, to
order their dissonances and disunities and secure the significance of their parts. I
am arguing that, on the contrary, Hemingway's short story practice is marked by
a decided hostility to interpretative activities and of what they bring by way of
expectation to the site of the text. Hence the impedances perpetrated against
benignly novelistic readings of In Our Time and the stated resistance to the kind
of story in which symbolism and meaning can readily be fixed.
'Hills Like White Elephants' (published in Men Without Women, 1927)
demonstrates how 'positive' shortness for Hemingway involved removing from
his text whatever material would be restrictive of its plurality. The most obvious
way in which it does this is by refusing to make explicit the topic around which
the couple are circling in their fraught dialogue. By inference it is generally
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critics have long noted that Hemingway likes to insert textual blanks like this in
his stories, blanks which, as Hubert Zapf puts it, 'have an appellative function,
calling upon the reader's activity to supply the missing context' (1990, 96). Zapf
goes on to describe how throughout Hemingway's short fiction we are called
upon in this way to 'interpret implicit, ambiguous, or incomplete textual
information' (ibid. 97). But if we do supply the 'abortion' theme, does that
really solve anything for us in relation to this story?
My difficulty is with Zaprs critical vocabulary, this notion that the text is
'calling' us to 'supply' something that's 'missing', to reconstruct through
interpretation an 'incomplete' entity. Suppose we do supply that absent fact and
state that the couple are discussing an abortion. What would that explain?
'[One could go on forever inventing the situations that might lie behind the
dialogue' Milan Kundera has said of 'Hills Like White Elephants' (1995, 125).
Quite so. For example, who are the couple? Are they married? Is she his
mistress? Assuming that an abortion is what they are discussing—and it is never
explicitly confirmed by the text—is it his child? Is she resistant to his idea of an
abortion or is it she who has decided on that course of action and is now tested
by conscience or doubt? Does he want her to have the abortion for his own
selfish reasons or is he being supportive of her in the belief that, as he says, it
will be to her good? What is the extent of irony in any one utterance? In all the
utterances and gestures made by the couple we lack any adverbial mediation, any
sense of how—and consequently why—what is said gets said. How, for
instance, do we read her words, 'I was having a fine time'? or his, 'It's really an
awfully simple operation, Jig'? Is she being sarcastic or regretful, scathing or
loving? Are his words manipulative or are they comforting in recognition of her
fears? And are they even talking about the same thing in exchanges like this:
'You've got to realize,' he said, 'that I don't want you to do it
if you don't want to? I'm perfectly willing to go through with it
136if it means anything to you?'
'Doesn't it mean anything to you? We could get along.'
'Of course it does. But I don't want anybody but you. I don't
want any one else. And I know it's perfectly simple.'
'Yes, you know it's perfectly simple' (265)
His first 'it' appears to relate to the operation. But what of his second and third
'it's? Is he saying he's willing to go through with the abortion or the pregnancy?
And does the 'it' in 'if it means anything to you' refer to the putative foetus or to
his willingness to 'go through with it', whatever that 'it' is? Her question then—
'Doesn't it mean anything to you?—might refer to the foetus, and her subsequent
'We could get along' to her considering the possibility of life with a child.
Alternatively, she may be angered by his deferring aH responsibility for the
decision to her, in which case she would be probing angrily, as in 'Doesn't it
mean anything to you?'. Her suggestion that they could get along might be said
calmly, after some pause, and mean ' we could try not to argue'. His final
speech indicates that he thinks she means the pregnancy not the abortion by her
'it'. But it's not clear that she means that, and so this might be typical of his
misunderstanding her or lacking compassion for what she would have to endure
in having an abortion. His statement that he wants only her, no one else, might
strike her as selfish, in which case her final remark that he knows it's simple
involves not only sarcasm but an appropriation by her of what she takes to be his
sense of 'it' in 'it's perfectly simple'.
More generally, what do we know of his worries and fears? Are they of
the pregnancy? the abortion? the relationship? It might be suggested that in her
white elephants simile the woman is betraying her susceptibility to 'fantasies,
emotions, and impressions' (Smiley 1990, 290), while the man's reaction to it
betrays his insistence on 'facts and proofs' (ibid). However, as Kundera points
out, her 'metaphor-find' can as easily be read as 'mannerism, precocity,
affectation' while his coolness may be a necessary and helpful reserve
(1995,126-7).
As with the contradictory interpretations of Dubliners, there are so many
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itself is not the subject here. When the man says 'It's really an awfully simple
operation', that 'it' is exophoric, relating to something which exists outside of
what is retailed to us. The dialogue we witness is a weightless, repetitive
litany—'I'm fine', 'I know', 'It's all right'—because all meaningful explorations
of the predicament have been undertaken hitherto, in the pre-textual past, as it
were. We are merely given a recapitulation of sentiments, persuasions,
explanations and devices that have already been devalued in the minds of the
participants and which will not, accordingly, be elaborated for our interpretative
benefit. We encounter this text after the fact. All that matters in the story,
between the couple, we simply do not get to know.
Given the impossibility of any definitive penetration of this text, given
our marginal status, our ignorance in relation to the story's discursive situation, it
seems to me that the idea that we are there to 'complete' or 'supply' missing
parts, that the story shows a 'trust' in its reader who 'shares certain beliefs and
knowledge' (Boardman 1992, 149), rather misses the point. The interpretative
activity of the reader is being mocked by a text whose indulgent plurality puts its
beyond the realm of determinate reading Our assumption that we can scrutinize
it for meaning is what this text resists: we are detained at the level of the
signifier, unable to push through to an appraisal of the signified. Even the
story's single linguistic innovation, the one thing the couple say to one another
that they have not already said and found wanting as a solution to their
predicament—in other words, the one utterance whose referent exists within the
text and not in some undisclosed extra-textual situation—does not remain
constant. Early on the girl backs away from the image altogether: 'They don't
really look like white elephants. I just meant the coloring of their skin through
the trees' (263). Or does she back away? That second sentence may mean that
the hills look white the way elephant skin looks white when glimpsed through
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away from her metaphor at all as she is still maintaining that the mountains have
'skin' that looks like the skin of elephants. This complexity is intensified further
by her substituting the word 'mountains' for 'hills', which inflects the later use
of 'mountains' in a scene apparently connoting fertility and growth, and by the
couple's agreement that if she has the operation 'it will be nice again' if she says
things are like white elephants (264). The rhetorical riddle of the hills/mountains
is finally 'solved' only by having them disappear altogether from the story,
behind a 'later, sadder kind of landscape' (Hollander 1985, 215). If there is a
'white elephant' in this story it is the simile 'hills like white elephants'.
Kundera's essay on this story is particularly relevant to my study of short
fiction because of its opposition to what Kundera terms 'kitsch-making
interpretation' (1995, 145), that is, the sort of criticism that throws a veil of
commonplaces' (ibid. 146) over the complex singularity of the text. Of course,
all self-respecting criticism tries to avoid summary reductiveness, but Kundera's
finer point is that we should be able to recognize the elusive plurality—the
indeterminate 'present' as he terms it—of texts. Kundera's own analysis of
'Hills Like White Elephants' does not, significantly, involve raising an
interpretation of the story's meaning. In fact, he makes a point of working
through a pre-existing interpretation of the story (by Hemingway's biographer
Jeffrey Meyers) not to counterpoint it with his own reading but to demonstrate
how it is eluded by the text itself. Kundera sees the reader's task in relation to
this story as reportorial, computative.
I have been arguing throughout this thesis that interrogative short fiction
demands a similar readiness on the part of the critic to validate plurality and
indeterminacy as the desired and desirable products of the genre. We have to
understand these texts as total objects, complete with missing parts, and not seek
to limit their play by installing our own detenninate critical discourse. This is
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very much concerned with resisting interpretative interventions—so much so
that they often explicitly present critical abductions from models of narrative
continuity and closure. In 'Hills Like White Elephants' the non-mention of the
abortion theme works in this way by luring the reader into supposing that
cracking the riddle of the missing word will allow him to determine the text's
meaning. As Gerry Brenner describes, Hemingway lets his readers 'stew' over
the missing term knowing that 'once they discover it or its meaning, they will
feel they have solved the story and can mosey on along to the next one' (1990,
161). I would agree that Hemingway's stories do much to divest us of this
confidence, but I would want to add that this is because their techniques of
ellipsis, interdiction and reticence exploit the plurisignificant and differential
constitution of language; in other words, because they are interrogative.
Reading Hemingway within my theory of interrogativeness allows us to
revise our understanding of one of the central precepts of his story technique
which I quoted above—the theory that any aspect of a story could be left out so
long you 'knew what you omitted'. The 'omission' theory is interesting because
it suggests that what is radically absent from Hemingway's texts in their finished
form is nevertheless conventionally present during the writing of them. 'Out of
Season', as we saw, can be made benign by the restoration of its original 'lopped
offi ending; 'Big Two-Hearted River', though differently, also offers up a
developmental narrative if we consider it as tending towards the 'On Writing'
conclusion. Of course, it is naive to envisage the stories and the processes of
their composition in this way, but these examples of the 'omission' theory are
interesting because in both cases what is omitted is the telos, that point of
disclosure which retrospectively orders all the elements in the narrative, which
establishes them as constituent of a meaning that has finally been revealed.
Teleological structuring of this sort occurs at all levels in discourse. It is
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signified. Symbolism similarly works by the retrospective attribution of
meaning. So, for example, when we encounter a phrase like 'hills like white
elephants' we immediately attempt to normalize it within the text's discourse by
locating its sense. Again, we move from the act of signification, the moment of
the sign, to the imposition of significance. At narrative level we look for
meaning to be secured by resolution of the text's enigmas, by the revelation of
the significance of the narrative details.
Now, if we confound that teleological structure, if we fail to reveal or
make determinate our meaning, then we threaten the communicative process.
Hence the difficulty of assimilating Joyce's trio of signs, gnomon, paralysis,
simony, within his story 'The Sisters', or the enduring riddle of the hills in
Hemingway's text. These stories interdict teleological structure: they impose a
hermeneutic detention at the level of the signifier, resisting our desire to pass
through the word to what the word means. Interrogative short fiction works by
suppressing these explicatory connections, by refusing to supply a determinate
end-point that orders the various elements in the narrative. The interest that
Gerlach, Lohafer and others have shown in the point of closure in the modernist
short story, and which I discussed in the introduction, arises, I think, from the
form's suppression of these teleological structures. Gerlach, of course, only
witnesses the anti-closural gesture literally at the end of the narrative—for him
the 'open' modernist form is defined by way in which writers 'defused the
impact of termination' (1985, 74). My theory of interrogative short fiction sees
that resistance to closure at every level in the text, the result of the various
devices of reticence, ellipsis and interdiction intensifying the plurality and
indeterminacy of language.
In 'The Art of the Short Story' Hemingway expressed what was
essentially his scepticism about the kind of teleological structure I have been
141describing. There he states that with the 'good enough' story writer the gun
hanging on the wall, or any other narrative detail, will not make its symbolic
meaning determinable (1990, 4). At the level of the sentence, too, he seeks to
suppress the way in which causal relations build up towards determinate end-
points. Hence the fondness for parataxis, static repetition and polysyndeton, the
refusal 'to allow of trivial connections' (Hollander 1985, 212), that gives rise to
structures like these: 'When his father died he was only a kid and his manager
buried him perpetually' (Stories, 393); 'It was very hot and the express from
Barcelona would come in forty minutes' (262); 'We were all at the hospital
every afternoon, and there were different ways of walking across the town
through the dusk to the hospital' (256).
Hemingway's theory of 'omission' involves breaking the teleological
connections in his narratives at every level. The material he omits is that which
would allow us to secure symbolic and other meanings in his texts. In other
words, the omissions are interdictive of the expectations the stories themselves
generate. By removing the elements which produce teleological structures, he
leaves us with words which do not securely signify, symbols whose symbolism
is uncertain and narratives whose constituent parts refuse to cohere.
Jonathan Culler's notion of presupposition, which I mentioned earlier,
can provide a useful explication of the epistemological consequences of the
theory of omission. According to Culler, the logical presuppositions of a
sentence are all those statements which must be true in order for the sentence
itself to be true. So, I was delighted to hear that Bob and his sister Mary sold
their house presupposes that Bob and Mary sold their house, that there is
someone called Bob who has a sister called Mary, that they owned a house, that
there exists a means of buying and selling, and so on. This lowly sentence is
related by presupposition to a whole body of other sentences that must be true
(or false) in order for it to be true (or false). In everyday communicative terms,
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lies behind the statement we are making—we assume an inferential capacity on
the part of our interlocutor and so are able to communicate using a variety of
cohesive devices such as substitution, lexical reiteration and collocation.'0
Nevertheless, it is important to recognize that there is this narrative structure
underlying our most basic linguistic transactions.
Culler extends his definition of logical presupposition more informally to
clarify its importance in literature. The presuppositions of a sentence, he states,
'consist of all the assertions made by a sentence except the assertion made by its
surface structure predicate' (1981, 112). It follows from this that it would be
possible to make an assertion in a text indirectly by asserting something else that
presupposed it. We can adapt this to Hemingway's short fiction in a particularly
informative way by suggesting that the theory of 'omission' entails removing
that 'surface structure predicate' from the final form of the text. To return to the
example of John and Mary selling their house, if we list all the propositions
presupposed by that sentence, and then excise the sentence itself, we are left with
series of statements of random purpose: the main sentence is required as a
predicatory focal point establishing these statements as presuppositions. So, in
'Out of Season', the main predicate of that story which was present in
Hemingway's mind as he wrote ('you could omit anything if you knew what you
omitted') was the suicide of Peduzzi. Removing that leaves us with a series of
statements which function as presuppositions of an undisclosed central premise.
Similarly, with 'Big Two-Hearted River', the removal of the conclusion on
writing robs the story of exposition.
As an informative contrast to these stories, the uncharacteristic 'A
Canary for One' does contain its controlling predicate. In that story an American
couple travelling on a train encounter an old woman who, in the course of
'°Beckett's Watt, of course, lands us in a limbo of provisionality by foregoing
these cohesive economies and spelling out every presupposition.
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husbands as opposed to 'foreign' ones. The story's 'wow ending' is that the
American couple are on their way to Paris 'to set up separate residences'
(Stories, 326). That closural statement that causes the various details of the
story to emerge as presuppositions within the economy of the narrative: for the
story to 'work', for the ending to be effective as an ironic twist, these statements
have to be in place; once the main predicate is revealed their significance is
fixed.
When the man in 'Hills Like White Elephants' says "It's really an
awfully simple operation, Jig...It's not really an operation at all" (Stories, 263)
we find it so problematic deciding his meaning because his words have been
dislocated from the narrative chain of presuppositions. Our expectation is that
the text will at some point—usually the point of (dis)closure—restore to the
husband's words what was presupposed in the writing of them, for instance by
confirming that he is attempting to bully the young woman into the abortion.
But the main predicate concerning the husband is missing, hence we cannot read
his words here as evidence that he is bullying her: we cannot read them as a
presuppositions of a given statement 'He is a bully'. Hemingway has placed all
such conclusiveness outside of the text.
Returning to Frank O'Connor's comment that Hemingway was a
'practical writer', I am not sure that this is necessarily a disparaging or unhelpful
epithet. It at least directs our attention to the fact that Hemingway's
abstemiousness often involved simply lopping off material from his stories.
What is remarkable about his best work, however, is the extent to which it is
prepared to court misreading through its indigent signification. When we turn to
Beckett we find precisely the same willingness to 'fail' to make meaning. What
the theory of interrogative short fiction offers us is a way of validating that
'failure'.
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Throughout his career Beckett wrote short fiction, and from the publication of
L 'Innomahie in 1952 until his death in 1989 it was his favoured prose form.
Nevertheless, his principal critics have seemed reluctant to survey his work from
the point of view of genre. This neglect is surprising because from his earliest
published works Beckett was engaged in exploiting and revising the operative
principles of the interrogative modernist short form, particularly as he inherited it
from Joyce. Later, after the publication of the Trilogy, he turned again to short
fiction in his efforts to find a way to 'go on', and over the next fifty years
worked at the very limits of the genre.
The following discussion reflects the bipartite nature of Beckett's
engagement with the short story. In the first part I will look at how in his early
works, especially More Pricks Than Kicks, he undertook a parodic exploration of
the tropes and conventions of the modernist form. The interest here will be in
how his parodies and metafictional interventions provide a critical reading of the
form's interrogativeness that supports the definition I have been developing in
this thesis. The second part of the chapter considers Beckett's short fiction after
the Trilogy, in particular the 'residua'. In these works, Beckert explores to the
limits of intelligibility what can be achieved by the systematic occlusion of
orientational material in narrative. I want to argue that in 'Imagination Dead
Imagine' and 'Ping' we can discover not only how Beckett came to transfigure
literary modernism but also how he found a way to 'go on' from the aporetic
entrapment of the Trilogy. For these reasons, Beckett's work in the short form
exemplifies the theoretical thrust of my thesis as a whole. In the course of this
chapter I hope to communicate his importance both as an acutely critical reader
of the modernist form, and also the most ambitious exponent of the art of
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In the preceding chapter 1 discussed at some length the critical dialogue
which Hemingway established between the novel and short story in In Our Time.
It was suggested that Hemingway used the interrogative, interdictive modernist
form to disrupt the impetus towards novelistic continuity in his text. To a great
extent, of course, Hemingway's practice depended on a stable notion of what the
novel was and how it functioned, and, as we saw, he was at pains to establish in
his texts the kind of model narratives he was seeking to subvert. With Beckett,
the novel was never a consistent phenomenon. Nevertheless, like Hemingway
he did realize that interrogative short forms could be used in an interdictive
counter-teleological fashion, creating dead-ends and doublings-back within and
against a linear, causal narrative. Near the beginning of Watt, for instance, the
eponymous character loses his hat on a railway station platform. It is returned to
him by a newsagent of whom we are told the following:
Now at the end of the platform the newsagent came out of a door,
wheeling his bicycle. He would carry it down the winding stone
stairs and then ride home. There he would play a game of chess,
between masters, out of Mr. Staunton's handbook. The next
morning he would carry his bicycle up the stairs again. It was
heavy, being a very good bicycle. It would have been simpler to
leave it below, but he preferred to have it near him. This man's
name was Evans. (1976, 24)
Elsewhere on the one page he occupies we are told the shape of Evans's mouth,
the colour of his hair, how he dresses, how he walks, and so on. The narrator
even enters some speculation (over some things but not others is he obliged to
conjecture) about Evans's apparent disequanimity: 'He seemed a man of more
than usual acerbity, and to suffer from unremitting mental, moral and perhaps
even physical pain' (ibid. 23). None of which is remarkable in any way, except
that Evans is never mentioned again in the novel. A discrepancy of extent
therefore arises between the account given of him and the function of that
account in relation to the dominant diegesis of the text. The delight of the
passage lies in the way in which it appears to be stabilizing meaning, presenting
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text. 'This man's name was Evans', the extract concludes, as though that
matters, as though the preceding paragraph has somehow established the validity
and significance of that declaration.
The Evans episode is one of many such seemingly inconsequential
abductions, tangents, counter-teleological diversions in Walt. Characters and
events come and go in this way without any effort by Beckett to resolve their
discursive codes in relation to the host narrative; it is as though they are brought
about, these episodes, only to prove their redundancy, their recalcitrance to the
principle by which texts attain to what Frank Kermode calls 'sense-making'
form (1967, 3). We are persistently waylaid by the text's surplus signification;
we follow the trails it lays in the belief (a belief born of our experience of
narrative tropes and conventions) that significance will be uncovered, that the
thirty or so pages devoted to Arthur's story of his friend Ernest Louit, for
instance, will reolve to function as metadiegesis, as a story within the story
offering, as David Watson says, 'a certain crystallisation en abyme of the
macrocosmic fiction' (1991, 19) in which it occurs.1 The story of Louit, like the
intervention of Evans, is full of enticements towards precisely this kind of
reading: it begins as an anecdotal illustration during a conversation about a
restorative drug called Bando. 'But I shall better illustrate what I mean,' says
Arthur, 'if I tell you what happened to my old friend, Mr. Ernest Louit...' (1976,
169) and then embarks on his lengthy account of Louit's dealings with Thomas
Nackybal, an idiot savant with an extraordinary capacity for square and cube
roots. But Arthur loses heart in his recitation which at no point mentions Bando,
the subject of which it is meant to be helpfully illustrative. The episode
concludes thus:
'In other words we expect these stories to function in much the same way as
certain critics have asserted that Hemingway's stories in In Our Time function:
as episodic instalments in the novel of Nick Adams.
148In another place, he said, from another place, he might have told
this story to its end, told the true identity of Mr. Nackybal (his
real name was Tisler and he lived in a room on the canal), told
his method of cube-rooting in his head (he merely knew by heart
the cubes of one to nine, and even this was not indispensable, and
that one gives one, and two eight, and three seven, and four four,
and five five, and six six, and seven three, and eight two, and
nine nine, and of course nought nought), and told the
delinquencies of Louit, his fall and subsequent ascension,
running Bando. (ibid, 198)
There, at last, is 'Bando', mischievously suspended at the end of a sentence that,
purporting to summarize all that Arthur did not get round to in the main body of
his story, itself becomes caught up in the failure of narrational selectivity.
Bando was the starting point of Arthur's speech; nine thousand words later, his
story at an end, he is ready to begin. Robert Cochran has written of Beckett's
'endings that reject ending in the consideration of other beginnings' (1991, 34).
Here all is 'beginning': we are trapped in a discourse that refuses to 'close', to
gratify the sense of an ending. The story, in David Watson's terms, refuses to
crystallise, to 'advance the "plot" of the main diegesis' (1991, 19). It remains a
fugitive from the ordering principles of narrative.
I dwell on the example of Watt for two reasons: firstly, because of its
interdictive use of short narratives to refute continuity and stability in the wider
text. As readers we look for a point of textual disclosure that will situate these
episodes within the economy of meaning in the novel; but throughout Watt
textual elements like these are kept discrete in terms of their significance from
the dominant diegesis. There is a refusal, in other words, to allow these elements
to establish—or, conversely, their meaning to be established by—a point of
closure. Instead of resolution or gratification we encounter interdiction,
preclusion. The story of Louit disrupts and competes with the effort to erect a
completed order of sense for the text; it refuses to operate as a metadiegesis or
149illustrative crystallisation of meanings established in the dominant diegesis.2
Once again, a connection between brevity and plurality is adumbrated: the short
interrogative narrative is being used to establish apertures within and against
emergent meanings in the text. Later in his career, Beckett begins to explore the
limits of this connection in the short form itself
The second reason for my interest in the Wait passages is their parodic
nature. What they parody is novelistic convention, in this case the technique of
inserting an illustrative, referential 'story-within-a-story'. Early in his career
Beckett employed this kind of parody of fictional praxis within fiction in his
short stories. In works such as 'A Case in a Thousand' and throughout the
volume More Pricks Than Kicks he explicitly engaged with the Joycean short
story, parodying its tropes and mannerisms and revealing the principles of its
composition. Indeed, Beckett's early stories offer some of his deepest readings
of Joyce. In particular he uncovers through parodic imitation the complexities of
narrational voice in the Dubliners stories. These early stories in many ways
subject modernist short fiction to the kind of scrutiny 1 have been attempting
throughout this thesis.
By John Pilling's account, Beckett began writing short stories by default.
Dismayed at the rejection (by Chatto) of his poems and of the novel Dream of
Fair to middling women Beckett turned to the short story simply to 'enable him
to keep his hand in and. ..provide a modicum of revenue' (Pilling 1997, 95).
Pilling makes clear his own indifference to the short form, describing it as an
impoverished 'half-way house' lacking in both the 'freedom of movement' of
the novel and the 'complexity' through 'brevity and density' of the poem (ibid).
20f course, it may be argued that the Louit story's very inconclusiveness is
consonant with the novel's wider insistence on the provisionality and partiality
of all knowledge. However, such a reading would still be based on an
acknowledgement of the discrepancies between the various elements in the text
and would have to found its claim of coherence on a notion of similarity in form
or structure rather than in meaning—the level at which incoherence is rife.
150Like many of the critics mentioned already in this thesis, Pilling writes with
some resistance to the idea that the short story has credibility as a literary form,
let alone that it may be conducive to innovation or experimentation. He claims
that the form was an uncomfortable one for Beckett because it had hitherto
proved 'largely resistant to radical and experimental development': 'Deprived of
any mentor from whom he could learn, even if it was only to subvert the
achievement from within, Beckett was left without the stimulus to do very much
more than the 'lower' form required of him' (ibici).
Pilling's justification for this claim involves him in some familiar critical
gap-plugging: he takes the 'absence of any recurrent, substantial or profoundly
significant comments on his stories by Beckett' (ibid) as proof of the author's
lack of interest in what he achieved in them. In other words, Pilling 'reads'
Beckett's reticence on this matter, interprets his silence as 'indifference'. The
suggestion that Beckett lacked any mentor, and that he therefore was unable to
devise a way in which he might engage critically with the short form, arises, I
would argue, from Pilling's insensitivity towards the aesthetic of the modernist
short story. Indeed, his assertion is contradicted by the simple fact that
throughout More Pricks Than Kicks Beckett explicitly subverts and scrutinizes
many principal effects and mannerisms of the Joycean story. I would argue that
Pilling fails to see the importance of Beckett's achievement in respect of short
fiction because he is unclear about the particular characteristics of the form
Beckett was engaging with.
'A Case in a Thousand' (1934) concerns a young physician, Dr. Nye,
who finds himself having to treat his former nanny's gravely ill son. The young
boy dies during surgery but weeks later the mother is still to be seen every day
lingering in the hospital grounds. The final scene of the story involves an
encounter between the mother and her former ward, Dr. Nye, and is marked by a
reticence typical of interrogative short fiction:
151"There is something I've been wanting to ask you," he said,
looking at the water where it flowed out of the shadow of the
bridge.
She replied, also looking down at the water:
"I wonder would that be the same thing I've been wanting to
tell you ever since that time you stretched out on his bed."
"Can't you go on," he said.
Thereupon she related a matter connected with his earliest
years, so trivial and intimate that it need not be enlarged on
here, but from the elucidation of which Dr. Nyc, that sad man,
expected great things.
"Thank you very much," he said, "that was what I was
wondering." (1995, 24; my emphasis)3
The narratorial interdiction here—the deliberate withholding of information the
text has itself created the desire for—is typical of the modernist short fiction we
have been examining. But what is particularly interesting is the way in which
Beckett frankly and conspicuously signals the occlusion in that penultimate
paragraph. Interstices in Joyce and Hemingway are precisely that—gaps, spaces,
silences which do not threaten the illusion of objectivity in the presentation. In
Beckett's story, however, the decision-making narratorial voice is explicit about
its act of omission. There is no effort here to maintain the objective stance, to
disguise the sleight of hand by which the text's interrogativeness will be
achieved.
Beckett's exposure of the moment of interdiction in the story represents a
critical engagement with what is perhaps the defining mannerism of
interrogative short fiction. The characteristic narratonal withdrawal at the point
of expected disclosure in the text is revealed at the same time as it is enacted.
Beckett is unwilling to adopt uncritically the Joycean persona of the artist
'refined out of existence'. Such alleged objectivity is shown to be, as John
Updike says, a narratonal 'pose' like any other (1976, 450). Throughout his
early stories Beckett draws attention in this way to the act of narration itself,
particularly at the structural crux of the text, the moment of revelation or
epiphany. This is especially the case in More Pricks Than Kicks (1934) where
3A11 references to this edition, Complete Short Prose, will be abbreviated CSP
hereafter
152he explores explicitly the limitations and possibilities of the modernist form as
he inherited it from Joyce.
In 'A Wet Night' the broad parody of Joyce's 'The Dead' climaxes in
this passage:
But the wind had dropped, as it so often does in Dublin when all
the respectable men and women whom it delights to annoy have
gone to bed, and the rain fell in a uniform and untroubled
manner. It fell upon the bay, the littoral, the mountains and the
plains, and notably upon the Central Bog it fell with a rather
desolate uniformity (1970, 87)
The parody here functions on many levels. That second sentence, of course, fails
to follow Joyce's famous original where it leads—from 'treeless hills' and the
'Bog of Allen', through images of Calvary, to the 'universe', all its living and its
dead (Dub, 255-6). On the Central Bog does the rain most notably impinge in
Beckett's universe; and, of course, it's only raining there, not snowing. Hugh
Kenner has written of how in Joyce's original snow 'rhymes with the uniform
inevitability of human stasis', of how it 'levels and unifies all phenomena' in
Gabriel's sight (1996, 54). In Beckett's parody, this effect of uniformity, of the
levelling of the gravestone, the mountains, Dublin, is toyed with: the rain's
uniformity is grey and mundane and transfigures nothing. Beckett uses rain
throughout the ruminative last parts of the story as his reiterative element in
imitation of Joyce's technique of narrow semantic repetition ('falling softiy',
'softly falling', 'falling faintly', 'faintly falling'). Beckett's reiteration, however,
is deliberately misplaced: he tropes on a word that he has consciously de-
poeticized: 'Now it began to rain upon the earth beneath and greatly
incommoded Christmas traffic of every kind by continuing to do so without
remission for a matter of thirty six hours' (1970, 86-7). Furthermore, he does
not allow the parodic epiphany4 to conclude the story. Belacqua leaves his
4The word epiphany is in fact slyly inserted just before the scene in question: 'A
divine creature, native of Leipzig, to whom Belacqua, round about the following
Epiphany, had occasion to quote the rainfall for December...' (1970, 87)
153girlfriend's house (having enjoyed the kind of passionate intimacy denied
Gabriel Conroy) in the pitch dark small hours. The street lamps, which in
Joyce's story provide the 'ghostly' twilight shrouding Gretta and also induce
Gabriel's vision of Michael Furey (Dub, 247; 255) are extinguished.
In 'Love and Lethe' the cuspidal scene is again exposed, though in a
somewhat different way:
Who shalt judge of his conduct at this crux? Is it to be
condemned as wholly despicable? Is it not possible that he was
gallantly trying to spare the young woman embarrassment? Was
it tact or concupiscence or the white feather or an accident or
what? We state the facts. We do not presume to determine their
significance.
'Digitus Dei' he said 'for once.'
That remark rather gives him away, does it not? (1970, 104)
Here the narrator makes explicit the questions which the narrative itself has
prompted concerning the motivations of the central character. These are
precisely the kind of questions modernist short fictions by their reticent and
interdictive strategies cause us to ask. Here the narrative is asking them for us,
foregrounding the device by which the answers to them are withheld. The
question posed to the narratee—'That remark rather gives him away, does it
not?'—makes explicit the relationship the reader typically has to the
interrogative story type: in the absence of a superintending, directive narrating
presence we are obliged to supply confirmation of the meaning of the various
textual details. The narrator here may be conspicuous, but it is as an ignorant
subject of the énoncé. Earlier the narrator was similarly benighted concerning
the central question of the text: namely why Belacqua wishes to kill himself:
How he formed this resolution to destroy himself we are quite
unable to discover. The simplest course, when the motives of
any deed are found subliminal to the point of defying expression,
is to call that deed ex nihilo and have done. Which we beg leave
to follow in the present instance (ibid. 95).
More than comical disingenuousness, this disclaimer parodies precisely the kind
of narratorial withholding that we find repeatedly in modernist short fiction. Of
course, Beckett's story achieves the same interrogativeness as Joyce's, presents
154the same interdictions, and so offers a critique of the modernist form that is also,
paradoxically, an arch expression of it. For this reason we have to be careful not
to suppose that Beckett is simply parodying the Joycean epiphany in these stories
in the sense of revealing its blind spots or expediencies. As we saw in chapter 2,
Joyce's epiphanies are complex and unstable sites where discourses are brought
into unmediated conflict, where suppressions, denials and occlusions undermine
any attempt to impose a monological interpretation. Beckett's 'epiphanic'
scenes offer a critical exposure of the Joycean technique in its full complexity,
making explicit its instabilities and narratological sleights of hand. All of these
early stories, in fact, can be read as exegetical counterpoints to Joyce's. In the
treachery of apprenticeship, Beckett voiced the Joycean story's scrupulously
unarticulated knowingness. As the narrator says at one point of Belacqua,
'Notice the literary man' (1970, 101). Indeed we do.
Beckett's exposure of the inner workings of the Joycean epiphany
functions in a similar way to Hemingway's interdictions of model story types in
his stories. Like Hemingway, Beckett seeks to contain 'anticlimax within our
expectations of climax' (Kenner 1996, 53). The difference, however, is that the
'norm' from which Beckett is diverting is the modernist form itself. Whereas
Joyce replaced the unifying plot resolution with a complex polyphony, Beckett
attempts a further revision but by means of parody rather than by any
paradigmatic shift in narrative structuration.
Linda Hutcheon has described postmodernist parody as 'repetition with
critical distance', an 'ironic signalling of difference at the very heart of
similarity' which allows the writer to 'speak to a discourse from within...' (1988,
15526; 35).5 In Beckett's early stories this ironic signalling is achieved by making
explicit that which is normally implicit in modernist short fiction. Crucially, as
Hutcheon implies, the parody acts not to diminish, or reveal the fallibility of, the
former text. Rather, it infiltrates the discourse of its predecessor in order to
conduct an ironic re-articulation of it. When we read the following passage in
'Draff', for example, we are struck not by the sense that it ridicules the kind of
epiphanic moment experienced by, say, Chandler in 'A Little Cloud', but by the
way in which Beckett gives playful voice to the agonized suppressions of the
Joycean story:
Hairy, anxious though he was to join the Smeraldina while his
face was at its best, before it relapsed into the workaday
dumpling, steak and kidney pudding, had his work cut out to tear
himself away. For he could not throw off the impression that he
was letting slip a rare occasion to feel something really
stupendous, something that nobody had ever felt before. But
time pressed. The Smeraldina was pawing the ground, his own
personal features were waning (or perhaps better, waxing). In the
end he took his leave without kneeling, without a prayer, but his
brain quite prostrate and suppliant before this first fact of its
experience. That was at least something. He would have
welcomed a long Largo, on the black keys for preference (97O,
195)
The irony directed at Hairy and his lusting after a certain melancholy depth of
feeling, fingered on the black keys, is also targeted at the structural device of the
epiphany and way in which it is conventionally read as a moment of 'inscape' or
illumination. The irony is encapsulated in the play on 'waxing' and 'waning':
Hairy's appearance is actually 'waning', but the scene demands a dilation of
feeling, a 'waxing'—lyrical and lachrymose. We saw in the analyses in chapter
2 that Joyce's epiphanies are typically qualified by suggestions that they may be
fabricated or delusionary. For instance, Little Chandler's epiphany may well be
5The same point has been made by Robert Alter who describes parody as a mode
which 'fuses creation with critique' (1975, 25). Matei Calinescu has applied this
observation in particular to avant-garde parodies of modernist convention: '...a
successful parody should convey, together with its criticism of the original, a
degree of resemblance, a degree of faithfulness to both the letter and the spirit of
the original. Ideally, a parody should at the same time appear to be a parody and
offer the possibility of being mistaken for the original itself (1987, 141).
156an aspiration toward feeling rather than a genuine occurrence of it. Beckett's
parody works not by erecting a superior metadiscourse in relation to the Joycean
device. A more accurate appraisal would emphasize the way in which Beckett's
story gives voice to that which is implicit in Joyce's texts. In other words, it
exposes the implicatory sleight of hand by which the Joycean story achieves
interrogative complexity. If there is a target in the parody here it is the
'innocent' or monological reading of the discourse of interrogative short fiction
which overlooks or denies that complexity.
Of course, the device of the epiphany is only one of the means by which
the Joycean story complicates the emergence of any determinate thematic
reading. The difficulty in determining a story like 'Clay' arises because Joyce
omits or subdues so much onentational narrative material throughout the text.
Maria's psychology and motivation, the meaning of her song, the story's title,
Joe's final feelings all remain unresolved, incongruent. Beckett's critical
engagement with the form involves the installation of a metafictional narratonal
voice that exposes this occlusive technique. The famous last line of 'Dante and
the Lobster' encapsulates his acknowledgement of the aesthetic of the modernist
short story best of all: in response to Belacqua's self-assurance on seeing the
lobster boiled alive that 'it's a quick death' comes the rebuttal, 'It is not' (1970,
21). For Robert Cochran these are the words of an 'impersonal voice out of the
heavens, speaking in fiat and inquisition' (1991, 18). Cochran's phrase, 'fiat and
inquisition', gathers nicely the impression of the voice as at once stentorian and
at the same time critically probing: we can read those words as both a general
proclamation and as a weighing of the evidence that, in this particular case, God
help us all, death will not be quick.6 Instead of the characteristic withdrawal at
the point of closure in the text we get the blatant intrusion of a voice signalling
6Further meanings reveal themselves when one takes into account Belacqua's
literary antecedent, Dante's indolent friend encountered in ante-Purgatory (iv,
97-135): no quick death indeed, unless, of course, quick means 'live'.
157over the heads of the characters. Clare Hanson reads the line as forcefully
unifying:
The emergence at this point of a voice speaking against the
authority of Belacqua is important. It is as though a 'voice' has
been submerged throughout the fiction, but as it finally achieves
utterance we realize that it is crystallizing, summarizing, what the
text has been saying all along through its particular forms and
articulations (1985, 144-5)
Hanson takes the final line to be a thematic decoding of the whole story, a full
illumination of all that has dwelled in the half-light of implication: the line
brings together Belacqua's present predicament and the various allusions
throughout the story to the protracted sufferings in Dante's hell. The problem
here, however, is that Hanson's emphasis is on how the declaration gratifies and
unifies through the resolution of enigma at the level of the discourse of the
énoncé. She does not, in other words, perceive any irony in it. Yet surely the
closure achieved by the 'It is not' is so blatantly superimposed that if judged
against the vraisemblance of the rest of the story it seems a clumsy contrivance.
The intrusion of such a prepossessive narratorial point of view is not simply a
device for instating closure; rather, I would argue, it encapsulates Beckett's
parodic exposition of the kind of narratological legerdemain by which the
modernist short story achieves interrogativeness. He blows the cover, as it were,
under which the story operates, exposing the narrator's presence by making it
explicit. As with 'A Case in a Thousand' and 'A Wet Night' he is unwilling to
allow the naturalistic illusion of the inconspicuous or objective narrator to
predominate: he is signalling an ironic awareness of how the interrogative story
seeks to defer meaning by a suppression of the personality of the narrator and the
instatement of an enigmatic openness in its various discursive codes.
Pilling suggests that Beckett's criticism of Maupassant, made during a
lecture entitled 'Naturalists', that he contained 'no subjectiveness' comparable to
the great European novelists is evidence of Beckett's lack of interest in
158Maupassant and, by extension, the short story (1997, 94).7 But Beckett's
complaint here might also be read positively, as a declaration of intent. The
intrusive 'It is not' encapsulates the break Beckett is attempting throughout these
early works with the aesthetic of the modernist short story as he inherited it. The
line brings to bear on the story a 'subjective' narratorial voice which exposes,
plays with, the conspicuous detachment and 'objectivity' which the short form
seemingly depends upon for its interrogativeness. All the parodic passages
examined above contain this narratorial self-consciousness, this voice that reads
as it writes.
Overall, I think it is difficult to credit Pilling's argument that Beckett
found the short story a recalcitrant form of which there was no significant
exponent with whom he could engage. One can only assume that Pilling shares
Hugh Kenner's guardedness about the literary value of the stories comprising
More Pricks than Kicks: 'With carefully directed attention, we can perceive
latent in it his later directions. Other claims should not be made' (1996, 49). I
would argue that if read within the context of modernist short fiction Beckett's
early stories reveal their significance as far more than adumbrations of later,
greater works.
For Beckett, however, the kind of parodic re-visioning of a form I've
been describing here was sufficient only as a beginning, not as the basis of his
critical distanciation from the literature of the past. The limit of the revisionary
approach is that it is central to the discourse of modernism itself (as it is to all
avant-gardes)—witness the manifestos prefacing Futurism, Cubism, Imagism,
Expressionism, Dadaism, Vorticism, Constructivism, to name but some, as well
as the various declarations of intent offered in critiques of existing and past
literatures, such as Woolf's 'Mr. Bennett and Mrs Brown' and Eliot's 'Tradition
and the Individual Talent'. In his early stories—indeed, in most of his fiction
7Pilling is quoting here from Rachel Burrows's lecture notes
159prior to the Trilogy—we see Beckett adopting this same 'logic of critical
"overcoming" (Begam 1996, 150) in relation to modernism. What Beckett was
interested in, as he described in relation to Bram van Velde (in the third of the
dialogues with George Duthuit), was an art that would be self-sufficient, that
would not take up with any discourse of the past, nor even, indeed, with any
referential discourse outside of itself. As Bersani and Dutoit put it, he was
promising 'a work of art cut off from all cultural inheritance' (1993, 19).
An early indication of the path Beckett would take in his short fiction can
be found in the 1940s stones 'The End', 'The Expelled' and 'The Calmative'.
These texts continue with the critical re-reading of the poetics of the modernist
short story begun in the early works, but they do so now by bringing into
question not just the mannerisms of the established form but the validity of the
narrating act itself. In addition they begin to challenge the stability of their own
mimetic discourse. 'The Expelled', for instance, is constructed along the lines of
an excursion narrative, a kind of stumbling picaresque in which the narrator,
expelled from some undetermined abode, takes his way about a city, eventually
bedding down for the night in a cabman's stable. The crux of the narrative is
reached as he ponders the potential energy in a box of matches:
I held the box of matches in my hand, a big box of safety
matches. I got up during the night and struck one. Its brief flame
enabled me to locate the cab. I was seized, then abandoned, by
the desire to set fire to the stable (CSP, 59)
We are familiar with such moments of decisive intersection in the modernist
short story—possible closures summoned then interdicted—and Beckett' s
narrative appears to act in precisely the same way: instead of lighting the fire the
narrator leaves the stable and walks towards the dawn light. However, Beckett is
not content with this final self-expulsion into interrogativeness. He undermines
the security even of that ending by a metafictional exposure of the arbitrariness
of the act of narration. 'I don't know why I told this story,' the narrator says. 'I
could just as well have told another. Perhaps some other time I'll be able to tell
160another. Living souls, you will see how alike they are' (ibid). Linda Hutcheon
claims that narrative is the translation of 'knowing into telling' (1988, 121);
Beckett here questions that intuition, suggesting that what is 'known' is
intimately dependent upon what is 'told' .
Attention to the status of narrative and to the act of narrating is similarly
given in 'The Calmative' and 'The End'. Both stones use again the framework
of an excursion narrative within which are situated other, fragmentary stories,
and again both seek to undermine the validity of their own narration. In 'The
Calmative' the father's story of Joe Breem or Breen which was once intimately
known—'If he had skipped a single word I would have hit him'  (CSP, 64)—is
now less securely remembered: 'Joe Breem, or Breen, the son of a lighthouse-
keeper, a strong, muscular lad of fifteen.. .who swam for miles in the night, a
knife between his teeth, after a shark, I forget why, out of sheer heroism' (ibid)
This inability to grasp the point of the action in the Joe Breem story—'I forget
why'—similarly afflicts the narrator's reception of the tale told by the comedian:
'He was telling a funny story about a fiasco. Its point escaped me' (CS?, 63).
The failure to establish the teleological principle governing these stones shifts
attention toward the act of narrating itself and away from the search for meaning.
Within the larger narrative, the narrator's excursions do not end, like these
stories, in any 'arrival'; he simply continues, as 'The End' puts it, aware of the
arbitrariness of his efforts to narrate, aware of the story he might have told, 'a
story in the likeness of my life' (CS?, 99). It is not simply that the story ends in
aperture rather than closure but that the preferred ending is itself undermined: as
Robert Cochran puts it, the story 'sabotages itself and ridicules its own making'
8J is, incidentally, by no means inevitable that the story will deny itself the
conflagration ending. In 'DrafT' fire does take hold. There, however, the irony
resides in the mocking excess of plot: 'Little remains to be told. On their return
they found the house in flames, the home to which Belacqua had brought three
brides a raging furnace. It transpired that during their absence something had
snapped in the brain of the gardener, who had ravished the servant girl and then
set the premises on fire.' (1970, 202).
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This epistemological fatigue in these texts, told 'without the courage to
end or the strength to go on' (CS?, 99), is accompanied by an ontological
exasperation that challenges our coordination as readers. 9 The narrator's way of
speaking in 'The End', for instance, 'assimilating the vowels and omitting the
consonants' (C'S?, 83), or the description, in 'The Calmative', of the cyclist
'pedalling slowly in the middle of the street, reading a newspaper which he held
with both hands spread open before his eyes' (CS?, 71), are 'inconsistencies'
which, like the puzzle of how Murphy is able to tie himself up, or the ringing of
Erskine's broken bell in Watt, threaten the realist economy of the stories.
However, this consternation is, like the flirtatious ontological impasse that opens
'Assumption'—'He could have shouted and could not' (CS?, 3)—short-lived,
the predominately realist mode being quickly reasserted. With 'The End', 'The
Calmative' and 'The Expelled' a limit of tolerance is reached with the
conventions of realist narrative. Beckett himself described that limit in relation
to Kafka, in an interview given in 1956:
You notice how Kafka's form is classic, it goes on like a
steamroller—almost serene. It seems to be threatened the whole
time, but the consternation is in the form. In my work there is
consternation behind the form, not in the form (Shenker 1979,
148).
In these stories, as in Kafka, the threat to form is apparent only—the
'consternation' is really just an implausibility within an otherwise competent
discourse. The act of writing itself is secure, no matter what chaos and collapse
are being retailed. The writing subject operates at a stable descriptive distance
from its material. What Beckett did in The Unnamable was collapse that
distance entirely to undertake a 'repudiation of language in language' (Bersani
9Brian McHale uses the terms 'epistemological' and 'ontological' to classify the
differing preoccupations of modernist and postmodernist fiction, i.e. the former's
concern with 'problems of knowing', the latter's with 'problems of modes of
being' (1987, 10). In his later refinement of this theory, he prefers the terms
'cognitive' and 'post-cognitive' (1992, 32).
162and Dutoit 1993, 51).
All of the texts so far examined function with what Beckett himself
termed in the so-called 'German Letter' of 1937 a 'Nominalist irony' 10. The
Unnamable may leave his calling card here and there—'He could have shouted
and could not' (CSP, 3)—but we are at some distance yet from the 'much
desired wordless literature' (Cochran 1991, 93) of Beckett's deepest imagining.
With The Unnamable, however, we find ourselves in the departure lounge of
writing. 'Affirmations and negations invalidated as uttered, or sooner or later'
(Beckett 1994, 293), the Unnamable states early on, a self-defeating, self-
consuming proclamation. What is affirmed, this statement tells us, will not
siirply be negated but invalidated, in advance of any possible negation. If
affirmation is invalidated as uttered then negation can have no reality, because
there is nothing to negate: we cannot be forced back to where we began by dint
of contradiction or repudiation for we have not even begun. The statement
wishes to act as both an affirmation (of the invalidation of affirmation) and as a
negation (affirmation invalidated) but collapses, unable to repel the semantic
impedances it generates against itself. The 'sooner or later', despite its
appearing to offer a redemptive temporality, falls apart too: if subjected to the
first clause its affirmation is invalid, as is the negation (sooner or later) it seems
to offer. There is no escape: the statement simultaneously  says and gainsays."
Throughout The Unnamable we are detained like this at the level of the
signifier, unable to access any stable, ratifiable world beyond. Joyce explored
the possibilities of this kind of hermeneutic detention in the opening lines of the
'Sirens' episode in Ulysses. There, however, the impasse was apparent only as
'°This letter, to Axe! Kaun, is reprinted in Disjecta, 51-54. The translation cited
here is by Robert Cochran and Christoph Irmscher (Cochran 1991, 92-3).
"Alain Robbe-Grillet has written of how events in Beckett's texts 'are constantly
in the process of contesting themselves, jeopardizing themselves, destroying
themselves, so that the same sentence may contain an observation and its
immediate negation' (1989, 33).
163the puzzlingly disembodied utterances were contextualized and made meaningful
in the largely mimetic discourse that followed: 'Imperthnthn thnthnthn', for
instance, is resolved as the boots' querulous imitation of Miss Douce's
'impertinent insolence'. Beckett offers no such normalization. Richard Begam
has argued that accompanying Beckett's admiration for Joyce and Proust was an
understanding that, for all their innovativeness, they had succeeded only in
'subjectivizing' the realist tradition and that their work remained 'predominantly
mimetic' (1996, 31). The challenge Beckett set himself, Begam goes on, was to
find a way in which 'to "overcome" a modernity that [was] itself based on a
logic of critical overcoming' (ibid. 150). In other words, the problem was to find
a way of critiquing modernism from a position exterior rather than posterior to it,
not in a discourse belonging to modernism already—the discourse of 'critical
overcoming'. The problem is akin to that identified by Derrida in relation to the
discourse of ethnology. Demda points out that while ethnologists seek to
displace Western culture as the comparative norm or centre in their readings of
other cultures, they are only able to do so in a discourse of displacement
belonging to the very culture they wish to decentre—'a discourse which borrows
from a heritage the resources necessary for the deconstruction of that heritage
itself' (Derrida 1978, 282). The position required of Beckett in relation to
modernism is 'unnamable' because it would be 'namable' only in the terms of
the discourse he is seeking to elude. As the narrator of one of the Texts for
Nothing puts it, 'with what words shall I name my unnamable words?' (CS?,
125). Faced with impossibility of escape (except into silence) and yet with the
'obligation' to express he is thrown back on language, a witness, as we saw in
the passage from The Unnamable quoted above, to its deconstructive fallibility,
the d[férance at the heart of signification. What we encounter in the text is not
some recuperable rhetoric of failure, but rather a failure of rhetoric (Hill 1990,
122).
164In the early short fictions we saw how Beckett installed an ironic re-
reading of modernist practice in his discourse. Both Joyce and Hemingway
perpetrated abductive ironies in much the same way against conventional story-
types in their texts. With The Unnamable Beckett breaks from this discourse of
critical 'overcoming' by trapping intelligibility in the negative space of aporia.
Immediately, of course, the problem arises within the obligation to express of
how to 'go on' from the unnamable, how to negotiate between the realization
that '[t]here is no way to go on' following the disintegration of 'I', 'have' and
'being' in that novel and the effort to find a way out of the 'attitude of
disintegration' (Shenker 1979, 148)—between, as Beckett put it, the 'nothing to
express' and the 'obligation to express' (1965, 103). Susan Brien' suggests that
'going on' became possible for Beckett principally through experimentation with
'stylistic devices' (Brienza 1987, 20-47), but given that the most obvious trait
one notices surveying the post-Trilogy oeuvre is a propensity towards shortness
in prose form, a genre-based study like the present one may be best placed to
offer an analysis of why Beckett should have chosen to go on as he did.
One might be tempted to understand the marked inclination towards short
and fragmentary forms following The Unnamable as just the continuation of a
process of reduction leading ultimately to disintegration: having failed to say
anything the next step is to fail in shorter measure, to 'fail better' as Beckett puts
it at the beginning of Worstward Ho. The obvious limit of this argument is that
it does not allow that the act of reducing textual content may have any greater
effect than an intensified negativity. Yet, admittedly, it is difficult to read the
Texts for Nothing as achieving anything more than that. Certainly Beckett
himself felt that the Texts failed to escape the 'attitude of disintegration'
established by The Unnamable (Shenker 1979, 148). Nevertheless, several
critics have sought to identify ways in which the Texts might be read as a
significant development in Beckett's writing. James Knowison and John Pilling,
165for example, have described them as a 'genuine median point' between  The
Unnamahie and later works (1979, 43). Their argument is that through the
formal restraints incurred by brevity the Texts further punctuate and fragment
narrative. In this way do they overcome the 'babble' of the unnamable who is,
by contrast, 'unable to resist' narrative (ibid. 44). The result of this
fragmentation, this greater 'reliance on gestures of cancellation'  (ihid), is a work
whose energy acts centrifugally rather than centripetally. Clare Hanson,
similarly, identifies the various 'strategies of organisation', such as 'long-term
repetition and accumulation' (1985, 145), which operate in the novel but which
are ruled out of the Texts. She is keen to emphasize the way in which the Texts
deny efforts to establish intratextual continuities; their significance lies in the
way in which they shift the main unit of expression 'from the 'story' or overall
structure to the sentence' (ibid).
H. Porter Abbott has taken further this idea of the structural contrasts
between The Unnamable and the Texts. In his essay he takes a passage from
each and after describing their shared 'referential uncertainty and drift' (1994,
106) proceeds to outline the ways in which they differ. In particular, Abbott is
interested in how the excerpt from late in The Unnamable belongs to a wider
narrative of 'progressive disembodiment' which in turn 'conforms to the oldest
pattern of storytelling, the voyage or quest' (ibid). The passage he quotes
'culminates the steady, inexorable progress of the 'trilogy', a progress that
contextualizes it and, to a certain extent, naturalizes it' (ibid). The extract from
the Texts, on the other hand, appears within no normalizing 'storytelling'
trajectory; the reader encounters its complexity raw, as it were, free from any
contextualizing narrative structure.
All of these readings make the valuable point that, apona
notwithstanding, The Unnamable still collaborates with that 'linear orientation
which the mind appears to crave in narrative' (Abbott 1994, 106).  The
166Unnamable is intelligible as the culmination of a progress begun in  Molloy,
where the realist economy is threatened by Molly's apparent identicality with,
yet difference from, Moran, developed further in Malone Dies with its
displacement of Malone's world by that which he claimed to be the creator of,
i.e. Macmann and his world, and culminating in the collapse of the distinction
between narrator and narrated in The Unnamabie, where Basil/Mahood, for
instance, appears as a creation of the narrator and yet also as the principal
narrator of the narrator's own life, his voice mingling and dominating that of the
narrator before leaving him for good, or refusing to leave, 'I don't know' (1994,
311). The Trilogy still has a fugal continuity.
If we are to read the Texts for Nothing as an advance upon The
Unnamable then we must focus, I would suggest, on the way in which they
progressively refuse to participate in the act of narrating itself, Of course, what
is immediately present in such a summary is a meta-narrative telling of the
disintegration of narrative! Perhaps Beckett's awareness of this narrational bind
contributed to his feeling that the Texts were a failure. Nevertheless, there is an
obvious shift over the course of the work from the calmative intrusions of the Joe
Breem story in Text 1, and the anecdotal memories of Mother Calvert and Mr
Joly in Text 2 which, while not giving hope, recollect a time and place where
hope was possible—'How one hoped above, on and off...' (CS?, 108)—to the
later texts that fail to establish character or story at all, which struggle even with
that abandonment: 'Give up, but it's all given up, it's nothing new, I'm nothing
new' (CS?, 141). Text 10 probes at the limits of this dissolution: 'But there is
not silence. No, there is utterance, somewhere someone is uttering. Inanities,
agreed, but is that enough, is that enough to make sense?' (ibid). The question is
one Beckett will seek to answer in subsequent short works: what is to be done in
language, how does one 'go on', when confidence in its sense-making function is
lost? As Text 10 puts it:
167No, no souls, or bodies, or birth, or life, or death, you've got to
go on without any of that junk, that's all dead with words, with
excess of words, they can say nothing else, they say there is
nothing else, that here it's that and nothing else, but they won't
say it eternally, they'll find some other nonsense, no matter what,
and I'll be able to go on, no, I'll be able to stop, or start, another
guzzle of lies but piping hot, it will last my time, it will be my
time and place, my voice and silence, a voice of silence, the
voice of my silence (CSP, 142-3)
The representational breakdown indicated here is performed in the Texts as a
whole as they strip away the props of narrative, examining how little can be said,
how much can be omitted, short of silence. The problem with words is that they
name things—bodies, birth, death—and the only way in which it is possible to
describe 'nothing' is in words, i.e. through the act of naming that 'nothing'. The
'on'/'no' circularity encapsulates the speaker's anxiety, his desire for silence yet
his realization that the silence will be so named, in language, and that there can
therefore be no 'silence', no beyond-words. The aporetic 'voice of silence' with
which the passage ends is an effort to force language beyond this point, into the
condition of unnamability.
As this analysis indicates, the Texts become caught up largely in a
reiteration of the difficulties of The Unnamable. Their importance, however, lies
in the way in which they attempt to disavow the sort of continuities of extent that
form in the novel. Where the unnamable proclaimed his inability to go on yet
continued going on, the Texts attempt to silence that voice, or rather, they
envisage the final collapse of that narrating voice, going on without even that.
Indeed, the ver shortness of the constituent texts seems to me significant in this
regard. If, as Roch C. Smith (adapting Hillis Miller's 'Ariadne's Thread')
contends, the 'narration of fiction, the weaving of a verbal tapestry, multiplies
words and carries the narrator further away from the exit of his verbal labyrinth'
(1986, 79) then the less said the better, the more important it is to remove as
many of the excesses—the labyrinth-making excesses—of narrative as possible.
Faced with the 'obligation to express' the 'only way out is through words'  (ibia'),
but every word spoken weaves more of the web, propagates the labyrinth.
168Hence the need to reduce, to curtail, to stop short.
Bersani and Dutoit, in Arts of Impoverishment, have used the term
'indigence' to describe the quality of Beckett's post-Trilogy writing  (1993, 17).
They are careful to point out that they do not mean by this term 'impoverished
expression' or self-erasure (ibid); rather, they are insisting that we recognize that
Beckett's use of the word 'failure' does not designate a thematic concern in his
work. He is not referring to a representation of failure, but to a failure of
representation:
[W]hen Beckett speaks of failure as the artist's vocation, as "his
world", he is not referring to the artist's subject matter, rather, he
is speaking of a failure intrinsic to the very process of artistic
production. In the terms of the Three Dialogues, to fail does not
mean to represent successftilly existential failures or existential
meaninglessness; it means to fail to represent (either
meaninglessness or meaning') (ibid, 14).
Bersani and Dutoit go on to argue that it is in the  1960s that Beckett first begins
to produce the 'insignificant text.. .that performs its own powerfiul resistance to
representation' (ibid. 27). I take it from this that Bersani and Dutoit read the
Trilogy, as I do above, as still dependent on, and expressive of, narrative. They
suggest that in the late works Beckett attempts to 'go on' without even this,
denying sense-making narrative connections even at the level of the word.
'Language is sanctified as expression only by a certain disregard for the
particularity or discreteness of words', they suggest (ibid, 23). Narrative, that is,
works by creating connections and unities between individual words. Beckett, in
his work from the 1960s onward, seeks to resist this by an 'unprecedented
emphasis on language' (ibid. 24) that detains us at the level of the signifier:
'Deprived of narrative sequences, words sound only in and for
themselves...Beckett's ideal of failure would seem to depend on a contagious
destruction of relations' (ibid).
Throughout this thesis I have been arguing that interrogative short fiction
functions by a similar destruction of relations, a denial of teleological structure
169both at the level of the word and in the narrative as a whole. Beckett's comment
about units of continuity 'abdicating' their unity (1983, 49) directs us to his own
achievement in texts such as 'Imagination Dead Imagine' and 'Ping' (discussed
below), but it also leads us back to the 'discreteness' of Joyce's paralysis,
gnomon, simony, and to Hemingway's refusal to allow his counteractive short
texts to be absorbed by a telos of novelistic closure. Interrogative short texts
offer Beckett a way to 'go on' because they can occlude the 'units of continuity'
that emerge in the novel. With the 'residua', Beckett takes to a new extent the
indeterminacy that results from narrative strategies of shortness, from the
suppression of teleological connections at all levels in the text and the
interdicti of narrative structure. In effect, the 'residua' take to its limit the
logic of interrogative short fiction as I have defined it.
From his earliest work, Beckett signalled an awareness of the
conceivable effects of reduction, of stopping short, of semantic 'indigence'. In
Dream of Fair to middling women (written 1932) we find the following
disavowal of longitudinal and latitudinal plotting in the classic realist novel:
The effect or concert of effects, unimportant as it seems to us and
dull as ditchwater as we happen to know, that elicited the
Smeraldina-Rima, shall not, for those and other reasons that need
not be gone into, be stated. Milieu, race, family, structure,
temperament, past and present and consequent and antecedent
back to the first combination and the papas and mamas and
paramours and cisibei and the morals of Nanny and the nursery
wallpapers and the third and fourth generation snuffles... That
tires us. As though the gentle reader could be nothing but an
insurance broker or a professional punter. The background
pushed up as a guarantee...that tires us (1993, 12-13; Beckett's
ellipses)
The impatience with the rituals of causality and vraisemblance'2 would appear to
suit Beckett ideally for the interrogative short story; and, fittingly, for sixty years
the only published parts of Dream were those incorporated in More Pricks Than
Kicks. But the deeper point to grasp here is that this denial is made in
'2Watt, of course, labours these very rituals, pushes the background up, but as a
hindrance to, rather than a 'guarantee' of, understanding.
170conjunction with the admission that all these elements of race, milieu,
temperament and the rest are present as conjectures within the classic realist
narrative economy. Simply not mentioning them does not discount or hinder
speculation over motive, histoiy or orientation for these are the very terms in
which vraisemblance functions, the causal laws which stabilize its discourse.
The passage seems to suggest that mere ellipsis was not in itself enough for what
Beckett envisioned as possible and desirable in fiction. It was enough for the
modernist story writers we have looked at to disrupt the continuities of narrative
closure, but Beckett was engaged in finding a way to supersede modernist
practice. As Kenner wrote in his 'Progress Report, 1962-5', 'To play one more
game by the old rules would merely be competence' (Calder 1967, 61). Beckett
himself made the ambition explicit in the 1929 story 'Assumption': 'To avoid
the expansion of the commonplace is not enough; the highest art reduces
sign y'Icance in order to obtain that inexplicable bombshell perfection' (CS?, 4;
my emphasis). In other words, it is not enough just to say less, not enough to
leave unchallenged the mimetic principles of fiction. Rather 'significance'—the
desired end product of classic realism—must be diminished by a principle of
reduction, by shortness.
What was missing in these early works, of course, was the technique to
match this ambition, hence our awareness in many of the early works of a gap
between what, they aspire to and what they actually achieve. Post-Trilogy,
however, reduction became the principal means by which Beckett was able to
'go on' in prose. In 1971 Raymond Federman argued, prophetically, that short
forms were all that was now left to Beckett: 'Beckett must invent more
restraining and constraining rules for his fiction, for he can only continue if he
eliminates further, if he reduces further, but no longer the novel as such. He is
finished with the novel' (1971, 30). In the 'residua', especially 'Imagination
Dead Imagine', 'Ping', and 'Lessness', the reductions and eliminations threaten
171the referential function of the language. The teleological structure of
representationalism is the first casualty in this aesthetic of reduction; words, as
Federman puts it, are 'designified', language is reduced to 'pure ratio' (ibid, 28;
30).13 In the modernist short fictions we have looked at the connection between
brevity and plurality was exploited but within a controlled mimeticist aesthetic.
3oyce and Hemingway applied techniques of reduction—ellipsis, occlusion, the
suppression of a corrective narrational point of view—in order to generate
interrogativeness in their texts. Beckett's abstemiousness destabilizes both
language and its referents:
No trace anywhere of life, you say, pah, no difficulty there,
imagination not dead yet, yes, dead, good, imagination dead
imagine. Islands, waters, azure, verdure, one glimpse and
vanished endlessly, omit. Till all white in the whiteness the
rotunda. No way in, go in, measure (CSP, 182)
This passage (from the beginning of 'Imagination Dead Imagine') achieves its
remarkable fluidity of meaning by suppressing deictic elements in its structure.
Deictic elements in a statement orientate the various propositions spatially,
temporally, and in relation to the speaker and his implied listener or reader.
Normally texts work to stabilize the relationships between these various parts
through the use of deixis. Here, however, we are uncertain about the coordinates
of the scene being described, and about the interaction between the narrator and
his supposed interlocutor. How are we to understand that first sentence? The
opening phrase seems to imply that the narrator and his implied addressee are
located in relation to some reality in which there is no trace of life. But this
would depend on who speaks that first phrase. If it is the narrator, and the tag
'you say' refers to what follows rather than to what has just been said, then the
deictic element in 'no difficulty there' directs the interlocutor's reply to that first
statement made by the narrator. Hence we might read the sentence along these
lines:
NARRATOR: No trace anywhere of life
13The phrase 'pure ratio' is, in fact, Ihab Hassan's (1967, 9)
172OTHER: Pah, no difficulty there, imagination not dead yet
NARRATOR: Yes, dead, good, imagination dead imagine
In this case, the sentence appears to operate as an instruction from the narrator
first of all to imagine no trace of life, then, when the other objects that that is
easy and does not signify the limit of imagination, the narrator instructs him to
imagine the death of imagination.
Alternatively, that first phrase can be read as the narrator's report of the
interlocutor's speech act. In that case we attach the tag 'you say' to the opening
statement. What follows can be read as a continuation of the reported speech
act, or alternatively it can be taken as the narrator's reply to the assertion by the
interlocutor that there is no trace of life anywhere. In the latter case, we might
understand the narrator as saying that just because no trace of life can be seen it
does not follow that there is nothing: imagination is not dead yet, and to imagine
it dead is still to imagine. In other words, imagination, like consciousness for
Henry James, is an illimitable force; even its own non-existence is imaginable.
Other equally valid readings might understand the narrator's reply as
asserting that only when imagination is dead will it be possible to detect a trace
of life. 'Islands, waters, azure, verdure...': all these 'baseless fabrics' of
conventional imagining need to be eradicated if one is to catch truly a glimpse of
life. Alternatively, the narrator may simply be imploring his interlocutor to
imagine the death of imagination, and then proceeding, paradoxically, to
envisage that.
The impossibility of determining the meaning of this passage arises
because guiding material has largely been removed. As we have seen
throughout, this kind of occiusiveness causes individual sense units to become
dirigible. What punctuation there is has the effect not of assisting interpretation
but of further breaking down any chain of meaning in the language. A simple
orientational phrase like 'you say' hovers uncertainly between its commas;
instead of securing the speech acts that surround it, it operates as a kind of
173revolving door by which one both exits and enters the various semantic fields in
the passage. Rather than assisting in an essentially teleological, cumulative
refinement of meaning, the repeated commas emphasize the way in which these
individual units create apertures and loops in the narrative logic—words as 'pure
ratio'.
The principle of reduction, then, involves removing differential elements
in the language, the markers that separate one possible meaning from another. I
said in my introduction that this study would take as read the differential and
plunsignificant constitution of language and look at how an omission of
narrative guiding material might intensify that instability. Language as a whole,
of course, functions on a principle of difference: signifers signify meaning by
virtue of their differential place within the total system of signification.
Throughout the 'residua' Beckett increasingly undermines the dependence
fiction has on a referential world which it seeks to convey accurately by
linguistic discrimination. Dismissing that experiential world from his texts, he is
free to explore the extremes of reduction, the limits of signification. The drastic
economies of vocabulary and the consequent dependence on repetition
throughout the 'residua' are the most obvious manifestations of this effort. In
the quoted passage from 'Imagination Dead Imagine' the reduction of
differential elements in the language leaves us a world bereft of differentiation:
'all white in the whiteness.. .The light that makes all so white no visible source,
all shines with the same white shine, ground, wall, vault, bodies, no shadow'
(ibid). The rotunda cannot be 'seen' in any naturalistic sense of the word. In
fact, the point is that we are not supposed to 'picture' it, refer it to reality—it is
imaginable only. As Brian Finney puts it, 'the image is itself' (1971, 68).
Beckett is not after some 'reduction of the commonplace', some economy in the
representation of reality, but a reduction in sign y'icance (signification). He is
seeking a form in which there will be 'no shadow' of represented reality in the
174language itself. As he envisaged in the so-called 'German letter' to Axe! Kaun,
1937: '...must literature alone be forever left behind on worn out paths
abandoned long ago by music and painting?... Is there any reason at all why that
terrible arbitrary materiality of the word's surface can't be eroded, like for
instance the great black pauses eaten in the tonal surface of Beethoven's seventh
symphony, so that for whole pages we can see nothing but a path of sound
threading dizzying abysses of silence...' (Cochran 1991, 92-3). The pseudo-
scientific observationalism brought to bear on the rotunda and its inhabitants is a
futile attempt to account for what is seen 'realistically', to 'reproduce' a reality.
At the end of the quoted passage we shift into that discourse with the paradox,
'No way in, go in, measure'. The realization is that language will always seek
out a referential reality, will always 'go in' and 'measure': such is the burden of
un-silence. The paradox indicates, however, that here that 'reality' will be
unnamable, impossible; it is, in the words of the unnamable, invalidated as
uttered. There can be no question 'of ever finding again that white speck lost in
whiteness' (CSP, 185).
It should be pointed out here that the effort to free language of
representationalism is, of course, futile, and that that is t'he nature o ec'xet s
'failure'. However, obliged to go on, and necessarily 'skewered on the ferocious
dilemma of expression', the writer 'continues to wriggle. The void he speaks of
is perhaps simply the obliteration of an unbearable presence, unbearable because
neither to be wooed nor to be stormed' (1965, 110-11). In the 'residua' the
attempt is to work despite that 'unbearable presence' of representationalism.
Words will always 'refer', will always 'go in' and 'measure'. But within his
texts Beckett is able to create a world where linguistic representationalism
collapses in on itself, in apona: 'no way in, go in...'.
Beckett's principle of reduction takes to extremes the connection already
established in this thesis between brevity and plurality. The more specific the
175topographies of confinement in these late stories—the deeper the blight of
enclosure and sensory defeatism—the more apertures emerge semantically in the
texts. Just as James envisaged in the preface to 'The Lesson of the Master', the
short form should be able to embrace multiplicity within its 'science of control';
meaning should amplify outward from the necessarily curtailed centre. Like
James, Beckett had a vision of what was possible within an aesthetic of
reduction. I-us 'total object, complete with missing parts' resonates, like James's
statement, in relation to much that has been discussed in this thesis. Repeatedly,
I have drawn attention to the ways in which modernist short fictions can be read
as 'total objects', 'complete' in themselves despite their occlusions and
interstices. Indeed I have argued that these 'gaps', in their various ways,
constitute the aesthetic of the modernist form. Against this have been set the
many readings that insist on the short story as an incomplete or partia'
expression of an undisclosed, greater whole. As regards Beckett, the total
object/partial object discrimination takes on further significance in the 'residua'
because there he attempts not only to proceed with an increasing number of
missing parts but uses this to remove from the economy of his texts the shadow
of representationalism in language itself.
As mentioned above, the post-Trilogy fictions are characterized by an
increasing paucity of vocabulary. Related to this is a dependence on repetition.14
Usually, repetition creates semantic or sound patterning which reinforces
cohesion and meaning in texts. In the 'residua', however, repetition is used to
break up any linear movement or narrative, to impede the reading process and
undermine the effort to construe a teleology in the text. Along with the other
paraphernalia of reduction, in syntax, vocabulary and punctuation, repetition acts
against sense-making form. Paradoxically, when we read 'Ping', for instance,
we may be conscious of its extreme repetitiousness—David Lodge counts ninety
'4For a deconstructionist reading of repetition in Beckett see Connor 1988.
176occurrences of 'white' in the text (1986, 1 20)—as its only expansive gesture,
when in fact it is acting constrictively in conjunction with the abstemious
vocabulary.
Once again, however, we have to read Beckett's device of repetition as
more than just one further 'reduction of the commonplace'. We saw how in
'Imagination Dead Imagine' there was an attempt to free language of the shadow
of representationalism. Well, the technique of repetition assists in that effort.
The connection is made clear by Barbara Trieloff in her essay on the post-
Trilogy fictions. 'As in non-verbal music,' Trieloff writes, 'repetition and
echoing can be said to suggest aesthetic, intra-textual representation: references
and relaticns dc iot point to phenomena outside of the music or text itself
(1990, 95). In other words, the repeated units refer us back to themselves, to
their earlier occurrences, rather than to any proposed reality:
All known all white bare white body fixed one yard legs joined
like sewn. Light heat white floor one square yard never seen.
White walls one yard by two white ceiling one square yard never
seen. Bare white body fixed only the eyes only just. Traces
blurs light grey almost white on white.. .Traces blurs signs no
meaning light grey almost white (CSP, 193; my ellipsis)
William Gass reads that opening 'All' as 'audacious' (1970, 13). It certainly is
audacious if one understands it as a claim to self-sufficiency. As with
'Imagination Dead Imagine' there is an apparent effort to rid the discourse of its
extra-textual representationalism. However, the effort is doomed to 'failure'
because language 'can't help being quotations of language already heard'
(Bersani and Dutoit 1993, 20). As Barthes points out, 'the writer can only
imitate a gesture that is always anterior, never original' (1977, 146). Beckett
cannot free his language of representationalism here; what he can do, however, is
interdict the teleological structure of the signification. We will be given the
'traces blurs signs' but 'no meaning'; the words of the text will act not as units in
some gathering continuity, but as monadic seizures impeding the progress of the
reader towards sense. Closure is precluded. As David Lodge has pointed out,
177we normally pursue repetitions as elements of cohesion within the 'variegated
texture' (1986, 121) of discourse. Here, we are unable to use Beckett's
patterning in this way because variegation has been so drastically reduced. The
text's indigence involves the occlusion of the orientational material we require to
determine significance. This refusal of teleological structure is manifest in the
interdictive ending: 'silence ping over' (CSP, 196). The sign which breaks the
'silence' here is the text's most consciously indeterminate unit; the 'over' only
returns us to silence. Beckett offers us cessation, not closure. Never closure.
It is because Beckett stops short at every level in 'Ping'—narrative,
grammatical, lexical—that determination is impossible. But it is not only that
the text achieves this plurality through its narratorial reticence, occiusiveness and
closural interdiction that makes it relevant to my study of interrogative short
fiction; it is also that Beckett should have found the form so amenable to his
efforts to 'go on' from the Trilogy. I would suggest that the reason for this was
that, given the 'obligation to express' yet the impossibility of escaping language
in that expression, interrogative short texts allowed him to 'fail better'—to fail
without the paraphernalia of narrative or any of the emergent continuities of
extent that mark the Trilogy, to fail, above all, at making meaning from what is
said.
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Richard Ford has written of the 1960s and 70s in America as 'a time of
boisterous experimenting and questioning about what a short narrative might
variously be' (1998, xiv); a time when convictions about the short story—
gleaned largely from Frank O'Connor's The Lonely Voice—were 'being
uprooted and turned upside down' (1992, viii). In particular, Ford cites the
impact on American writers of recently translated work by Borges, Carlos
Fuentes, Garcia Márquez, aesthetic ideas emerging from Gruppo 63 in Italy and
the Nouveau Roman in France, along with the decline in the academy of the New
Criticism.
Of course, all of these influences and trends have been—and will
continue to be—thoroughly documented in writing about postmodernism,
American or otherwise. However, Ford's account is somewhat at odds both with
contemporary and retrospective critical discourse about the 1960s and early
1970s because of its generic emphasis on the short story and its suggestion that
the theoretical and experimental upheavals of the time may have been especially
or differently manifest in short fiction than in the novel. Almost withottt
exception, critics writing about this period have observed no such critical
distinction between the forms; the focus has, rather, been on the competing
registers of experimental/conventional, representational/non-representational,
modernist/postmodernist, within which the novel and short story are lumped
together. This homogenization of the two forms has unfortunate consequences
for the short fiction which, as we have seen, has a tendency to be subsumed in a
critical discourse geared largely to the aesthetics of the longer form. Hence, one
finds repeatedly assertions made about postmodernist or experimental fiction
180which in fact pertain only to the novel; and this even when the illustrative text is
a short story.
In this chapter, therefore, I want to propose readings of stories by Donald
Barthelme and others that place them as stories within the trajectory of
modernist short fiction as I have defined it. My first objective in doing so will
be to enhance understanding of the texts themselves by freeing them from a
novel-orientated postmodernist perspective. By extension, this will allow me to
challenge established definitions of literary postmodemism which are based
solely on consideration of the novel, while at the same time demonstrating why
the short story has been, in the case of Barthelme, so amenable a form for the
experimental imagination.
Much of what I am concerned with in this chapter can be elucidated to
begin with in relation to the title story from Ronald Sukenick's 1969 collection
The Death of the Novel and Other Stories. Despite appearances, Sukenick's
story does not attempt some putative displacement of the novel by the short
story, nor does it offer to narrate, in short measure, the 'demise' of the novel as a
genre. The much larger object of Sukenick's attention is what his narrator
describes as the 'absolutely problematic' quality of post-realist fiction in terms
of its treatment of chronological time, characterization and plot (1969, 41). The
main diegesis of the story concerns the narrator's relationships with his fifteen
year-old girlfriend Teddy and his mistress Betty. However, this narrative is
repeatedly displaced and interrupted by fragments of newspaper stories, counter-
teleological digressions, metafictional ruminations and, ultimately, by an account
of the narrator's efforts to write the story itself.
The particular anxiety for Sukenick's narrator lies in his pressing sense of
the arbitrary selectiveness of the narrating act. He is continually plagued by the
presence of all that his narrative is excluding, all that he is leaving out in order to
make this particular incidence of meaning. Hence the fraught intrusions into his
181narration of 'real' newspaper columns reporting atrocities in Vietnam. Despite
their narrative quality, their appearance as structured récits, these columns
convey, as the narrator's story itself does, their status as arbitrarily selective
representations of a reality that is not encompassable; they serve only to remind
the narrator of the 'overwhelming social dislocations' (bid) that are entailed in
any feeble location of meaning. The newspaper, like the story, is implicated by
its very act of selectivity in the formation of the 'reality' it reports.
To escape this predicament, the narrator attempts to write without any
'hysterical impositions of meaning', to 'improvise' his art as he does his life
(ibid, 42). To this end he adopts a 'principle of simultaneous multiplicity, or the
knack of keeping several things on your mind at once', a strategy which he
believes will better reflect the inundation of data, the multitude of possible
narratives that surrounds him, 'the central fact of our mental life'  (ibid. 53). This
'simultaneous multiplicity' is manifest not only in the newspaper intrusions but
in the many counter-teleological abductions from the dominant diegesis. Several
of these begin 'Once upon a time...' or 'One evening...', statements that are, as
Jonathan Culler puts it, 'extremely rich in literary and pragmatic
presuppositions...relat[ing] the story to a series of other stories' (1981, 115).
However, these openings, rich in promise, are followed by a marked failure to
deliver any significance: the mini-narratives peter out indeterminately or are
displaced by yet other digressions, as in the 'John Johnson' anecdote which is
not only abortive but which is parodic of the novelistic compositional gesture of
the illustrative anecdote itself: 'John Johnson was a short, slight fellow, tall and
portly, with a nondescript face' (1969, 57).
My interest in Sukenick' s story emerges from the familiarity of the
techniques he is using to undertake his exploration of the 'post-realist'
problematic. In preceding chapters we witnessed the importance of
indeterminacy and resistance to formal closure in the modernist short story.
182With Hemingway in particular we saw the device that Sukenick deploys of
signalling conventions and archetypes of story-telling ('Once upon a time...')
only to have the main narrative divert from the kind of closure promised by such
a beginning. Similarly, the indeterminate anecdotes that resist recuperation by
the main diegesis, and which in fact threaten to overrun it, recall the deceptive
way-laying Joyce undertakes repeatedly in his stories and which Beckett
explores to the limits of its logic. My point is that Sukenick's story exploring the
predicament of 'post-realism' adopts characteristic techniques of modernist short
fiction to do so. Sukenick's concerns may be different from his modernist
predecessors, but many of the formal strategies of his narrative are not.
This formal connection is made clear in the ending to the story, where the
metafictional anxiety about ending—'Here begins the last hour that I allow
myself to finish this performance' (ibid. 90)—gives way finally to an explicitly
and self-consciously modernist short story epiphany. In this 'last hour', the
digressions, anecdotes, newspaper intrusions multiply as do the writer's pseudo-
Beckettian imprecations to himself to 'go on', 'keep going', 'faster'. Every
channel of information is open—'Another call. And still another'  (ibid. 100)—
and inundating the narrator with possibilities for closure that will, of course, be
predicated on the occlusion of all other possible closures: 'What else can
happen? The house can burn down' (ibid).' Maddened with anxiety the narrator
finally writes in the actual situation of writing: 'Enough. Saturday, January 20,
1968. Let's take a walk' he says and heads out into the thawing landscape:
The sun begins to dip behind the mountain, I call it a
mountain.. .And here's the bend in the road. I start around it. In a
minute I'll be out of sight. But before I disappear, I lift my red
wool cap that I bought so the hunters won't blow my head off a
'The pressure of multiple possible endings is felt throughout postmodernist
fiction: see, for example, B.S. Johnson's story 'Broad Thoughts from a Home' in
his 1973 collection Aren 't You Rather Young to be Writing Your Memoirs, Flaim
O'Bnen's At Swim-Two-Birds (1939), John Fowles's The French Lieutenant's
Woman (1964), and Barthelme's 'Views of My Father Weeping', discussed
below.
183gesture of goodbye, as if to say, in fact to say, I'm happy folks,
and I wish you luck. I disappear around the bend.
So long. End of story (ibid, 102)
Given the anxiety about the conditions of 'post-realist' fiction that the narrator
has been worrying over throughout the text, this ending is entirely appropriate
because it describes the writer abandoning the scene of writing while at the same
time placing that abandonment as the arbitrary ending to the text. However, as a
gesture of valediction it is decidedly familiar in structure and effect to the reader
of the modernist short story. That self-consciousness ('I call it a mountain')
arises because of the epiphanic nature of the scene: the narrator has risen from
his desk and walked out into a pastoral landscape that is also, like Gabriel
Conroy's, a scene of transition—the thaw is on. Despite this self-awareness the
ending acts interrogatively, as epiphanic endings do: it does not function as a
point of disclosure. The relevance of the landscape is uncertain—indeed, it
opens new interpretative possibilities concerning the narrator's convictions that
we have reached the 'post-realist' stage in fiction. This closing scene is the most
steadily pictured in the story, and like so many of the endings we have examined
in previous chapters it represents a site of conflict and amplification in the text
despite its gesture of closure and completion. What interests me is why an
ending so conscious of its prefiguration in the modernist short story should
emerge as ideally expressive of the narrator's 'post realist' anxieties about the
writing act.
Rather than read Sukenick' s text as simply an arch example of the playful
metafictional imagination, then, I am suggesting that we approach it through a
consideration of the form in which it is written—an approach that is surely
invited by the title of the volume to which it belongs, The Death of the Novel and
Other Stories. In other words, I am arguing for a genre-based perspective on this
text rather •than one geared solely to the consideration of its status as a
postmodemist fiction. Postmodernist critics have understood Sukenick's story in
terms of the challenge it presents to the classic realist piety of
184representationalism and the fictional paraphernalia—time, plot, character—
which facilitates that. Underlying this is an assumption that the postmodernist
critique of mimetic realism cuts across genre, that a perspective sensitive to
generic discriminations is no longer valuable, or even valid. I want to argue that,
on the contrary, such an approach would not only supplement our understanding
of the texts in question but also impinge upon our view of postmodernist fiction,
its critical history, provenance and procedures.
Of course, the reluctance of critics to recognize the particular properties
of the short story is nothing new; in previous chapters 1 have cited many whose
readings of short fiction are predominantly based on theories of the novel. Yet it
is still remarkable to come across commentators of the stature of John Barth and
William Gass who even as they note the preference among their contemporaries
for short forms do not undertake any consideration of the reasons for this
phenomenon or bring to bear any generic discrimination in their analyses. In an
interview published in 1973, Barth commented on how many of his fellow
Americans were at that time finding the novel 'much less congenial a form
artistically than shorter, different kinds of things' (Gado 1973, 124). He cited
Kafka, Borges (whose Ficciones appeared in English translation in 1967) and
Beckett as the principal influences on writers like Donald Barthelme and Robert
Coover. Yet nowhere does he explore possible reasons for this phenomenon.
Barth's comments echo those made by William Gass a few years earlier in his
influential volume2 of essays Fiction and the Figures of Life (1970):
A number of our finest writers—Barth, Coover, arid Barthelme,
for example—have begun to experiment with shorter forms, as
Beckett and Borges before them, and in many ways each wishes
to instruct us in the art of narration, the myth-making imagination
(1970, 107)
Gass too recognizes some generic preference on the part of these writers, some
20n the importance of Gass's book as the 'manifesto' of the 'nontraditionalists'
in American letters see McCaffery 1982.
185leaning towards short forms as particularly suited to the metafictional
explorations they wish to undertake. However, he is concerned only with these
stories' ability to lay bare elements of narrative structure: he is not interested in
their formal properties except as they distil what he takes to be the fundamental
patterns underlying all narrative. As regards Donald Barthelme, this confines
Gass's interest to Snow White (1967). Although a deeply sensitive reader of the
contemporary scene, Gass, like Barth, nevertheless fails to consider that it may
be the short story's formal properties which account for its intimate involvement
in so much of the experimental fiction of the time.
The indifference Barth and Gass show to the short story is reflected
throughout critical texts of th period, and this neglect has consequences when
we consider the tneories of postmodemism that have emerged therefrom. For
instance, reading through Raymond Federman's influential 1975 anthology of
essays Surfiction one discovers that there is not a single reference to the short
story as a distinct genre, let alone any debate about its formal properties, despite
its ubiquity as a form among the writers represented and discussed in the book.
Jerome Klinkowitz, in his essay 'Literary Disruptions; or What's Become of
American Fiction?', for example, examines work by, among others, Sukenick,
Barthelme, Kurt Vonnegut, and Jerzy Kosinski. In his analyses Klinkowitz
makes a number of claims for these writers as representative of the 'new style' in
American fiction, Writing of Kosinski's Steps, a novel composed of extremely
short chapters, he highlights the text's radical truncation and compression and
the way in which this results in conventional plotting being 'replaced by more
inventive associations' (Federman 1975, 171). Rather than gratify readerly
expectations of closure, we are told, 'Kosinski prefers instead to write the bare
minimum, so that "the reader is forced to imagine what the novel merely
suggests" (ibid). Only a reader unconscious of the achievements of modernist
short fiction would carry the conviction that Kosinski's approach here is
186radically new. Yet even in his discussions of short stories, such as Barthelme's
'Robert Kennedy Saved from Drowning', Klinkowitz fails to relate the text in
question to any notion of the significance or history of the very form in which it
is written. He notes of Barthelme's story that its various narrative elements 'add
up to nothing conclusive' and from this argues that accordingly 'a new way is
needed to count their meaning' (ibid. 170). That 'new way' has been the
challenge in modernist short fiction for some sixty or so years prior to
Barthelme's story.
To a great extent Klinkowitz's claims about the radical newness of the
fiction he is witnessing arise from his conviction that the American novel has
remained largely conservative and stable in formal terms since the  1920s. Set
against the 'persistent old-fashioned story tellers', with their 'leading characters,
plots and morals to be pointed', their 'beginnings middles and ends'  (ibid, 165),
these new writers certainly are provocative and radical. But it is surely
inadequate to argue for their 'newness' by contrasting their poetics of
indeterminacy, generated through truncation, ellipsis, interdiction, resistance to
formal closure, and so on, with the continuities of the 'conventional' realist
novel. Some consideration of the achievements of the modernist short story
would quickly alert Klinkowitz to the fact that the very innovative strategies he
is celebrating in this new writing have already been extensively cultivated in
short fiction. At best, some revision of the claims for radical newness would be
required.
To illustrate my point here, consider Barthelme's story 'Views of My
Father Weeping' (from City Life, 1970) and the responses of some leading critics
to it. The story is narrated by a character whose father has been run over and
killed by an 'aristocrat...riding down the street in his carriage' (1970, 3). After
the funeral ceremony the father appears, sitting in the centre of his son's bed,
weeping. Or so it seems, for here the ontological doubt (interrogativeness) sets
187in. Is it his father after all? The resemblance is strong, but identity cannot be
confirmed. Throughout the story the father will reappear in this way, variously
weeping, in fragmented, possibly delusionary, possibly memorial, interpolations
into the main narrative:
My father throws his ball of knitting up in the air. The orange
wool hangs there.
*
My father regards the tray of pink cupcakes. Then he jams his
thumb into each cupcake, into the top. Cupcake by cupcake. A
thick smile spreads over the face of each cupcake. (ibid, 5)
The temporal, spatial, and semantic status of these interpolations in relation to
the main diegesis is not determined. Is the father (dead, of course) doing these
things, or are they memories? And if the latter, what is their significance to the
narrator? Their significance either way, of course, is uncertain—it is suspended,
deferred, like his father between states of life and death, like the ball of orange
wool.
In the midst of this uncertainty, Barthelme activates a plot predicated
simply on a quest for certainty. The narrator wishes to reconcile opposing
statements by witnesses to the accident, one of whom claims it was the father's
fault that he was run over, another that it was due to the recklessness of the
aristocrat. In his quest to know for sure which account is correct the narrator
tracks down the aristocrat's coachman, Lars Bang, who 'resolves' the doubt by
telling how the father had tried to attack the horses and been trampled underfoot
in his madness. The story concludes thus with Lars Bang's account:
"I wanted to go back and see what had become of the madman,
your father, who had attacked us; but my master, vastly angry
and shaken up, forbade it. I have never seen him in so fearful a
temper as that day; if your father had survived, and my master
got his hands on him, it would have gone ill with your father,
that's a certainty. And so, you are now in possession of all the
facts. I trust you are satisfied, and will drink another bottle of
this quite fair claret you have brought us, and be on your way."
Before I had time to frame a reply, the dark-haired girl spoke.
"Bang is an absolute bloody liar," she said.
Etc. (ibid, 15-16)
188Brian McHale has described this as a 'non-ending', the 'Etc.' as a 'gesture
towards endlessness' (1987, 109). But I read it as a typically interdictive short
story ending. As Lars Bang's account begins, we question his reliability as a
witness, not least because he is a 'suspect' in the narrator's inquiry. However, it
is clear from this ending that the story is not interested in establishing the relative
reliability or otherwise of its characters. Rather, the function of the ending is the
non-resolution of the quest plot. The 'Etc.' does not only signal that the quest
for certainty carries on ad infinitum, it also refers to all that has been left out of
this narrative; it reflects back, in other words, on the condition of indeterminacy
in the story as well as projecting forward an endless series of statements and
counter-statements. That 'Etc.' we could attach to the end of every modernist
short story we have examined so far—it is the mark of the form. It is the 'Etc.',
too, that critics have sought to supply in their readings, filling the semantic gaps
left by the interdictions, ellipses, withholdings and occlusions that mark the
positive shortness of the form.
All of the radical effects in this story can in fact be read in this way, as
extending from modernist short story techniques. The 'endlessness' of the
ending, as I have suggested, is a extension of the interdictive openness that
characterizes the short form. Similarly, the deferral of meaning mentioned above
is typical of the short story technique of withholding, refusing to arrest the
significance (symbolic or otherwise) of certain details in the narrative for the
purposes of enforcing the dominant diegesis. Connected to this is what McHale
calls the 'rhetoric of contrastive banality' (1987, 76), referring to the way in
which in postmodernist fictions the narrator or characters often remain 'blasé in
the face of miraculous violations of natural law' (ibid). In this story, the narrator
does not at any stage remark upon the impossibility of his father's actually being
in his room weeping after his death: that fact does not cause the narrator to
discount him as an unlikely cohabitee. Furthermore, he is concerned to make
189sure that the weeping figure is not the 'mailman, the man who delivers the
groceries, an insurance salesman or tax collector' (1970, 4) as though their
presence, sitting weeping on his bed, would be more readily explicable.
Contrastive banality is not just an instrument of irony or oddness; it marks a
refusal to arbitrate connections between elements in the narrative—again, a
refusal to recuperate the details of the story for the dominant diegesis. It is, in
other words, akin to reticence in the short story. As with Joyce's three 'surplus'
signiflers—paralysis, gnornon, simony—we are left to establish meaning and
significance from the contexts of reference and utterance: the narrating voice
refuses to mediate any connections for us. Finally, there is the status of the
dominant diegesis itself. The quest plot is, of course, a pretence at narrative
closure. Particularly in Hemingway we saw this technique of signalling an
affinity to a minimal story structure in order then to refute it. Barthelme' s text
simply makes explicit in its 'Etc.' this refutation.
Obviously, there are significant differences between Barthelme's textual
world and that of Joyce and Hemingway; he is, after all, unquestionably
postmodernist. Barthelme more conspicuously disrupts ontological coordinates
in his fictions than do the earlier writers. Hence the estrangement of the world in
which the story takes place. The deadlundead simultaneity aside, this is a place
populated by telephones, insurance salesmen, grocery delivery boys, plastic
jonquils and Ford pickups, yet it also a place where aristocrats ride around the
city streets in carriages and employ livened footmen. The rational coordinates
of Barthelme's world are difficult to fix. My interest, however, is that the
narrative techniques Barthelme uses to disrupt ontological certainties are those
employed throughout the modernist short fictions we have been examining.
Barthelme uses shortness as a positive quality in his stories; form is integral to
the meanings he generates, or degenerates. He exploits the techniques of
interrogative short fiction but in order to explore questions of being as well as
190those of meaning.
Aside from offering us another perspective on Barthelme's textual
practice, the kind of reading I am advocating here has consequences for how we
place Barthelme, and other story writers, within an appraisal of postmodernism.
Indeed, I would go as far as to say that that appraisal may have to be altered or
qualified when we involve it with a genre-based analysis. Certainly, critics who
have responded to 'Views of My Father Weeping' have been unwilling to
account for it as in any way related to the history of the form in which it is
written. Barbara Roe, for example, would prefer to seek out ambitious, and
ultimately impressionistic, connections to the visual arts in order to explain the
story's structure, claiming that it 'simulates collage's temporal and spatial
ambiguity' (1992, 40). Larry McCaffery, similarly, even while he contemplates
the way in which 'final answers' and 'teleological explanations' (1982, 110) are
missing from the text, is unable or unwilling to relate this to story form or to any
critical history of short fiction.
More importantly, McCaffery's wider thesis is that the work of
Barthelme (along with that of Coover and Gass) represents a break with the
aesthetics of modernism. He argues that it was principally from the  Nouveau
Roman that these writers inherited the scepticism about 'causal relationships,
beginnings, middles, and ends...' (ibid. 13) evident in their narratives. However,
McCaffery's perspective, like Klinkowitz's, is exclusive of generic
considerations; he is making a claim about fiction that is in fact based solely on a
theory of the novel. Accordingly, he can make pronouncements about radical
postmodemist credentials based on comments like this, about Barthelme:
When his characters—or we ourselves—try to gain "deeper"
insights or teleological explanations about what has happened,
the search inevitably ends futilely with our efforts often being
antiôipated and directly mocked (ibid. 110)
Barthelme feels that he cannot offer his readers the easy
assurances which lie at the centre of most realistic
narratives.. .[His] work is characterized by his refusal to present
191well-rounded characters, supply easy explanations, or make
causal connections (ibid, 114-5)
All of McCaffery's observations here could be applied to the modernist
interrogative short story as we have encountered it. Not only is he arguing from
a position blind to achievements in the form in which Barthelme is working, but
once we take that form into consideration, then the integrity of the
modernist/postmodernist breakthrough metanarrative he is arguing for can itself
be compromised.3
Although she does not undertake any extended consideration of
Barthelme as regards postmodernism, Barbara Roe, like McCaffery, seems
happy to conduct her book-length study of Barthelme's short fiction as though
the history of the genre were a footnote to his achievement. 'In the conventional
sense,' she writes, 'Barthelme did not write "short stories'" (1992, xiii). She
does not define her use of 'conventional' here but it surely cannot include
modernists writers because she describes Bartheime's radical art in terms of its
refusal of 'such explicit parameters as plot' and its cultivation of 'indeterminacy'
(ibid, xiii; xiv). Where she does identify some of his experimental techniques
her account is nevertheless still limited by its lack of awareness of the ways in
which these might relate to short fiction, as when she writes of how in his stories
'unobstructed routes are not permitted.. .the paths of plot must be blocked at
every turn.. .or narratives stalled by anticlimax' (ibid. 4). As with McCaffery,
Roe's observations here could as easily be applied to the interrogative,
interdictive modernist short story.
Alan Wilde goes further still than McCaffery and Roe in propounding the
theory of a postmodernist breakthrough. According to Wilde, modernism is
3The phrase 'breakthrough metanarrative' is Brian McHale's, who argues that all
such metanarratives concerning the relationship of modernism and
postmodernism must be divested of authority in order to allow more refined,
singular readings of the texts involved (1992, 24).
192characterized by a 'disjunctive irony' which 'recognizes the disconnections' of a
fragmented, relativized world yet seeks to 'control them' through 'an aesthetic
closure that substitutes for the notion of paradise regained an image.. .of a
paradise fashioned by man himself—an aesthetic evident in, for instance,
T.S.Eliot's countenancing of the 'mythical method' in Ulysses (Wilde 1981,
10). Postmodernism, on the other hand, Wilde defines by its quality of
'suspensive irony' in which the effort to close or unify the 'vision of multiplicity,
randomness, contingency, and even absurdity' is replaced by an acceptance of
'quandary. ..a low-keyed engagement with a world of perplexities and
uncertainties' (ibid).	 Wilde observes how various postmodernist writers
'welcome or at any rate subscribe an aesthetic of openness' (ibid. 135) in
contradistinction to modernists in whose 'heterocosmic' imaginations
'fragmentation is overcome' and 'discontinuity transcended' (ibid. 128).
Wilde cites as an 'emblem' of postmodern suspensiveness Max Apple's
'Free Agents', a fantastic story in which a narrator finds himself party to a court
tribunal set up to establish whether his bodily organs, which have downed tools
and gone on strike, have the right to determine their own future. Like the best
courtroom thrillers, Apple's story hinges ultimately upon the decision of the
jury. However, the jury, in this case chaired by Einstein's brain, delivers a hung
verdict, a decision (or rather a failure to decide) whose indeterminacy is joyously
accepted:
"To tell me this," I yell to the heavens, "I don't need Einstein's
brain." Clouds suck up the jury. Full of myself, on tiptoes I
bounce on the grass ready for everything (1977, 51)
For Wilde, postmodernist 'suspensiveness' is 'imaged in the hung jury' (1981,
132). However, we might equally read the interrogative openness of this ending,
its deliberate refusal to supply information the narrative is itself generating the
desire for, as significant of modernist short fiction. In other words, we can relate
its strategies to the form in which it is written as much as to some postmodernist
193anxiety about the indeterminacy of truth. Read as a short story, Apple's text cuts
across the modernist/postmodernist binary as Wilde wishes to define it.
In effect I am arguing here that a study of the 'postmodernist short story'
needs to take into account both elements in that designation. When we do so, we
realize that the postmodernist breakthrough metanarrative can be compromised
and qualified in relation to the short fiction. My position here aligns me with
critics such as Helmut Lethen, Matei Calinescu, Marjorie Perloff, William
Spanos and Brian McHale, all of whom have been concerned with refining our
understanding of the continuities between modernism and postmodernism. They
each seek to qualify the definition of the latter through an extension of our
understanding of the former—something that the dependency relation in the term
postmodernism itself would seem to invite. Helmut Lethen, for example, re-
reads postmodernism as 'uncovering a dimension which has been buried within
Modernism for some time' (1986, 233), namely the avant-garde. Lethen argues
that the (by definition) disruptive and discontinuous avant-garde has been
occluded in accounts of modernism firstly in order to guarantee 'the coherence
of the critical construct of Modernism', and secondly in order to 'warrant the
claim of innovation which is inherent in Postmodernism' (ibid, 234). Lethen
suggests that if one compares the features of Postmodernism to those of
Dadaism, for example, 'one will be hard put to discern any basic differences'
(ibid). He goes on to list polarities commonly called upon to distinguish the
modernist from the postmodernist, such as Hierarchy/Anarchy,
Presence/Absence, and, most significantly for me, Determinacy/Indeterminacy
(ibid. 235). Lethen argues that this list of polarities in fact 'shows the battlefield
on which Modernism itself operates' (ibid. 236). In other words, the critical
discrimination modernistlpostmodernist is in fact already inherent within
modernism.
Now, throughout this thesis I have been arguing for a definition of the
194modernist short story based on its cultivation of indeterminacy. In the light of
Lethen's comments we might say that what Klinkowitz, Wilde, MeCaffery and
others define as postmodernist indeterminacy in the stories of Sukenick, Coover
and Barthelme could equally be read as emerging from an opposition within
modernism. Furthermore, Lethen's point that the notion of a consolidated
modernist aesthetic depends on the expulsion of the oppositional and, by
definition, discontinuous avant-garde, concurs with my repeated insistence that
the critical history of the short story has been suppressed by an emphasis on the
aesthetic of novel; hence the claims for postmodernism based solely on an
understanding of the dominant prose form, ignorant of any countermanding
evidence in the short fiction.
Lethen's sentiments are echoed by Matei Calinescu who suggests that
postmodernisrn 'is mostly an extension and diversification of the pre-Worid War
II avant-garde' (1987, 143). However, Calinescu refines the argument by
observing the ways in which postmodernist writers have retreated from the
relentless and 'ruthless devastation of the avant-garde and opted instead for a
'logic of renovation' (ibid, 276). Like John Barth and Umberto Eco4, Calinescu
believes that the logic of the avant-garde ends ultimately in sterility, impasse, the
impossibility of saying Hence the efforts made by Barth and others to articulate
an alternative and recuperative 'logic of renovation' (ibid. 277) in which the
postmodernist poetics of indeterminacy came to be understood as the
'continuation' of a force which has always existed within modernism.
Calinescu derives his definition of this poetics of indeterminacy from
Marjorie Perloff who argues that there exist within modernist poetics two
distinct though often interwoven strands: the 'symbolist mode' that runs from
4See Barth's 'The Literature of Exhaustion' (1967) and 'The Literature of
Replenishment' (1980), both in Barth 1997. See also the interview in Bellamy
(1974, 1-18). For Eco's views on the sterility of the logic of the avant-garde see
Eco 1985, 66-7.
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symbolist 'mode of indeterminacy or "undecidability", of literalness and free
play' that runs from Rimbaud's Illuminations, through Stein, Pound and
Williams, Cubism, Dadaism, early surrealism and which also includes 'the great
French/English verbal compositions of Beckett' (1981, vii). Perloff elucidates
this difference in a comparative reading of John Ashbery's 'anti-symbolist'
poem 'These Lacustrine Cities' and Eliot's The Waste Land. Her conclusion is
that, despite its opacities and disjunctions, its allusiveness and symbolic richness,
one can nevertheless readily decode Eliot's poem because in it 'the relationship
of the word to its referents, of signifier to signified, remains essentially intact'
(ibid. 17). The elements of Ashbery's poem on the other hand remain disparate
and indeterminate:
In Ashbery's verbal landscape, fragmented images appear one by
one—cities, sky, swans, tapering branches, violent sea, desert,
mountain—without coalescing into a symbolic network.. For
there seems to be no world, no whole to which these parts may
be said to belong. Totality is absent (ibid, 10)
There is a striking similarity between Perloff's descriptive rhetoric here and that
which I have found appropriate for my account of modernist short fiction. The
centrifugal nature of Ashbery's poem, its deliberate failure to bring about a
coalescence of meaning in its detail, to subjugate the 'presence' of its parts to a
symbolic totality—in short, its qualities of indeterminacy—all signal its kinship
to the kind of texts I have been dealing with. Of course, Ashbery's poem goes
further than the stones I've been looking at (Beckett's excepted) in attacking the
referential assumptions we make about language; nevertheless, Perloff's
descriptions of the poem's techniques could equally apply to modernist short
fictions. For instance, take the way in which imminent plots are signalled in the
text only to be abandoned at the point of closure:
[S]uch potential plots are rather like water sprouts, rising to the
surface only to dissipate again. As readers, we are thus left in a
state of expectancy: just at the point where revelation might
occur, the curtain suddenly comes down (ibid. 11)
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can readily associate short fiction—as another relatively neglected history within
modernism—with this poetics of indeterminacy. The value of this for my
account of postmodernism, and the reason I have advanced towards it, is that it
establishes a metanarrative that cuts across the modernistlpostmodernist binary
which I have found so reductive in relation to short fiction.
Returning to Larry McCaffery, we find a discussion of the impact of
Alain Robbe-Grillet's For a New Novel on American fiction (and criticism)
following its publication in English in 1965 in which McCaffery argues that the
work provided a theoretical grounding for the breakthrough against the dominant
psycho-social realism of Salinger, Mailer, Bellow, Updike, and William Styron.
Unquestionably, For a New Novel was an important part of the effort to free
fictional practice from the strictures of representationalism. For many writers
and academics it became the principal means by which the fiction of Beckett,
Nabokov and Borges could be appropriated for literary theory, though Donald
Barthelme, it should be noted, was careful to distance himself early on from the
theory and practice of the Nouveau Roman.5 It is possible, however, to read
Robbe-Gnllet's text in support of the theory I have been outlining, namely that
the short fiction contravenes the modernistlpostmodernist dichotomy based on
the metanarrative of a postmodernist breakthrough..
Discussing his own film, Last Year at Marienbad, Robbe-Grillet
complains about the nature of the questions audiences invariably ask, questions
about the past lives of characters, about events preceding those in the film:
'The new French novelists, Butor, Sarraute, Robbe-Gnulet, Claude Simon,
Phillipe Sollers, have...succeeded in making objects of their books without
reaping any of the strategic benefits of the maneuver.. .Their work seems leaden,
self-conscious in the wrong way. Painfully slow-paced with no leaps of the
imagination, concentrating on the minutiae of consciousness, these novels
scrupulously, in deadly earnest, parse out what can safely be said.' (Barthelme
1964(a), 16). 'Made dreariness into a religion,' one of his imaginary critic says
elsewhere (1985, 40).
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each other last year at Marienbad? Does the young woman
remember and is she only pretending not to recognize the
handsome stranger? Or has she really forgotten everything that
has happened between them? etc.
Matters must be put clearly: such questions have no meaning.
(1989, 152)
It is as though the audience requires some preterition, some larger chronology, in
order to decode the 'present' action of the film. We have seen how the same
questions are repeatedly asked of modernist short fiction; indeed, I have argued
that Joyce, Hemingway and Beckett all utilize the persistence of this kind of
readerly curiosity as an operative principle in their texts. Robbe-Grillet's
impatience is with the audience's refusal to recognize the self-sufficiency of the
present moment in which the action of the film occurs. In the same way,
modernist short stories refuse the explanatory teleological justifications and
continuities of the novel; they are predicated on the self-sufficiency of their
present, as it were. The repeated efforts of critics of, for example, Hemingway's
'Cat in the Rain' or 'Hills like White Elephants' to reconstruct a past life for the
text that will offer motivations and explanations for the characters' actions
betrays the depth of this determination to unify and recuperate meaning.
Robbe-Gnllet argues that in the new narrative time 'no longer completes
anything...Moment denies continuity' (ibid. 155). This emphasis on the
momentary at the expense of continuity may appear to entail a sense of
frustration, even disappointment, for the reader. But Robbe-Grillet argues that in
fact this kind of writing celebrates the 'creative assistance' of the reading act:
For, far from neglecting him, the author today proclaims his
absolute need of the reader's cooperation, an active, conscious,
creative assistance. What he asks of him is no longer to receive
ready-made a world completed, full, closed upon itself, but on
the contrary to participate in a creation (ibid, 156)
Robbe-Grillet's phrasing here recalls that of Robert Louis Stevenson who
defined the short story as resistant to the 'full close' (1997, 464) of the novel. As
I have argued throughout, the modernist short form excites the co-productive
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(1995, 3). Once again, there would appear to be consonance between the
aspirations of experimental fiction of this period and the formal properties of the
interrogative short story.
I am not suggesting here that modernist short fiction is somehow the
unacknowledged nonpareil form for postmodemist fiction; nor am I unconscious
of the fact that Robbe-Grillet's criticisms are of conventional realist fiction as a
mode of representation and apply equally to the short story as to the novel. What
I am pointing to is the manner in which the short form as I've defined it seems
answer in many ways to the demands Robbe-Grillet is making of fiction as a
whole. Throughout For a New Novel we encounter prophesies and projections
about the new fiction that appear to be descriptions of the procedures of
modernist short stories. In 'On Several Obsolete Notions', for instance, Robbe-
Grillet calls for an end to teleological plot structure governed by the 'impulse of
each episode toward a conclusion' (1989, 32). The modernist short story, as we
have seen, resists precisely this teleological impulse and so would appear to be
ideally suited to the resistance effort RobbeGrillet is calling for against the
classic realist imposition of 'the image of a stable, coherent, continuous,
unequivocal, entirely decipherable universe' (ibid). Similarly, in 'A Future for
the Novel' Robbe-Grillet chooses the detective story as his model of the 'old'
narrative mode in which everything 'is resolved in a banal bundle of causes and
consequences, intentions and coincidences' (ibid. 22). The oppositional 'new'
form, by contrast, will thwart the desire for such conclusiveness, returning us
instead to the 'evidence' in search of meanings that the text refuses to secure:
'Though they may conceal a mystery, or betray it, these elements...have only one
serious, obvious quality, which is to be there' (ibid. 23). Resisting our
determination to reduce their meaning to 'a single determining element' (ibid.
19), these texts will revel in surfices, enigmas, contradictory states, celebrating
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how the stories of Joyce, Hemingway, Beckett and others I have cited, function
to this end, interdicting closure and returning the reader always to the enigmatic
'presence' of their parts.
In an interview with Donald Barthelme in 1978, Heide Ziegler pursued
the matter of Barthelme's preference for short forms in terms very similar to
those Robbe-Grillet uses in For a New Novel. 'Would it be possible to say that
you prefer experience over meaning?' Ziegler asked, citing as an example the
way in which the balloon in Barthelme's story 'The Balloon' figures as a
'concrete particular' with no determinate meaning or significance (Barthelme
1982, 50). In other words, is Barthelme a poet of the surface, the testifiable
'present', conscious of the destitution of the old myths of 'depth'? Ziegler's
question is based on a speculation that the short story may be ideally suited to
this activity because as a form it permits or even enforces a disavowal of large-
scale recuperative structures of meaning. Barthelme side-steps the question on
this occasion, commenting only on his distrust of 'big canvasses' (ibid. 51). But
in a later interview he is more forthcoming about what he aims for in a story and
about what the short form offers him that the novel does not:
A process of accretion. Barnacles growing on a wreck or a rock.
I'd rather have a wreck than a ship that sails. Things attach
themselves to wrecks. Strange fish find your wreck or rock to be
a good feeding ground; after a while you've got a situation with
possibilities. (Barthelme 1983a., 34)
The metaphor is interesting here because it seems to suggest that the unextended
form can be richer in 'possibilities' than that which exhibits, full-rigged, its
development and identity. This resistance to novelistic elaboration is echoed
later on in the same interview when he talks about the importance of removing
the narrative scaffold, the rigging, in a story: 'It's a question as to whether such
things can be made to fly without the support of a controlling narrative' (ibid,
4 1-2). By eschewing the investigative paraphernalia of plot and character
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multiple 'present' of his textual world. Short fiction as a form is ideally suited to
the 'student of the surfaces' (ibid. 43), as Barthelme calls himself Its
interrogative openness and resistance to closure allows him to testify to the
strange possibilities of those surfaces without any obligation or scope to explain
them, to present situations free from any teleological development—the text as
'an itself (Barthelme 1974, 52), in other words, rather than a reflection of a
reality pre-structured with meaning.
Barthelme may be for many the exemplary postmodernist—indeed, his
'After Joyce' (1964) is a striking precedential account of McHale's ontological
dominant—but his chosen grammar is that of the interrogative short story.
Indeed, stories such as 'The Explanation' (City 1970) and 'Concerning the
Bodyguard' (Great Days, 1979) are purely interrogative, both being constructed
around questions that are either answered obliquely or not answered at all.
When we read Barthelme, then, I think we need to be conscious of both these
contexts—postmodernism and the short form. I have already set out why I think
such an approach is important in relation to postmodernism as a whole; now I
want to demonstrate what it offers to our understanding of Barthelme's
achievement by undertaking some further readings of his work.
Throughout his career, Barthelme has made plain his awareness of the
generic history of short fiction and its 'eligibility for responding to radical
innovation' (Davenport 1991, 70) by parodic playfulness with its conventions
and devices. For example, 'The Dolt' (Unspeakable Practices, Unnatural Acts,
1969) concerns an aspiring writer, Edgar, who must compose a story in order to
pass the National Writers' Examination. Edgar's problem is that he cannot think
of a 'middle' for his story. He has a captivating opening and an 'ironic'
conclusion (he recites these to his wife, Barbara) but he is unable to contrive a
love intrigue between his two central characters. "Something has to happen
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Of course, Barthelme's story itself lacks any such suspenseful intrigue, a failure
that is recognized in the text's wholly arbitrary, outlandish and ironic ending:
At that moment the son manqué entered the room. The son
manqué was eight feet tall and wore a serape woven out of two
hundred transistor radios, all turned on and tuned to different
stations. Just by looking at him you could hear Portland and
Nogales, Mexico.
"No grass in the house?"
Barbara got the grass which was kept in one of those little
yellow and red metal canisters made for sending film back to
Eastman Kodak.
Edgar tried to think of a way to badmouth this immense son
leaning over him like a large and blaring building. But he
couldn't think of anything. Thinking of anything was beyond
him. I sympathize. I myself have these problems. Endings are
elusive, middles are nowhere to be found, but worst of all is to
begin, to begin, to begin (ibid. 69).
The reiteration of 'begin' is, of course, playfully situated at the end of the story
here, but more than that, the problem with beginning at all, as hapless Edgar
discovers, is the obligation to conclude meaningfully. to justify having begun in
the first place. Edgar has an 'ironic' ending for his story, but it has no meaning
because there is no situation—no middle—for it ironically to resolve: the gap in
his text robs it of significance. Barthelme's interdictive and ironic ending to his
own text makes it as much a 'failure' in this respect as Edgar's.
The mischievous exploration of closure in the short form is a feature, too,
of 'The Piano Playtr' (Come Back Dr. Caligari, 1964). Here, the madly
discontinuous domesticity of Mr and Mrs Brian Hess, comprising an unsmoked
ham that talks, stale penicillin, paint chipping, Parsfal, IBM, Edmund Wilson,
Coriolanus, a sleepy combustible giraffe, and, of course, a piano, concludes with
Brian's attempt to move said instrument into the grape arbour for his wife to
play: 'He took a good grip on its varnishedness. He began to trundle it across
the room, and, after a slight hesitation, it struck him dead' (Barthelme 1964b, p.
22). A 'wow' ending, yes, but yet another perverse inflection of Chekhov's
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Hemingway's 'The Art of the Short Story', p.126 above). Here the title proposes
some cohesive duty for Barthelme's piano, so he has it 'go off' at the end. What
he's mocking is the convention that a fiction's guns and pianos and giraffes must
come to order, must be made to 'mean'. Throughout his story Barthelme plays
in this way with our desire to attribute significance to textual detail through
unruly juxtapositions which, because of the absence of any mediation between
them, strike us as literally discontinuous—elements resistant to sequentiality and
ratification in a telos. The killer piano is a parody of the 'wow' ending, but also
of the wider ways in which narrative discourse achieves intelligibility.
'The Piano Player' is interesting because it reveals, parodically, how
appropriate the elliptical short form is for the effects of indeterminacy Barthelme
wishes to create. Unlike Joyce and Hemingway, he uses it to enforce an
ontological interrogativeness: what is the nature of this world the characters
occupy? What are its physical laws and coordinates, and who or what has
agency in it? The short form is ideally productive of this sense of discontinuity:
it is a form which by its very nature is anti-teleological, which tends, through its
devices of interdiction and ellipsis, to suppress the causal relationships that
establish integrity and intelligibility in narrative. Whereas modernist writers
indulged the doubts it was able to raise about the status of knowledge and
meaning, Barthelme is interested in how its interrogativeness can be exploited to
undermine our sense of a coherent, describable world.
In 'The Wound' (Amateurs, 1977), he undertakes a parody of narrative
causality that again involves some playfl.ilness with conventions of closure in the
short story. 'The Wound' concerns a famous torero who is confined to bed after
being gored in the foot during a televised bullfight. He is waited upon by,
among others, his mother and his mistress, along with groups of  imbéciles,
idiotas and bobos. While his mistress films the convalescence, a roast beef is
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talk briefly of his experiences in psychoanalysis and drink a glass of Chivas
Regal. He is followed by the Queen of the Gypsies who, having helped herself
to some roast beef, decides to take possession of the torero's wound. She
commands that he be lifted up and carried out of the house, but the doorway is
suddenly blocked by a large black bull. The bull begins to ring, 'like a
telephone' (1979, 17).
In summary form like this, speculative absurdity would appear to be the
dominant interest of 'The Wound'. But in fact, the manner in which the
narrative proceeds encourages a reading of the story that emphasizes its
connections to, rather than its differences from, mimetic realism. Large sections
of the text are structured in the following way (1 have underlined to clarify the
pattern):
The torero, ignoring the roast beef, takes the silver dish from his
mother and sips from it, meanwhile maintaining intense eye
contact with his mistress. The torero's mistress hands the camera
to the torero's mother and reaches for the silver dish. "What is
all this nonsense with the dish?" she asks the famous aficionado
who is sitting by the bedside. The torero offers the aficionado a
slice of beef, carved from the roast with a sword, of which there
are perhaps a dozen on the bed. "These fellows with their
swords, think they are so fl," says one of the imbéciles to
another, quietly. The second imbécil says, "We would all think
ourselves fi if we could. But we can't. Something prevents
us.,
(ibid., p. 13)
At least one element in each sentence here provides the basis, the subject, for the
next sentence. It is as though the story were written to no plan: where it will end
up, how it will conclude, is being revised on a sentence by sentence basis. Like
a sestiria, the narrative provocations arise from the concatenated keywords—that
is the flimsy basis of the causal relationships in the passage. Yet it is still a
narrative, and I think Barthelme is exposing here, as Sukenick does in his story,
the ultimately factitious and arbitrary nature of all narrational acts. The
challenge is to see that the artifice of this story resides not solely in the fabulous
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selectivity it lays bear—mechanisms on which all narratives rely. Their
exposure in this way, and indeed the parodic treatment throughout Barthelme's
fiction of conventions of plotting and narration, reveals how textual meaning is
always a fabrication, how, as one critic puts it, reality 'does not speak for itself
but is always signified' (Maltby 1991, 5) 'The Wound' simply does
conspicuously what all realist fiction does more or less covertly.
The conclusion of the story, like that of 'The Piano Player', is a parodic
'wow' ending, making a pretence of closure. The final sentence reads, 'The bull
begins to ring, like a telephone' (1979, 17). In modernist short fiction we have
seen many endings which are interdictive of expectations that the narrative itself
generates. Barthelme's ending is also highly interdictive but it achieves this not
by diverting from but by aping a dramatic closural gesture. Furthermore, the
clarifying simile, 'like a telephone', undermines our objections to the absurdity
of the image of the ringing bull by involving it in a sense-making linguistic
structure. It is no more or less valid than all the other entirely arbitrary
selections that have been conspicuously made throughout the text and which are
made in all narratives. To the objection that bulls can't make ringing noises in
real life, comes the reply, Nor can imaginary telephones. In other words, let us
recognize the constructed nature of all that we encounter in narrative and free
ourselves from the (illusory) prison of descriptive realism.
The double focus I am employing in these readings—that is, on the texts
as short stories and as postmodernist metafictions—is useful because it
demonstrates how applicable the procedures of one are to the concerns of the
other. The interrogative short story's resistance to teleological structuration, the
way in which it returns us always to the enigmatic 'evidence' of its parts, makes
it the ideal form iri many ways for the destitution of that myth of 'depth', as
Robbe-Grillet calls it, that effort of classic realist fiction to uncover in itself 'the
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universe' (1989, 32). 'Moment' does indeed deny 'continuity' in Barthelme's
hands and our understanding of his postmodernism is enhanced once we
acknowledge the role his chosen form has in creating it.
This destitution of the myth of depth is performed explicitly in 'The
Glass Mountain' (City Life), a story that again is interdictive of an established
story type but which uses this tactic to reveal the inadequacy of such narratives
for the postmodern condition. The story, composed of one hundred
consecutively numbered sentences, concerns the ascent of a glass mountain at
the top of which, it is said, there is a castle within which dwells 'a beautiful
enchanted symbol' (1970, 61). According to Lance Olsen, 'The Glass
Mountain' reworks an ancient Norse tale called 'The Princess on the Glass Hill'
(1991, 9), where, as that title suggests, it is a beautiful princess rather than a
symbol that is the object of attainment. Barthelme's revision of the tale involves
transplanting the glass mountain to the centre of New York City and having his
narrator ascend, through the cat-calls of his neighbours and acquaintances, with
the aid of a pair of plumber's mates—the sort of functional detail that establishes
the comic incongruity between the heraldic nature of the quest and its location in
a bustling, sceptical, materialistic metropolis.
On his way up the narrator relates the 'conventional means of attaining
the castle', as described in The Yellow Fairy Book, which involves being seized
by a giant eagle, circling the castle at a great height, then cutting the eagle's feet
off and dropping on to a balcony that gives access to the beautiful princess (ibid.
63-4). This fairy tale represents, as one would expect, the narrative model from
which the present story seeks to divert. And sure enough, as with many of the
short fictions we have examined, that subversion occurs at the point of closure in
the text:	 .
97. I approached the symbol, with its layers of meaning, but
when I touched it, it changed into only a beautiful princess.
98. I threw the beautiful princess headfirst down the mountain to
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99. Who could be relied upon to deal with her.
100.Nor are eagles plausible, not at all, not for a moment.
(ibid. 64-5)
The destitution of myth here takes the form of an 'abuse' rather than a 'reuse' of
the classical situation and turns the story, one critic has said, into 'a parable
about the destruction of the transcendental signified which the princess
symbolizes' (Olsen 1991, 9-10). I would agree with this summary but again
would emphasize the ways in which the text is exploiting the strategies and
structures of interrogative short fiction to achieve its effect. The summoning of a
classical story pattern and the interdiction of it at the point of closure is a
defining technique of the modernist short story, but more important still is the
way in which this formal gesture reflects the 'destruction' that Olsen is
describing. The enchanting symbol, with its layers of possible meaning, changes
into only a princess at the end; in other words, the symbol becomes simply a
sign, a distinction that is spelled out earlier in the story:
71. "The conventional symbol (such as the nightingale, often
associated with melancholy), even though it is recognized only
through agreement, is not a sign (like the traffic light) because,
again, it presumably arouses deep feelings and is regarded as
possessing properties beyond what the eye alone sees" (A
Dictionary of Literary Terms)
72. A number of nightingales with traffic lights tied to their legs
flew past me (1970, 63)
The debunking of the literary symbol here is achieved by reaffirming the valency
of the sign. In Robbe-Gnllet's terms we are returned to the plural 'present', the
'surface', of these textual details, as we are at the end of the story where the
quest for the transcendental symbol turns up only a sign, a princess. The text is,
as Olsen says, about the impotence of traditional symbolic narrative in dealing
with the postmodern condition, but it achieves this by virtue of an interdictive
short story structure which, like so many of the modernist texts we have
examined, acts to repel our efforts to determine significance. The anti-
teleological nature of the form affirms this refusal to pass from statement to
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language to expression, from units to continuities, is interdicted. in Barthelme's
story the very destitution that is his subject is enacted in the interrogative form
itself.
Thomas M. Leitch has made the valuable point that the anti-teleological
nature of Barthelme's fiction is more than just a case of 'declining to provide an
ending'; rather, it is a matter of his preferring 'forms that do not commit him
even to the idea of an ending' (1982, 136). Hence the dialogue stories, such as
'The Explanation' (City Life 1970), 'The Reference' (Amateurs, 1977), 'Wrack'
(Overnight to Many Distant Cities, 1983) and many of the pieces in Great Days
(1979), in which two voices are presented without any narrative mediation or
developmental structure. Other stories, Leitch point out, are based on self-
cancelling premises, such as 'On Angels' (City Lift) whose first sentence, 'The
death of God left the angels in a strange position', Leitch says 'depriv[es] angels
of any possible meaning, reduces.. .them to the status of pure phenomenon: a
narrative presence which by its very nature can imply no teleology and indeed no
significance' (1982, 136).
Although he does not recognize any connection between Barthelme's
practice and that of his modernist precursors (indeed, he claims for
Hemingway's short fiction a unifying 'telos...of revelation (ibid. 135)), the value
of Leitch's essay lies in the careful distinction it makes between fictions which
are interdictive solely of expectations of closure, such as we find in Joyce and
Hemingway, and texts like 'On Angels' which make 'no commitments to an
end' at any level in their discourse (ibid. 137). Because of his lack of
discrimination concerning the modernist short story, however, Leitch does not
see Barthelme's anti-teleological strategies as characteristic of the form in which
he is working; indeed, he considers Barthelme's work to be a decisive break with
the ultimately unified modernist text. I would argue that rather than constituting
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work can be read as extending its elliptical, interrogative and interdictive
narrative strategies to the ontological plane. As with the modernist writers, what
I have been seeking is a definition of Barthelme's stories in which their shortness
is recognized as, in Elizabeth Bowen's phrase, a 'positive quality'; a definition
which clarifies the connection between the short form and the concerns of
postmodernism.
In his essay 'Not-Knowing' (1985), Barthelme makes clear his
preference for forms which do not 'commit' him, as Leitch puts it, to the kind of
teleological structuration that fixes 'meaning' in acts of 'signification' and states
his opposition to critics whose readings impose that kind of determinacy:
I would argue that in the competing methodologies of
contemporary criticism, many of them quite rich in implications,
a sort of tyranny of great expectations obtains, a rage for final
explanations, a refusal to allow a work the mystery that is
essential to it. I hope I am not myself engaging in mystification
if I say simply that the mystery exists, not that the attempt
should not be made to penetrate it. I see no immediate way out
of the paradox—tear a mystery to tatters and you have tatters, not
mystery—merely note it and pass on. (1985, 45-6)
Barthelme's rhetoric here resembles Barthes' (indeed Barthes is cited in the
essay) when he asks that criticism be driven not by the quest for some 'theology'
of the text but by a desire fully to recognize 'what plural constitutes it'. As we
have seen, modernist short fiction's interrogative quality demands this kind of
critical approach and I think it is not coincidental that Barthelme should have
favoured the form in the way he did.
The condition of 'not-knowing' Barthelme insists on in this essay—both
from the writer and the critic—is further exemplified in 'The Balloon'
(Unspeakable Practices, Unnatural Acts, 1969). The story concerns the inflation
by the narrator of a huge balloon over the city in which he lives and the efforts
made by his fellow citizens to identify its meaning or purpose. Ultimately these
efforts have to give way to a recognition of the balloon's elusiveness, the fact
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admired about the balloon was finally this: that it was not limited, or defined'
(1969, 21).
• Now, it is easy to see the balloon as a symbol of a kind of art which
resists absolute interpretation, which can host any number of understandings.
And indeed, that is how the story has usually been taken, as the expression of an
aesthetic ideal: 'the art object which defies meaning, which cannot be said to be
about anything' (Maltby 1991, 44)•6 Barthelme himself seems to encourage this
allegorical reading with his summaries of the critical reception of the balloon:
Because we had hidden the pumps, which fed helium to the
interior, and because the surface was so vast that the authorities
could not determine the point of entry—that is, the point at which
the gas was injected—a degree of frustration was evidenced by
those city officers into whose province such manifestations
normally fell. The apparent purposelessness of the ballon was
vexing (as was the fact that it was "there" at all). Had we
painted, in great letters, "LABORATORY TESTS PROVE" or
"18° o MORE EFFECTIVE" on the sides of the balloon, this
difficulty would have been circumvented (ibid, 17-18)
The 'concrete' particularity of the balloon (text or art object), its presence as 'an
itself', cannot be tolerated by the critical intelligence which insists on locating a
point of entry, an origin, a limit, an explanation of purpose that can contain the
proteiform balloon (text or art object) within its own reifying discourse. So the
allegorical reading goes.
What I find interesting here is that to read the story as being about not
imposing allegorical meanings on art objects involves reading it allegorically,
i.e., refusing to accept the balloon as 'an itself', seeing it as a symbol of
something else. To understand this story as being about the ultimate
intractability of art objects to determinate meaning involves us in the imposition
of a determinate meaning on it. And I think this is Barthelme's point—he is
6 Maltby, it should be noted, is opposed to the ubiquity of the 'neo-formalist'
approach he describes here and in his own reading places the story 'within a
broader socio-political framework' (1991, 45)
210directing our attention to the persistence of our efforts as readers to fix
significance, even as we are congratulating ourselves on our recognition of the
indeterminacy of the text before us I think in many ways this exemplifies (here
we go again) the difficulties we have encountered throughout this thesis in
readings of modernist short fiction. The interdictive, interstitial nature of the
form means that we are forced, as with Barthelme's balloon, to recognize its
plural constitution and to reject as reductive the determinate reading. Modernist
short fiction removes the very onentational material we require to reach finality
in our interpretations—that is its defining characteristic. 'The Balloon'
embodies the theoretical position necessary for an understanding of the 'positive
shortness' of the form which it is itself an instance of. Like the balloon it
describes, 'The Balloon' is proteiform, indefinite, dirigible.
'The Balloon' exemplifies Barthelme's recognition (set out in 'Not-
Knowing) that the value of any object lies in the fact that it 'at once invites and
resists interpretation' (1985, 46). It is significant, I think, that Barthelme's
chosen form for the conveyance of his objects—interrogative short fiction—
itself invites 'objectification' rather than interpretation on the part of the literary
critic. Certainly, such is the position required of us in relation to a story like
'The Indian Uprising' (Unspeakable Practice, Unnatural Acts), as McHale and
Ron (1991) make clear in their protracted readings and re-readings of this text.
Initially unwilling to 'follow the recipe for poststructuraiist reading' (1991, 51)
that would result in testifying to the text's undecidable meaning, these two critics
at first attempted to exact a determinate interpretation of Barthelme' s story.
However, what they found was that their reading very quickly ran into 'more or
less intractable difficulties' (ibid. 56).
The problems McHale and Ron encountered all arose from the contrary
signals that Barthelme's text gives out. A salient example is the paradoxical
colour designations in the story. Blue, for instance, is at first associated with the
211invading Comanches in that the women sympathing with them wear blue
mufflers. Later, green becomes attached to those defending the city. However,
when the narrator and his Comanche-sympathizing girlfriend Sylvia look at a
map of the progress of the uprising he says to her, 'Your parts are green' (1969,
7). McHale and Ron are forced to conclude that the 'system of color-coding
collapses into self-contradiction' (1991, 60).
The same process occurred for the critics on the other levels on which
they sought to fix the story's sense. For instance, the cultural-historical pattern
they established in which the defenders are associated with a 'high-modernist'
allusive discourse and the Comanches with a deconstructive 'postmodernist' one
(ibid, 55-6). However, this coherence is broken down when, for example, one of
the captured Comanches cites Thomas Mann and speaks like the embodiment of
'Aschenbach's respectable professional-class forbears' (ibid. 61). Even within
the various narrative levels McHale and Ron identify problems arise through the
lack of any narratorial mediation. The technique ofjuxtaposition in the story's
discourse left them uncertain 'whether successive sequences could be integrated
in the same "situation", or even the same world, and if so, how' (ibid. 57).
McHale and Ron's grudging conclusion about 'The Indian Uprising' is
that the text is ultimately indeterminate. In many ways their experience of
reading it exemplifies the process of my thesis as a whole. I have attempted to
subject critical interpretations to interrogative short fictions in order first of all to
prove the insufficiency of these readings, and then to identify this insufficiency
as the desired and desirable aesthetic of a form premised on the displacement of
the 'determinate' by the 'interrogative'. It is not incidental that McHale and Ron
feel that this story 'recoils' upon its readers (ibid. 63)—that, as we have seen, is
a condition of the interrogative. I do not, furthermore, believe that this means
we have succumbed to the 'poststructuralist recipe reading'  (ibid) that these two
critics are so keen to avoid. The generic framework of the short story allows us
212to understand the text's indeterminacy as arising from certain narrative
techniques of reticence, occlusion and interdiction—all of which are evident in
Barthelme's story, particularly in its unmediated juxtapositions. Like Beckett,
Barthelme returns us to words as monads, preventing their absorption into a
continuous, teleological expressiveness. Blue is blue in 'The Indian Uprising',
just as for Beckett white is white; the word is 'an itself'. Indeed, as Miss R. in
Barthelme's story says, 'I hold to the hard, brown, nutlike word' (1969, 9).
Rather than fear, as McHale and Ron do, that stating indeterminacy leaves us
with an undifferentiated notion of textual practice, we can understand that it is
the inevitable product of a form that seeks always to retard our progress from the
word to what the word means.
As a last word, and marking my own susceptibility to closure, I should
like to address a prophecy of Saul Bellow's, made in support of his own late
engagement with short forms. Bellow has, of course, written stories throughout
his career, but it is only recently that he has begun to argue that they may
represent the nonpareil form of the future. The reason for this, Bellow suggests,
is that the modern consciousness is 'perilously overloaded' (1993, viii),
inundated with information and opinion. Every channel is open. Faced with this
the writer must compete for attention, but he will have to recognize, says Bellow,
that the contemporary mind is distracted, abused:
The reader will open his heart and mind to a writer who has
understood this—has understood because in his person he has
gone through it all, has experienced the same privations; who
knows where the sore spots are.. .Such a writer will trouble no
one with his own vanities, will make no unnecessary gestures,
indulge himself in no mannerisms, waste no reader's time. He
will write as short as he can (ibid, x).
For many, Bellow's words here will seem capitulatory, a suggestion that the
writer must narrow his compass to suit an age in which there is little room to
move. However, I would like to suggest that he might equally be voicing a
213recognition of what it is possible to do in short narrative forms. For Bellow does
not for a moment suggest that there is less to say or that we should aim to say
less. Rather, he seems to me to be arguing for precisely the connection between
brevity of utterance and multiplicity of meaning that I have been concerned to
identify in this thesis. The interrogative short form's discrepancy of extent—its
ability to generate amplitudes from economies—may be what Bellow is seeking.
In which case he aligns himself with all those writers I have studied here for
whom shortness was a positive quality.
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